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Abstract
This thesis addresses the validity of the Contingent Valuation (CV) methodology. 
Unlike conventional economic approaches, this is based on stated preferences in 
hypothetical market scenarios and is used in attempts to estimate economic benefits of 
non-marketed public goods, most notably natural resources. However, the methodology 
is not without controversy and many researchers question people’s ability to provide 
valid economic values for environmental amenities in these contexts. The present 
research applies a psychological perspective to this area, and hence adopts a different 
approach than mainstream work in the field that has traditionally been more concerned 
with methodological procedures and how well data fit with economic theory. The first 
section presents the rationale of the CV methodology and reviews a number of 
conceptual problems and empirical anomalies that have been demonstrated across 
studies and contexts. It sets these within a theoretical framework that, it is envisaged, 
will contribute to our understanding of people’s responses to CV questions.
In the empirical section a number of hypotheses derived from this theorising are tested. 
The results indicate that statements of economic value, particularly for complex 
amenities, are unresponsive to the magnitude or importance of the resource being 
valued. Some people also tend to provide, often seemingly ‘reasonable’ responses, 
irrespective of their ambivalence toward the valuation procedure. It is further 
demonstrated that there is a high degree of uncertainty involved in reported economic 
value, indicating that CV responses are quite imprecise representations of underlying 
preferences. Finally, hypothetical willingness to pay are shown to be a poor indicator of 
real economic commitments, resulting partly from the self-image people strive to 
achieve in these contexts, particularly when choices appear inconsequential. The major 
conclusions of the thesis are that responses in CV studies to a large extent are motivated 
by expressive rather than instrumental considerations, that respondents’ interpretations 
of the valuation task do not always correspond with the intention by the researcher, and 
that situational and contextual factors have important implications for the assessment of 
environmental benefits.
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Overview of Thesis
In environmental economics there has been an increasing interest over the last decade in 
order to assign economic values to natural resources. The argument is that 
environmental policy-decisions will be better informed if the ‘economic’ benefits 
accrued to these resources are compared to their costs of provision. This has lead 
economists to seek and develop methodologies that are capable of measuring citizens’ 
Willingness To Pay (WTP) for a variety of amenities, such as air quality, wildlife and 
recreation sites. By far the most popular approach of economic benefit estimation is the 
Contingent Valuation Method (CVM), which deduce economic value of a particular 
amenity on the basis of respondents’ WTP statements in hypothetical market scenarios. 
It thus facilitates a valuation of non-marketed goods, and has the advantage of also 
including benefits that extend beyond a use of the resource. The first attempt to assign 
economic values to natural resources through the CVM dates back to the early 1960’s, 
but its popularity did not take off until the late 1980’s, spawned by the investigation of 
lost passive use-values resulting from the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. In the same 
year the methodology was acknowledged by U.S. courts as a legitimate basis for 
assessing natural resource damage liabilities (Mitchell and Carson, 1989).
Notwithstanding its potential merits, the CVM has encountered widespread criticism 
(e.g., Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992; Diamond andHausman, 1994; Vatn and Bromley, 
1994; Blarney, 1998; Kahneman et al., 1999), and the frequent use of the method has 
given rise to a vehement debate that exceeds most other controversy in social research. 
Scepticism, both within the economic profession and in other branches of social 
science, is maintained by a variety of anomalies that have been demonstrated in 
empirical research. Many of these were realised in early research, which was attentive 
to problems such as strategic behaviour, anchoring effects, sponsor bias, hypothetical 
bias, etc. The main concern among Contingent Valuation (CV) practitioners was 
therefore how these could be overcome by methodological refinements, because “if the 
CV study is well designed and carefully pre-tested, the respondents’ answers to the 
valuation questions should represent valid Willingness To Pay (WTP) responses” 
(Mitchell and Carson, 1989; p. 3). However, a large body of research has challenged the
11
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assertion that the failure to assess valid and consistent welfare estimates is mainly due 
to flawed methodological procedures. The central theme of this objection is that CV 
responses may not be anchored in economic preferences, and as such represent 
something different than economic value. Thus, this perspective entails a shift in focus 
from methodological concerns to the basic nature of stated economic value.
Unfortunately, this interest in examining whether data corresponds to the intended 
theoretical construct is yet to be fully integrated with mainstream research on CVM, and 
too often, the fundamental problems of preference assessment are neglected by CV 
practitioners Attending a conference-session on CVM today one is more likely to see 
presentations revolving around statistical analysis and technicalities of established 
methodological procedures, with no serious attempts to scrutinise the essence of 
economic values in these contexts. The aim of this thesis is to renew the debate 
regarding what people’s responses in CV studies really involve. It adopts a perspective 
that facilitates an investigation of the extent to which statements of economic value are 
‘intuitively plausible’, and conducts empirical research on the validity of the underlying 
value construct. A key starting-point of the thesis is that, before we ask how much 
citizens value environmental resources, we ought to ask how and why they provide 
economic values for these in hypothetical market scenarios. Thus, emphasis is placed on 
the content validity of CVM and other Stated Preference Methods (SPMs), with the 
objective of investigating widely overlooked, yet important issues that, it is envisaged, 
will enhance our understanding of economic value in these contexts.
In chapter one the objectives and perspectives of the present research are presented. A 
brief history of monetary valuation of environmental resources is provided, along with a 
summary of valuation techniques in general and CVM in particular. This includes a 
description of the procedures of a standard CV study and those of alternative 
approaches to benefit estimation that will be applied throughout the thesis. The chapter 
also sets out the theoretical framework of the estimation of welfare effects associated 
with public goods. Chapter two presents a state-of-the-art survey of conceptual 
problems and sources of bias of the CVM. It reviews empirically based criticism and 
theoretical objections that have been put forward against a monetary valuation of non­
marketed goods, in particular natural resources. The text naturally focuses on the CVM
12
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and provides a discussion about its feasibility and appropriateness. On the basis of this, 
relevant aspects of validity that set the agenda for later chapters are put forward.
Chapter three presents the theoretical underpinnings, both from an economist’s and a 
social psychologist’s perspective, relating to anomalies of preference formation and 
decision-making. Hence, a more in-depth analysis of the conceptual problems and 
sources of bias presented in chapter two is set out here. The chapter is divided into two 
parts. In the first, axioms of standard economic theory are presented, including a review 
of empirical findings that challenge specific assumptions of the dominant theory. 
Additionally, it illuminates the research paradigm in economics that has given rise to 
these assumptions, whereby the aim is to make their foundations more explicit. On the 
basis of this, the second part of the chapter aims to put the CVM in a broader context by 
incorporating insights from other areas of research. It offers an account of how 
alternative perspectives from psychology and social psychology are likely to result in 
different approaches to testing the validity of CV responses, and that ultimately may 
improve our understanding of economic values in these contexts. Cognitive, affective 
and contextual processes of survey measurement and human decision-making are 
explored in this section.
The remaining part of the thesis presents the findings of four separate, but theoretically 
linked, case studies. The first, presented in chapter four, examines the internal 
consistency of WTP estimates, investigating if and to what extent stated values are 
responsive to the scope {i.e., magnitude, urgency or importance) of the environmental 
problem. It further addresses if the WTP for one particular amenity varies with how 
many other public goods are included in the valuation scenario and valued 
simultaneously. The study originates from a considerable body of research that has 
specifically examined these issues (e.g., Desvousges et al., 1993; Hoevenagel, 1996), 
but which has failed to provide a conclusion about the matter due to different views 
among advocates and critics of the methodology regarding what constitutes a ‘proper’ 
CV design. Whereas studies demonstrating insensitivity to scope and ‘part-whole’ 
effects have been criticised for flawed methodological procedures and for not following 
established guidelines for CV studies, those suggesting that respondents are capable of 
providing valid responses have most commonly relied on tests that are considered
13
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insufficient or inappropriate. This study relies on a design similar to a typical CV study, 
and employs experimental procedures that minimise the influence of external factors. It 
thus aims to constructively contribute to the debate on whether these effects are 
behavioural regularities, or if they may be overcome by an improved survey design.
The empirical approach in chapter five builds on the findings of the former and 
performs a qualitative analysis of people’s thought-processes when confronted with a 
CV questionnaire. The objective is to reveal the strategies used by lay people when 
assigning economic values to global environmental resources, and to investigate if these 
correspond to rational models of economic behaviour. It is based on the findings by 
Schkade and Payne (1994) and Vadnjal and O'Connor (1994) who show that CV 
respondents are quite unresponsive to factors that ought to be relevant according to 
these models, but tend to be largely influenced by irrelevant considerations. Apart from 
merely taking notice of these results, the present study carefully examines the basis and 
motivations of WTP. An indication will implicitly be provided of whether the public 
understand and comply with the principles of an economic valuation of natural 
resources, and if economic values in these contexts are pre-defined concepts, or if 
people construct their preferences at the time of being interviewed. It argues that WTP 
assessed in CV studies should not be taken at face value since respondents’ 
interpretation of the valuation question may be radically different from that of the 
researcher.
Chapter six presents the results of a study that focuses on the respondents’ uncertainty 
when faced with a CV question. The ambivalence over trade-offs between money and 
environmental changes that the respondent feels has been analysed by Dubourg et al. 
(1994), Gregory et al. (1995), Ready et al. (1995), and Ready et al., (1999). A general 
conclusion of these papers is that people only have a vague idea as to within which 
range their WTP is situated, which leads to imprecise estimates. However, previous 
research has not investigated to what extent varying conditions and contexts of 
valuation are responsible for such imprecise representations of economic value. Here a 
more inclusive response format is introduced in which the respondents express attitudes 
toward multiple dimensions of the public good, rather than only stating their support 
through a single measure embodied in WTP. Furthermore, in one setting respondents
14
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are given extra time to think about the valuation issue before a response is elicited, 
which may facilitate important social processes of opinion formation. Overall, the study 
provides specific tests in order to understand how various response formats and 
contextual factors contribute to the preciseness of WTP in CV studies.
The last empirical study, presented in chapter seven, employs a choice experiment in 
order to estimate the economic value of selected environmental issues. The rationale is 
to investigate whether, as argued by various researchers (e.g., Hanley et al., 1998; 
Carlsson and Martinsson, 2001), this alternative approach to benefit estimation 
generates more valid responses, or if these are likely to suffer from the same limitations 
as the CVM. In particular, the experiment examines the correspondence between 
hypothetical and real WTP. Previous studies indicate that CV responses are poor 
indicators of real WTP, although no unambiguous conclusion can be drawn from these, 
partly due to different characters of the good being valued and varying methodological 
designs across studies. The experiment uses a public good, and is designed in order to 
investigate whether respondents try to act in an internally consistent way when 
expressing both hypothetical and real WTP in subsequent order. By using a split-sample 
design, a tool is provided to test the impact of self-image and cognitive dissonance in 
these contexts, which will indicate whether within-subject tests are appropriate ways of 
testing for various anomalies. An underlying aim of the study is also to assess the 
impact of the financial incentives introduced in the experiment.
Chapter eight provides the overall conclusions of the thesis, where the results of 
separate empirical studies are summarised. On the basis of what has been found, 
implications for the current and future application of the CVM are discussed. The 
discussion centres on the possibility and limitations of assigning economic values to 
non-marketed environmental resources, and to what extent alternative theoretical 
perspectives and notions, most notably from social psychology, may contribute to our 
understanding of observed anomalies and problems with the methodology. The thesis 
concludes by suggesting some directions for future research in the area, addressing both 
the current methodology and alternative valuation approaches.
15
1. Introduction
"What is a cynic? A man who knows the price o f everything and the value o f nothing”
(Oscar Wilde)
Over the last decade monetary valuation of environmental resources has become a 
common practice in the field of environmental economics. Innumerable attempts at 
making economic impact analyses of environmental deterioration and improvement 
have been made in order to inform policy decisions, and by far the most popular 
approach of benefit estimation is the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM). This is a 
survey- or interview-based technique by which respondents are posed Willingness To 
Pay (WTP) questions for environmental amenities in hypothetical market scenarios. 
Hence, the approach enables an economic valuation of non-marketed public goods and 
services. On the basis of the results from Contingent Valuation (CV) studies, the 
prospects of environmental preservation are indeed promising; relatively large WTP 
amounts have been demonstrated for preserving various types of environmental 
resources in a variety of contexts (e.g., Mitchell and Carson, 1989; Carson et al., 1992; 
Kramer and Mercer, 1992).
However, the CVM has encountered strong criticism (e.g., Kahneman and Knetsch, 
1992; Diamond and Hausman, 1994; Vatn and Bromley, 1994; Fischhoff, 1997; 
Blarney, 1998), and the frequent use of the method has given rise to a heated debate 
among researchers in various fields. The scepticism, both within the economic 
profession and in other branches of social science, is maintained by the variety of 
anomalies and biases that potentially pose a threat to the validity of the methodology. In 
early CV research the main concern was that respondents would act strategically in 
hypothetical survey contexts in accordance with Samuelson's (1954) exposition of the 
‘free-rider* problem, but more recently the critique has focused on a variety of other 
sorts of problems that represent more fundamental difficulties. Some of these are 
common for many types of measurement in social research (e.g., anchoring, order 
effects, compliance, context and framing-effects), whereas others are more specific to 
the CVM. For example, WTP estimates assessed through hypothetical markets have
16
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been indicated to be insufficiently associated with the specific characteristics of the 
resource (Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992), assessed economic values are conditioned by 
the suggested payment scheme (Mitchell and Carson, 1989) and depend on whether the 
environmental change is pictured as a loss or a gain (Diamond et al., 1993), and 
hypothetical statements seem to correspond poorly with real economic commitments 
(Seip and Strand, 1992; Neill et al., 1994).
1.1. Objectives and Structure of Thesis
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the Validity of WTP estimates derived from 
hypothetical market scenarios, particularly the CVM. It adopts a social psychological 
perspective to address some key aspects of economic value assessment that have been 
widely overlooked in the CV literature. In addition to conducting quantitative analyses 
of some conceptually important anomalies, focus will also be placed on whether 
statements of economic value in these contexts are plausible, which includes an 
examination of whether these correspond to the underlying theoretical construct. Thus, I 
will not merely investigate the predictive quality of WTP responses, but also illuminate 
their motivational basis, which hopefully will provide insights into the possibility of 
assigning economic values to complex non-marketed public goods.
A tremendous amount of work has been devoted to the CVM throughout the last 
decades, covering a whole range of topics, but although there are a number of examples 
that have been more concerned with the foundations of CV results (e.g., Anderson, 
1993; Diamond and Hausman, 1993; Sagoff, 1994; Barry, 1995; Arrow, 1997), insights 
from and perspectives among these efforts have not been fully intertwined with 
mainstream research in the area. Consequently, the overwhelming majority of CV 
papers have either solely dealt with rather specific and technical methodological issues, 
such as optimal bid-design, theoretical justifications of substitution and income effects, 
the development of sophisticated econometric models, etc., or have on other occasions 
been written purely from an economist’s perspective, pertaining to theoretical 
underpinnings of neo-classical economic theory. This thesis attempts to address some, I 
will argue, of the more fundamental issues that lay the foundation of CVM. This 
endeavour evolves to questions of the following character:
17
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• What motivates people in their responses to CV studies?
• Do they adequately understand the valuation procedure, or how do they otherwise 
make sense of this?
• Are respondents committed to their stated WTP, and do hypothetical statements 
correspond with actual (economic) behaviour?
• To what extent is value assessment determined by situational and contextual factors?
I believe that answers to such questions are crucial for the future application of the 
CVM. They address the core question of whether more valid responses can be elicited 
by improving the methodology, or if observed anomalies are behavioural regularities, 
thereby implying that hypothetical value assessments of environmental resources are 
‘inherently’ flawed. Put in other words, before asking how much citizens are willing to 
pay for environmental improvements, we need an answer to how and why people value 
these, because only then is it possible to judge on what occasions and in what contexts 
CVM may be applied, how the methodology can be improved, or if economic value, 
given that it exists in the minds of people, could be better captured by alternative but 
conceptually similar methodologies.
As far as I am concerned, the mainstream research on CVM has to a large degree lost its 
relevance since, by and large, it tends to overlook such fundamental questions. In this 
respect there must be a greater willingness among CV practitioners to pay attention to 
factors traditionally viewed as outside the field of economics, since concepts such as 
altruism, socialisation and political action may not be adequately understood within the 
standard economic framework. If we do not understand the basis of the values people 
hold toward the environment, and furthermore, if we do not seriously consider the social 
and psychological mechanisms underlying a monetary valuation in the CV context, the 
prospects of deriving ‘acceptable’ welfare estimates of such public goods are 
undermined. Rather than relying on misdirected attempts at developing sophisticated 
quantitative models and rigorous analytical tools in order to fit data with standard 
economic theory, we need to ask: Do we ask the right questions? Are our questions 
interpreted as intended by the respondents, and are they meaningful to people? Are the 
implied property rights plausible and likely to be accepted? Do the public perceive the 
relation between scarce environmental resources and market valuations in the same way
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as CV practitioners do? What is a relevant framework within which these questions 
should be analysed? The aim of this research is not necessarily to provide precise 
answers, but to clarify these and other relevant questions for the CVM.
The thesis is separated into eight chapters. In this first chapter, the history and rationale 
for economic valuation of environmental resources is provided, followed by a 
description of various approaches to benefit estimation, in particular the CVM. Chapter 
two provides a state-of-the-art survey of conceptual difficulties and various anomalies 
that have been discussed and demonstrated in previous research. In chapter three I will 
discuss the theoretical underpinnings, both from an economist’s and a social 
psychologist’s perspective, relating to anomalies of preference formation and economic 
decision-making. This is aimed to provide a framework for understanding the nature of 
hypothetical value statements, and it thus constitutes a theoretical background for the 
empirical research in this thesis.
The remaining part presents the findings of four separate but for the purpose of this 
thesis coherent case studies. The first of these examines if and to what extent stated 
economic value is responsive to the scope (i.e., magnitude, severity or importance) of 
the environmental problem, and whether WTP depends on how many other resources 
are valued simultaneously. The second study builds on the former and performs a 
qualitative analysis of people’s thought processes when presented with a valuation 
scenario. It aims at revealing how people make sense of CV questions, the strategies 
they use in order to assign economic values, and whether these correspond to the 
assumptions of standard economic theory. The third study captures the uncertainty 
people feel when providing their responses, and how this varies with various contextual 
factors of valuation. In particular, it addresses the role of social processes in value 
formation. In the final empirical study, an alternative approach to CVM is applied in 
order to examine the correspondence between hypothetical statements and actual 
monetary payments. Chapter eight presents the conclusions of the thesis. In addition to 
summarise the findings of each empirical chapter, it discusses the implications of this 
research regarding the possibility and limitations of environmental benefit estimation, 
and suggests some future avenues of research in the field.
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1.2. Economic Valuation of Natural Resources
The public’s concern for the natural environment has evidently increased over the last 
decades, arising from awareness of the side effects resulting form the development of 
the modem industrial welfare state. Today, the support for increased efforts at reducing 
pollution, along with a more sustainable approach to the use of natural resources, have 
become settled and widely shared, at least in the Western world, although the trend is 
cyclical according to economic fluctuations and does not rank highest among public 
concerns (Department of the Environment, 1992; Ladd and Bowman, 1996; Office for 
National Statistics, 1998).
However, our commitment to a cleaner and safer environment is not unproblematic. 
Although public opinion is arguably legitimate and, at least to some extent, must be 
taken into account in environmental policy-making, the matter is far more complicated 
than that. Firstly, in a number of cases the environmental effects and consequences are 
not clear-cut, leading to disagreements in the natural and medical sciences. Secondly, in 
the light of finite (public) resources and reluctant taxpayers, some difficult policy 
questions inevitably arise as the costs of accomplishing various environmental 
improvements are realised. For example, how much should be spent on cleaning up the 
North Sea? To what extent should we increase the safety standards for nuclear power 
plants in order to reduce the risk of future radioactive catastrophes? Should we have car- 
tolls in major cities, and if so, what would be an adequate fee? How high a level of 
impurity should we tolerate in our drinking water? Are we willing to make the trade-off 
between the construction of a hydroelectric power plant and higher electricity bills? By 
reflecting over comparable issues, the question of how much resources society should 
allocate to these and similar problems is not entirely clear. The allocation problem is 
further reinforced by the fact that we may not only want to consider our own well-being, 
but also incorporate that of future generations; what weight should we give to our 
descendants, and how far into the future could the analysis reasonably be extended? 
Similarly, to what extent and how should non-human welfare be accounted for?
The core logic in economics is that public goods, such as environmental amenities, 
should be judged on the basis of the costs and benefits related to their provision.
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According to principles of Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), whenever the sum of benefits 
across all involved agents exceeds the aggregated costs, it would be economically 
worthwhile to provide the good. In addition to the weighting of costs and benefits in 
order to make environmental decisions, in many cases values are estimated in order to 
form a basis for subsequent actual payments. For example, licence-fees for fishing may 
be introduced to cover the estimated costs for a decrease of the fishing stock that this is 
causing, a higher charge for environmentally unfriendly activities creates an incentive 
for people to reduce such, and compensation may be paid to people who live nearby or 
enjoy the benefits of a recreational area that is diminished due to urban development.
As a result of these objectives, the last decades have witnessed the development of 
various environmental valuation techniques in order to facilitate an economic impact 
analysis of environmental improvements and deterioration. Unfortunately, such attempts 
are rarely without pragmatic difficulties. There are few endeavours more difficult than 
estimating the cost of the environmental damage caused by a run-a-ground tanker, the 
value of the establishment of a national park, or the preservation of a species on the 
verge of extinction, simply because no markets exist for these resources. In economics, 
welfare estimates are normally based on how much people pay for goods and services 
routinely bought and sold on markets, but for these kinds of environmental amenities, 
either there is no charge, or this would not be feasibly implemented due to their public 
character.1 This has lead economists to search for new methodological approaches for
1 Public goods differ from private goods in that they are characterised by the conditions of non­
excludability and non-rivalry between people who wish to use the good. A good is non-excludable if 
other individuals cannot be excluded from consuming it, whereas non-rivalry is defined as the case 
when one person’s consumption o f the good does not reduce the amount available to others. Examples 
of pure public goods are streetlights, police, national defence, clean air, etc. There are also many in- 
between cases. Take for instance cable TV broadcasting, which is a non-rival good since one person's 
consumption does not reduce the consumption possibilities of other people. On the other hand, it is 
excludable in the sense that people who do not have a decoder will not have access to the broadcast. 
These types of goods are commonly called club goods. There are also goods that are rival but not 
excludable, for instance highways; anyone, assuming no car tolls exist, can use this, but heavy traffic 
reduces the space available to other motorists. Finally, some kinds of goods are essentially private in 
their character but are provided for publicly (e.g., education) (Varian, 1992).
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estimating the willingness among the public to sacrifice other consumption 
opportunities in the trade-off with improved (or unaltered) environmental quality.
1.3. The Contingent Valuation Method
The CVM relies on surveys or in-person interviews in order to elicit people’s 
preferences when markets are absent, imperfect or incomplete. Preferences are assessed 
simply by asking for either people’s Willingness to Pay (WTP) for an improvement, or 
their desired compensation for a deterioration of a specific amenity. The latter is termed 
Willingness to Accept (WTA), but more correctly refers to the compensation people 
require, rather than the compensation people would accept, for a deterioration of a 
resource. The social welfare effect is then estimated as the total sum of WTP (or WTA) 
across all individuals that have an interest in or somehow derive a benefit from the 
amenity. The term contingent valuation derives from the fact that estimates are 
contingent upon the hypothetical market presented to the respondents. Furthermore, its 
is conditioned by what is specified in the valuation scenario in terms of involved 
environmental changes, which may be varied according to the extent and character of 
future policy interventions.
The application of Contingent Valuation (CV) studies has increased dramatically over 
the last decade, and an inventory made by Carson et al. (1996b) comprises more than 
2,000 studies, ranging from attempts to estimate the economic value of a wide variety of 
environmental services, to papers mainly concerned with theoretical and methodological 
issues.2 The methodology dates back to the early 1960’s when Robert K. Davis used 
surveys in order to estimate the benefits of outdoor recreation in Maine (Mitchell and 
Carson, 1989). However, its popularity did not take only off until the late 1980’s, 
spawned by the investigation of lost passive use-values resulting from the Exxon Valdez 
oil spill in Alaska, estimated to the staggering sum of 2.8 billion dollars over the whole
2
Apart from environmental resources, the CV method has been applied in attempts to value various other 
public and quasi-public goods, such as cultural heritage (Hansen, 1997), road safety (Dubourg et al., 
1994), and health issues (Propper, 1990).
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population in the United States (Carson et a l , 1992).3 In the same year the methodology 
was acknowledged by U.S. courts as a legitimate basis for natural resource damage 
liabilities (Mitchell and Carson, 1989).4 As mentioned previously, in many cases there 
is thus an underlying aim to introduce fees or pay compensation on the basis of CV 
results. Table 1.1. illustrates some examples of CV studies applied to various 
environmental resources.
Table 1.1. Examples of conducted CV studies (WTP implies a one-time fee unless stated)
Authors Type of environmental amenity Average WTP
(Bishop and Heberlein, 1979) Goose hunting permits $21/permit
(Whittington etal., 1990) Improved drinking-water facilities in rural Haiti $ 1.3/month
(Strand and Taraldset, 1991) 50% reduction of air-pollution in Norway $ 18-37/month
(Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992) Replantation of trees in cutover areas, Western Canada $55
(Seip and Strand, 1992) Membership in an environmental organisation $24-31/year
(Desvousges etal., 1993) Protection of migratory-waterfowls; 2000-200000 birds $78-88/year
(Neill etal., 1994) Preventing the extinction of the Colorado Squawfish $26-44
(Ready etal., 1995) Wetland preservation $1.3-30.2
(Hoevenagel, 1996) Prevention of the greenhouse effect $ 12-26/month
(Schulze et al., 1996) Improved visibility in three U.S. national parks $8.50/month
3
In this study, which is possibly the most cited CV study of lost passive use values, a median WTP of 
$31 was estimated among the interviewed respondents (Carson et al., 1992). In another study about rain 
forests, people were on average willing to pay between $24 to $31, depending on the question format, 
for preserving 110 million hectares of tropical rain forests. Aggregating these amounts over the total 
number of households in the United States gives a total WTP of 2.18 and 2.82 billion dollars 
respectively (Kramer and Mercer, 1992).
Eventually, the environmental damage-suits brought forward by the federal state and the State of 
Alaska against Exxon settled at $ 1.15 billion, to be paid over a period of 11 years (Portney, 1994). The 
study resulted in a heated debate between researchers regarding the validity of the methodology, and as 
a consequence, the legitimacy of basing policy decisions and damage liabilities on hypothetical value 
statements.
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1.3.1. Structure o f a Contingent Valuation Questionnaire
A conventional CV questionnaire has three parts. Although the order of these differ 
across studies, most commonly, the first section is focused on views and opinions 
toward the environment in general, as well as items relating to the respondents’ attitudes 
and knowledge of the particular amenity that is to be valued. The main purpose of these 
questions (apart from illuminating the respondents’ use and experience of the good that 
can be valuable input to policy decisions) is to examine the link between WTP estimates 
and non-economic opinions, which sometimes are used in order to validate obtained 
results. A common assumption is that people who are generally concerned with 
environmental issues, and those who have a direct interest in the resource, are willing to 
pay more for this.
In the core section of the questionnaire, the respondents are presented a scenario in 
which the amenity, its character and terms of provision, are described. The hypothetical 
scenario that precedes the valuation question seeks to present sufficient information in 
order for the respondents to carefully consider their personal value of the proposed good 
or service. This value is subsequently captured by asking how much the respondents are 
willing to pay for the specific provision or improvement of the environmental service 
(or what they are willing to accept in compensation for a withdrawal or deterioration of 
the same), other things being equal. Some important information should be included in 
the valuation scenario:
• the good, its qualities and reliability
• when and under what conditions it will be provided
• the payment vehicle, that is, in what way respondents are supposed to pay for it
• who is responsible for providing and maintaining the resource
• how many other people are deriving benefits of the good and thus are involved in 
paying for it
There are principally two different ways of eliciting the economic value of the resource. 
An Open-Ended (OE) question asks ‘What is the maximum amount you are willing to 
pay for this environmental resource?’ or ‘How much would the proposed intervention
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be worth to you?’ A Closed-Ended (CE) format, on the other hand, suggests a price to 
be accepted or rejected by the respondents. This may take the form of a single 
Dichotomous Choice (DC) question in a referendum format where one specific amount 
is presented that the respondent is asked to accept or reject, or as Multiple Bounded 
(MB) questions, presented either in a step-wise process whereby the amount is 
increased or decreased depending on a yes or no answer to the preceding amount, or in 
some other manner. In these formats the respondents are presented a question similar to 
‘Are you willing to pay x dollars for the environmental service?’, or ‘Would you 
support the project if it would cost you x dollars?’5 The valuation procedure is in some 
cases aided by an array of questions or items, such as ‘Are you willing to economically 
support some or any of these initiatives?’, or, ‘Would you favour a public intervention 
of this kind, for example through higher taxes?’
The final section of the questionnaire contains a structured series of questions about 
respondents’ socio-economic and demographic characteristics, such as gender, age, 
income, educational background, etc. The aim is to trace the determinants of the 
dependent variable and evaluate whether these factors explain WTP according to 
theoretical assumptions, that is, are consistent with rational choice as postulated in 
standard economic theory, or do behave in some other logical manner. This information 
is later used as a means of examining the internal validity of stated WTP.
1.3.2. Guidelines and Recommendations for Conducting CV Studies
The status of the methodology was significantly enhanced by the commission of a state- 
of-the-art assessment in 1983 by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, which 
included a review-panel of a number of eminent economists and other social scientists. 
The overall conclusion of the panel was that the method is a promising tool for future
5 The Open-Ended format is sometimes supported by a ‘payment card’, which contains an array of 
numbers ranging from zero to a large amount. This could either be based on estimated values in a pre­
test, or some other relevant benchmark, such as the average household spending on public goods, in 
order to enrich the context o f the WTP question.
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welfare estimation of environmental goods and services, but some important challenges 
remain (Arrow et al., 1993). Therefore, future research on the CVM should be given 
highest priority, and today this assessment combined with later evaluations are 
summarised in the NOAA panel’s report on the CVM, which sets out the 
recommendations and guidelines on how to carry out a CV study (Arrow et al., 1993). 
Some of the most important of these are:
• CV studies should be conducted as in-person interviews rather than as telephone 
interviews or mail-surveys
• pre-testing of the questionnaire is essential and should include tests for interviewer 
effects and other biasing factors
• the scenario must accurately describe the environmental amenity in question, and 
the expected effects of the environmental change must be defined in a way that is 
relevant for damage assessment
• there should be an adequate time-lapse between the value assessment and the 
environmental damage or the project implementation
• a measure of WTP should be elicited instead of WTA
• the WTP question should be posed as a dichotomous choice question in a 
referendum context, rather than as an open-ended question
• respondents must be reminded of their budget constraint and possible substitutes of 
the environmental resource
• a ‘no-answer’ option should be explicitly allowed in addition to the ‘yes’/ ’no’ vote
• follow-up questions related to the WTP question and the overall understanding of 
the procedure should be asked
Apart from some general remarks on survey methodology, what these recommendations 
reflect is the establishment of a conservative design. The NOAA panel states that 
“generally, when aspects of the survey design and the analysis of responses are 
ambiguous, the option that tends to underestimate willingness to pay is preferred” 
(Arrow et a l , 1993; p. 4608). The major reason for this recommendation is to avoid the 
over-assessment of eventual damage liabilities that follow from CV-based welfare 
estimates.
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1.3.3. Advantages o f the Contingent Valuation Method
The CVM is located in the category of hypothetical/direct approaches to benefit 
estimation. Apart from the obvious advantage that it enables a monetary evaluation of 
non-marketed public goods and services, three important arguments are commonly put 
forward by proponents of the methodology. Firstly, economic value has the advantage 
of providing a relative measure of importance; monetary resources are limited, and 
therefore assumed to prevent an infinite assignment of importance that may result if 
other ratings and scales are used. It may further be considered as a widely familiar 
metric that does not need extensive explanation to the respondents. Thus, economic 
value is assumed to possess some desirable properties compared to, for instance, notions 
and scales of attitudes that are invented by the researcher, not necessarily with bearing 
in ordinary life, and hence which require additional information about their meanings 
and interpretation of relative importance.
Another advantage put forward is the flexibility of the direct hypothetical approach 
(Mitchell and Carson, 1989). The CV researcher can easily specify various states of the 
good to be valued and the conditions of its provision, and thereby estimate what type 
and extent of the environmental resource people want and do not want in the future. The 
approach hence allows ex-ante judgements of planned but not yet realised 
environmental projects. The resource can further be provided under ‘novel’ institutional 
arrangements. Alternative methodological approaches all rely on observed behaviour 
among people; either the preferences for the targeted commodity are derived from the 
effective demand for another good (implicit markets), or the measures need to be 
translated into monetary terms before they can be interpreted within an economic 
framework.6 CV studies measure benefits and consumer trade-offs directly in monetary 
terms. Thus no complicated transformation of physical measures into economic value, 
with the risk of making wrong assumptions about the respondent’s utility function, is 
necessary.
6 For example, the price people pay for bottled water may be used as basis for estimating their demand for 
clean and safe drinking water.
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Of particular importance, and which has been routinely stressed in the literature, is the 
anticipated capacity of the CVM to capture the total economic value of the 
environmental amenity (e.g., Mitchell and Carson, 1989; Kopp, 1992). It is hence 
regarded as a ‘catch-all’ approach. By definition, the total value of an environmental 
amenity is constituted by use-value, option-value and existence value. Whereas the 
former two refer to a use of the good (either at present or in the future), existence values 
arise from the knowledge of the mere existence of a natural resource. An alternative 
categorisation that will be frequently used in this thesis separates use from non-use
o #
values, the latter category which incorporates ‘option’ values. Moreover, in a CV 
scenario both the present and future benefits are assumed to be intuitively included in 
people’s WTP responses, while other methods necessitate the discounting of future 
benefits and costs, which involves the difficulty of choosing an adequate discount rate. 
Accordingly, the price of the amenity is set after assessing the total and future change in 
welfare that it represents to people, whereas approaches based on observed behaviour 
only capture value related to a present use of the resource.
1.4. Alternative Approaches to Benefit Estimation
Techniques of benefit estimation are distinguished into Stated Preference Methods 
(SPMs) and Revealed Preference Methods (RPMs). Whereas the former relies on direct 
inquires related to the good or service being valued, for instance through interviews, the
7
An environment confers benefits on users and those who, while not using it directly, are glad that it is 
there. A key insight into this is commonly traced back to Krutilla (1967), who argued that there are 
people who obtain satisfaction from the knowledge that various environmental resources remain, even 
though there is no prospect that they will be exposed to them Thus, even if the individual does not 
intend to consume the service, she may still be concerned about its existence (Rosenthal and Nelson, 
1992). For instance, there are perhaps a number of citizens who value and support the preservation of 
the Siberian Tiger, although most will never see one or otherwise enjoy any of its benefits. Existence 
values are further separated into bequest values (which pertain to the enjoyment of a site by others, for 
instance by future generations), and intrinsic values (which are unrelated to human use of the resource). 
‘Option value’ refers to the possible future use of the resource. Thus, although not deriving any benefits 
at present, the option to use or enjoy the resource in the future accrue a benefit to the individual.
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latter extrapolates preferences from market behaviour, or actual choices made in other 
relevant contexts. A review of alternative SPMs to CVM and modifications of these 
applied in this thesis is provided below. In addition, the section briefly describes various 
RPM that sometimes are used in order to validate CV estimates.
1.4.1. Choice Experiments
Choice Experiments (CEs), or Contingent Choice Methods (CCMs), seek to measure 
the utility attached to a particular good by presenting choice sets in which the 
characteristics or attributes attached to this are varied. They involve asking people to 
choose between alternatives in such choice sets, and by modifying the attributes in a 
systematic manner, factors influencing people’s choices are highlighted. By explicitly 
stating the cost or price associated with alterations of the good, the welfare effect 
involved is thus estimable. These methods are similar to the CVM direct hypothetical 
approaches to benefit estimation since choices are direct expressions of an individual’s 
value, although this is elicited as a discrete rather than a continuous measure. The use of 
CEs to estimate economic benefits of natural resources have increased over the last 
decade and are considered by its pioneers as more viable approaches to environmental 
valuation (e.g., Adamowicz et al., 1994; Hanley et al., 1998).
Among the several advantages of CEs advocated, probably the most important is that 
they are less hypothetical in their structure than CVM. Rather than directly asking 
people to assess the value of a, possibly, complex and unfamiliar environmental 
amenity, they are asked to make choices on the basis of project-like scenarios, a 
procedure that is thought to enrich the valuation context. Thus, they differ from CVM 
by investigating the trade-offs people are making between alternative scenarios instead 
of focusing on a single and fixed outcome. The procedure is therefore believed to be 
more realistic; rather than stating a value out of pure invention, respondents are asked to 
make judgements between (several) specific interventions and the costs they carry, an 
act more similar to ordinary market behaviour (e.g., Mitchell and Carson, 1989). 
Moreover, by including private as well as public goods in the choice-set, a comparison 
of what people otherwise may achieve or could afford with their monetary budgets is 
facilitated. Other advantages discussed in the literature are the avoidance of yes-saying
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and the easiness of assessing the value of isolated and specific attributes rather than 
complete amenities (Hanley et al., 1998).
Nevertheless, there are two obvious drawbacks of this technique of preference 
assessment. Firstly, in order to derive meaningful and fairly continuous welfare 
estimates of the amenity and judge how these vary with different levels of the 
attribute(s), a considerable number of choice sets must be elaborated. This implies that 
the procedure is cumbersome to carry out as long as the choice problem is not simple. 
Secondly, research in decision theory suggests that people only have thoughtful or pre­
defined opinions on a very limited number of topics (e.g., Harris et al., 1989; Fischhoff, 
1991). If presented with many types of issues, or variations of these, an informed choice 
may be made between the most and least important issue, but the relative importance of 
intermediate items is likely to be arbitrary (Svedsater, 1996). Choices may for this 
reason only be meaningful for a limited number of alternatives and levels of attributes.
1.4.2. Multi-Attribute Utility Theory
The methodological techniques developed on the basis of Multi-attribute Utility Theory 
(MUT) are similar to CEs in the sense that both attempt to identify and value specific 
attributes of a broader and more inclusive good. An important difference is however 
that, whereas CEs isolate various physical characteristics, such as the money to be 
spent, the type of good and the extent of environmental projects, MUT suggests various 
dimensions of value that serve as criteria to evaluate events and justify actions. This 
definition stems from research indicating that people form judgements on the basis of a 
vast array of motivations (Gregory et al., 1993). These dimensions are further assumed 
to be shared within a culture or society, and thereby they function as types of social 
cognitions that are used in order to organise and make sense of the world (Grunert and 
Juhl, 1995). A more pragmatic modification of MUT is provided by Keeney and Raiffa 
(1976), which presents respondents with separate aspects and attributes of an event to be 
evaluated and that are assumed to reflect different motivational bases.
There are three steps needed in order to categorise the definitions discussed above. 
Firstly, values are considered to be associated with various motivational domains, such
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as universalism, conformity, power, or tradition (Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987). These are 
hypothesised to result in certain interests and objectives among individuals. The 
importance of each of these domains is then evaluated for each individual. Finally, a set 
of individualistic or collectivistic principles that subsequently guide attitudes and 
behaviour are distinguished.9 Motivations are assumed to be structured in a circular 
two-dimensional space as illustrated by Fig. 1.1., with separate regions representing 
different value-domains. These are positioned according to what interest they serve; the 
‘value-neutral’ individual is situated in the origin of the schema, and the further out 
from the centre we move, the more importance is attached to that particular motivational 
domain. Adjacent regions in the figure are most compatible, whereas opposite regions 
indicate high conflict.
collectivistic orientation
benevolenceuniversalism
spirituality
00
self-direction tradition
conformity
stimulation security
hedonism
power
achievement
individualistic orientation
Figure 1.1. Relations between value domains and motivational orientation (Grunert and Juhl, 1995).
9
Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) have defined eleven motivational domains that guide value formation; five 
are solely associated with individualistic action (self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement and 
power), four exclusively linked with collectivistic action (conformity, tradition, spirituality and 
benevolence), and two are related to both an individualistic and a collectivistic action {security and 
universalism).
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Grunert and Juhl (1995) have applied MUT specifically to environmental issues, albeit 
not within the context of CVM. Nevertheless, due to the multidimensionality and 
complexity of natural resources it seems fruitful to apply MUT and other conceptually 
similar approaches as support to CVM. Not only do these serve as tools for improving 
the validity of economic values assigned to environmental amenities by allowing for 
conflicting views to be expressed, but multiple responses may also prove vital in 
learning what motivates individuals in their valuation. They also provide policy makers 
with valuable information regarding how people think about and act in relation to these 
issues. Although support is measured on a single monetary scale, as in CV studies, by 
informing the respondents about underlying objectives, motives and purposes of 
valuation, or by asking them to explicitly consider each of these aspects before a 
response is elicited, they may be more capable of making informed decisions about their 
WTP.
1.4.3. Revealed Preference Methods
These methodologies are based on observations of actual choices and behaviour among 
the public. They are distinguished into Observed/Direct (OD) or Observed/Indirect (01) 
methods. Some rare examples of OD methods are found in simulated market 
experiments (e.g., Bishop and Heberlein, 1979), and so called ‘parallel’ markets. The 
latter approach implies that preferences are derived from the prices of another but 
similar good that is marketed. An example is to estimate the economic value of a lake 
on the basis of fishing licenses. However, there are few instances when the marketed 
good encompasses exactly the same benefits as the targeted amenity. For instance, in 
the above example we may argue that fishing permits capture some but not all utility 
aspects of the targeted resource.
In 01 methods the value is inferred from another good to which the amenity has an 
established link. One example is hedonic pricing. The price of a property, say a house or 
a piece of property, reflects the value of a variety of facilities and benefits, including 
communications, access. to schools and, possibly, environmental qualities. If two 
properties are very similar on all but the latter aspect, the one with a higher 
environmental quality should theoretically be priced higher, and the environmental
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value is then estimated according to this price-difference. Examples of environmental 
benefits that could be assessed using hedonic pricing is the air quality in a particular 
neigbourhood, access to parks, and drinking water quality. The problem is however to 
isolate these aspects, since in reality there exist a number of reasons why people want to 
live in a certain area and not in another. Another example of 01 methods is the travel- 
cost method, which is commonly applied in order to value recreational parks. The value 
of these is estimated on the basis of how much people spend in order to travel there, 
entrance fees, and sometimes the opportunity cost of time, generally calculated as the 
foregone income for a particular holiday. A final example is household production 
functions, which primarily are used to value health effects.10
1.5. Theoretical Framework of Economic Valuation
As mentioned previously, the rationale for assessing economic values of natural 
resources is to include these in economic impact analysis, which is assumed to be a 
powerful tool forjudging what projects are worthwhile to carry through, and which are 
not. The following section aims to clarify the theoretical foundations of CVM and other 
SPMs, which have their basis in economic welfare theory, in particular the theory of 
consumer choice and public goods.11 In its most simplistic form, the utility function of 
an individual facing a valuation scenario in a CV study may be stated as follows:
u(x, q)
where x  is a vector representing market goods, and q is a vector of environmental (or 
public) goods. A fundamental assumption of this is that the individual maximises utility 
by choosing the level or amount of marketed goods, but not the level of public goods
10For a detailed description of these and various alternative environmental valuation techniques, see 
Winpenny (1991), or Freeman (1993).
11 This section is by no means necessary in order to understand the objectives or results of this research, 
but due to its interdisciplinary approach, it provides a theoretical background of economic benefit 
estimation that may be o f interest for some readers. The notions presented here may further be valuable 
in order to comprehend some of the econometric analyses performed in the empirical section.
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since these, by definition, are not the subject of individual control. In order to have a 
definite and unique solution for this function, the income level and level of wealth must 
be specified. In other words we have the following constraint:
max u (x, q) s.t. px  = mu
where p  is a vector of market prices for goods belonging to category x, and m the total 
income level (i.e., combined level of income and wealth). From this expression we may 
define the following function:
v (py qy m) = max u (x, q) s.t. p x  = m
The expression above represents the indirect utility function, which gives the utility 
achievable at given prices, the given level of environmental goods, and income. The 
value of x  that solves this problem is the demanded amount, or bundle, of this good. The 
demand for and exchange decision between two goods can principally be described by a 
traditional indifference-curve diagram, presented in Figure 1.2. below.
Good A
O B GoodB
Figure 1.2. Maximisation of utility
12 ‘Subject to’ the constraint.
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Given the constraints p  and m, the agent’s budget constraint is represented by the line 
AB; she can trade up to but not above this line. Thus, all possible combinations of 
goods A and B are found within the area AOB.13 The utility is visualised by the dotted 
indifference curves presented in the figure, which represent the contours of each utility 
level. Since one curve depicts the same level of utility but for various weights of good A 
and B, the agent is indifferent between any combinations along this. Hence, moving 
along the curve does not alter the level of utility. However, each curve represents a 
different level of utility, which increases by moving from left to right (i.e., an 
indifference curve to the right and above implies a higher utility). Assuming that the 
agent’s initial endowment (i.e., the original amount of each good) is at point E, moving 
upwards along the budget constraint will result in a higher utility, and at point M utility 
is maximised. Any trade away from this point will put the individual on a lower 
indifference curve, and accordingly, a lower level of utility. Utility is maximised 
whenever the indifference curve is tangent to the budget constraint, which occurs when 
the price relation between the goods (p\ and pb) equals the Marginal Rate of 
Substitution (MRS) between the goods.14 Thus, the maximisation problem becomes:
du(A,B) I du(A,B) _ pA 
d A  /  dB  pB
Now, let us assume that the amount of environmental goods may vary, with no increase 
in any of the other elements (that is, keeping x and m constant). Moreover, we assume
13 If all funds are used for good A, the individual can consume A units of this, and by using all funds for 
good B, B units may be consumed. Accordingly, all combinations inside and to the left of AOB are 
economically possible.
14 Marginal rate of substitution is defined as the number of units of good A the consumer requires in 
order to give up x units of good B. Any such change will restore the original level of utility. In the 
expression below, the symbol ‘3’ denotes the derivative (or change). Thus, the expression should be 
read as ‘the change in utility with respect to a change in A’, and so forth. It implies that the utility is 
maximised when the price ratio between good A and B (i.e., the slope o f the budget constraint) equals 
the MRS for these goods (i.e., the slope of the indifference curve at this particular point). This implies 
that the ratio between the number of units of A required in order to compensate for x units of B, equals 
the price relation between good A and B.
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that the increase in the environmental good q is discrete, where q° denotes the original 
state, and ql is the state after the increase. Since q is hypothesised to be a ‘normal’ good 
(i.e., of which more is always consider better than less), we can claim that qx > q°. The 
underlying relation of utility therefore becomes:
u1 = v (p, q1, m)>u° = v(p, q°, m)
Thus, the utility after the increase in the environmental good or service will be higher 
than before the change. The objective of a CBA is to obtain an accurate measure of the 
benefits and costs of such changes, and in a CV study, the researcher is interested in 
measuring the benefits that follow from a change in environmental quality. The WTP 
(or WTA) provided is the amount of money that leaves the individual equally well-off 
with as without the change. The amount reflects the marginal value of the resource, and 
describes the additional WTP for one more unit of this.15 In order to represent this 
problem, we may re-write the indirect utility function into an expenditure function that 
illustrates how much could be achieved of each good given a certain level of income:
e(p ,q ,u )=m
There are two conceptually different measures in order to account for the welfare 
changes involved. If the individual is assumed to be entitled to the current or original 
level of utility (e.g., she has the right to access an undamaged natural resource), u°, 
Compensating Surplus (CS) would be the appropriate measure:
CS = [e (p, q \ u(>)] - [e (p. q", u0)] =
This expression represents the amount of money (m - m ) that needs to be extracted 
from the individual in order to restore the original level of utility, given the change of 
the environmental good. If on the other hand the individual is entitled to a new, higher 
or lower, level of utility, Equivalence Surplus (ES) would be appropriate:
15 It is important to distinguish between marginal and total value; whereas the latter is a measure of the 
WTP for x units o f a particular good, the former is defined as the WTP for an additional unit of x, 
which is also the appropriate measure in economic welfare analysis.
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ES = [e (p, q \ ux)] - [e (p, q°, u1)] =ml -m°
Thus, the difference between these measures is that, whereas CS holds the utility 
constant at the initial level, ES holds the utility constant at some alternative level.16 
Whether CS or ES should be applied depends on the assignment of property rights. For 
a quantity increase, given that the agent is entitled to the original level of utility, WTP 
reflects the amount of money the individual is willing to give up in order to attain this, 
and still maintain the original level of utility. Hence, WTP thereby represent CS (i.e., 
the utility level is kept constant). If the individual on the other hand is considered as 
having a right to the quantity increase, WTA would be the appropriate measure, which 
should be interpreted as the amount of money she demands in order to do without the 
improvement (i.e., she will in this case acquire a higher level of utility). For a quantity
1 7decrease, the reverse relationship holds.
In order to calculate the total, or social benefits (or costs) of an environmental resource, 
all individuals’ WTP (or WTA), represented either by CS or ES, are added across the 
whole population. Since public goods are non-excludable and non-rivalry, the 
appropriate method of valuing these is to summarise all individuals' WTP (WTA) that 
uses, have access to, or in some other way derive a benefit from the resource. Thus, 
since two or more individuals may consume a particular resource simultaneously, the 
value of this equals their added benefits. Then this welfare measure is compared to the 
involved costs of the project. Figure 1.3. below illustrates the maximisation problem, 
where MWTP is the aggregated marginal WTP for an extra unit of the resource, whereas 
MC represents the marginal costs of producing this.
16 These types of measure are based on the Hicksian (or compensated) demand function, developed in 
order to correct for the various problems of the ordinary observable Marshallian demand function. In 
the latter, income is held constant, implying an increased (decreased) utility when prices fall (rise). 
Thus, any change in demand is a reaction to both price and income elasticity. However, what is more 
interesting for subsequent benefit analysis is to examine only how the price change impact upon 
demand, and therefore CS and ES are considered as more adequate measures (Varian, 1992).
17 The interpretation of a quality change is the same as for a quantity change in this respect.
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Quantity
Figure 1.3. Optimal rate of output
The socially most efficient rate of output is to provide a quantity of the good equal to 
Q^; at this point the marginal worth of the good is equal to what it costs society to 
produce the same, as measured by marginal costs. Put in other words, at this point the 
benefits of an extra unit of the good (marginal benefits) will be less than the costs of 
producing this (marginal costs), whereas up to this point, the benefits of an extra unit 
exceed the costs of this. Any other output is by definition inefficient, since the net value, 
defined as total marginal WTP minus total marginal costs, will in these cases not be as 
large. The net social value of this particular allocation is (a + b) - c, whereby a and b 
together represent the social benefits associated with the quantity ( f ,  and c represents 
the costs of producing this.18
1.6. Conclusions
Traditionally, natural resources have been viewed as ‘free’ resources, much as a result 
of the lack of well-defined property rights. However, as the demand for environmental 
preservation has increased in modem society, a need has evolved to include benefits 
associated with natural resources in economic analysis. In this endeavour, the CVM has
18 For further reading on estimation of welfare effects, see for instance Pearce and Turner (1990).
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received prominent attention as a possible approach in the absence of markets or when 
markets are imperfect. Being a methodology assumed to measure economic value, with 
the exception of non-use values, ordinary concepts in conventional economic theory 
apply. Economic value has the advantage of providing a relative measure of 
importance; monetary resources are limited, supposedly preventing an infinite 
assignment of importance. It is also a widely familiar metric that presumably does not 
need extensive explanation to respondents and policy makers. Thus, economic value 
possesses some desirable properties compared to, for instance, notions of attitude.
Nevertheless, monetary valuation of issues and events that traditionally are not 
comprised by market transactions is not without difficulties. In this chapter I have 
presented the basic rationale of the methodology and conveyed a discussion about the 
theoretical underpinnings of economic benefit estimation. The following chapter 
presents various fundamental problems of the methodology and their possible causes, 
where emphasis is placed on issues that are relevant for the objectives of this thesis. The 
empirical research will be conducted on a variety of natural resources that have been the 
object of previous CV research, and the aim is to capture and investigate various aspects 
and anomalies that are anticipated to provide valuable information about the 
foundations of hypothetical value statements in these contexts. In order to investigate 
the possibilities, problems and limitations of the CVM and other SPMs, quantitative 
split-sample tests, as well as qualitative analyses, are performed. The studies are further 
conducted either as mail-surveys, face-to-face interviews, or as class-room experiments. 
The specific methodological approaches employed will be presented in more detail in 
each empirical chapter.
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2. Criticism of the Contingent Valuation Method: 
Conceptual Problems and Sources of Bias
As indicated in chapter one, the assessment of monetary estimates by the use of 
Contingent Valuation (CV) studies is unfortunately not without difficulties due to some 
fundamental problems that arise when economics is brought outside traditional markets. 
Respondents may, for a variety of reasons, not provide valid, reliable or truthful answers 
to the WTP questions. The methodology is in this respect threatened by anomalies such 
as hypothetical bias, strategic behaviour, anchoring, payment-vehicle bias, embedding 
effects and compliance bias, some of which are discussed by the NOAA panel (Arrow 
et a l, 1993). Moreover, the welfare estimation of complex natural resources that are not 
well demarcated in terms of property rights and accrued benefits entail some important 
theoretical problems. Since the validity of the methodology is vulnerable to the extent of 
these and other problems, a thorough discussion of conceptual problems and different 
types of biases and anomalies, along with their possible causes, will be provided here.
2.1. The Inclusion of Non-Use Values
Non-use values are defined as the values an individual derive from a resource for 
reasons other than a personal use of this. They may thus arise from a mere knowledge 
that the resource exists. The rationale for including non-use values in economic analysis 
is that all benefits somehow ought to be reflected in damage assessment. Otherwise 
prices and damage awards will not signal the effective costs and benefits of the 
resource, giving rise to incentives for more environmental exploitation than is socially 
optimal (Whitehead et a l, 1995). However, a number of researchers oppose the idea of 
including non-use values in the economic assessment of environmental resources (e.g., 
Edwards, 1992; Rosenthal and Nelson, 1992; Diamond and Hausman, 1993). They 
argue that the acceptance of non-use values is misguided, partly since these are more 
likely to represent matters of cultural symbolism and social ideology, concepts that are 
difficult to incorporate in economic measures (Anderson, 1993; Sagoff, 1994).
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In defence of such criticism, Kopp (1992) illustrates the following example; consider a 
woman living in New York who receives pleasure from the existence of the wild trout 
in California, merely due to her ethical view of people’s relationship with nature (that is, 
reflecting some kind of cultural symbolism). She later learns from the news that the fish 
has been killed by the dump of hazardous chemicals. Eventually, suppose that the state 
of California contemplates pressing damage charges or imposing stricter regulations, 
should not then the loss suffered by this woman, along with people living elsewhere that 
have similar feelings and motives, be accounted for? Kopp (1992) concludes that 
policies based only on the values among people who fish for sport, or otherwise use the 
resource in one way or another, would be inefficient.
To me, this argument is not very persuasive. Firstly, the term ‘other places’ deserves 
attention. Does it imply all the billions of people on this planet, or does it merely 
include the U.S. population, and if so, on what merit is such a distinction made? Given 
the core principle that ‘all’ values should be included in a cost-benefit analysis, then, 
when dollars and cents are multiplied, the estimated welfare effect will be nearly 
limitless and extend far beyond the intended application of the concept. For example, as 
Mead (1993) stresses, one must seriously question whether it is reasonable that the 
American public on average are willing to spend the sum of $11,950 in order to prevent 
the loss of one rather common seabird due to an oil spill, particularly in light of the fact 
that the population of this species will fully recover within ten years. Furthermore, what 
advocates of non-use values in welfare estimation seem to neglect is that the natural 
environment belongs to a radically different domain than goods and services normally 
bought and sold on markets. People are simply not used to including these in their 
monetary budget constraints. If someone told me that I have to pay for the air that I am 
breathing, or for the sea-urchins residing in the deep-sea, my future wage requirements 
would be quite another story than what they are today. To conclude, it is not the 
recognition of non-users’ that is inadequate, but rather the belief that their views and 
opinions are readily reduced into dollar values.
Perhaps more importantly, how do we treat all those people who do not know that the 
resource exists, and hence do not derive any value from it, but when informed about its 
existence claim to have suffered a loss? Diamond and Hausman (1993) argue that there
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is an important difference between a situation when a known resource is damaged, 
compared to when one learns simultaneously about its existence. Or can we say that an 
individual is equally worse off with prior knowledge as with no knowledge at all? The 
conventional definition of welfare does not take account of goods and services unknown 
to the consumer in the assessment of an individual’s well-being, so why should these be 
included in the welfare estimation of environmental resources?
Apart from such philosophical criticism, Rosenthal and Nelson (1992) put forward a 
variety of technical arguments against the inclusion of non-use values in cost-benefit 
analysis, one major reason being the double accounting of values that may arise. For 
example, consider two employees who put a value not only on their own income, but 
also another person’s earnings due to a concern for that person’s wealth. If both 
employees reason in this way, and if all other employees’ values are considered, then 
wage negotiations will surely get off the track. The same problem arises for 
environmental resources in so far as non-users value the resource out of sympathy with 
the users of it. We may even imagine cases where a resource is assigned a substantial 
value, although no one visits it, nor derives any obvious benefit from it. It therefore 
appears sensible to distinguish between the various reasons of ‘claimed’ non-use values; 
as long as people want to preserve an environmental resource due to the possibility of a 
future use (option value), or because they value the mere existence of it without taking 
into consideration the benefits accrued to users of the resource, no problem of double 
accounting occurs.19 Yet, this unravelling does not eliminate other analytical problems.
2.2. Divergence Between WTP and WTA Estimates
Whether Willingness To Pay (WTP) or Willingness To Accept (WTA) should be used 
as a measure of economic value depends on the definition of property rights. If the agent 
is considered as having a right to use or have access to a particular resource, WTA is the 
appropriate measure. In this case the agent should be compensated if she loses that right.
19 For a discussion of various definitions of altruism and motivations o f such non-use values (for 
example, genuine altruism, impure altruism, paternalistic altruism, etc.), see for instance Edwards 
(1992), and Johansson-Stenman (1998).
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Measures of WTP are on the other hand appropriate if the affected parties are 
considered as not having this right.20 A major criticism against the Contingent Valuation 
Method (CVM), among others put forward by Barry (1995), is the large differences 
repeatedly demonstrated between WTP and WTA measures (e.g., Hammack and 
Brown, 1974), which violates the presumption that the range between values should be 
negligible when income effects are not too large (Willig, 1976). Table 2.1. provides 
some examples of studies that have estimated both WTP and WTA for the same good, 
and according to the figures, the latter measure on average overstates the former by a 
factor of 4.7.
Table 2.1. Disparities between WTP and WTA estimates
Authors and Year WTP WTA
Hammack and Brown (1974) $247 $ 1,044
Sinclair (1976) $35 $ 100
Banford et al. (1977) $43 $ 120
$22 $93
Bishop and Heberlein (1979) $21 $ 101
Brookshire etal. (1980) $43.64 $ 68.52
$ 54.07 $ 142.60
$ 32.00 $ 207.07
Rowe et al. (1980) $4.75 $ 24.47
$6.54 $71.44
$3.53 $ 46.63
$6.85 $ 113.68
Hovis etal. (1983) $2.50 $9.50
$2.75 $4.50
Knetsch and Sinden (1983) $ 1.28 $5.18
Source: Pearce and Turner (1990)
20The defined property rights have important implications for subsequent Hicksian welfare analysis. 
Since we are dealing with quantity or quality changes, rather than price changes, when conducting 
welfare analysis in these contexts, either compensating surplus or equivalent surplus would be the 
appropriate measure; the former is used when there is an inplied property right in the status quo, the 
latter if there is an inplied property right in the change (see chapter one for further explanation).
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Nevertheless, CV practitioners may at first interpretation survive this criticism since
comparable discrepancies, although not equally large, have been demonstrated also for
marketed goods (e.g., Thaler, 1980; Kahneman et a l, 1990). It is evident that we tend to
attach higher values to goods we have in possession than goods we do not have,
regardless of whether they be chocolate bars, coffee mugs or environmental amenities.
Thus, losses seem to loom larger than gains; there is extra value added to the good if we
have it in possession, and hence this anomaly has been termed the ‘endowment effect’
(Thaler, 1980; Kahneman et al., 1990). Other possible reasons for the divergence
between WTP and WTA in CV contexts are due to incentives of strategic behaviour and
a lack of budget constraints in the case of the latter measure, implying that this
theoretically can be limitless. In order to present the respondents with a valuation
context more closely related to real markets, thereby avoiding overestimation of
benefits, WTP is therefore preferred over WTA, even when WTA is theoretically more
correct (Arrow et a l, 1993). The divergence has also been explained by income and
91substitution elasticities, although these can reasonably only explain part of this.
Furthermore, the cause of the discrepancy between WTP and WTA may be founded in 
imprecise preferences. Although Dubourg et al. (1994) believe that this is insufficient to 
explain more than part of the divergence, still, if respondents are very uncertain about 
their (economic) values for public goods, this could possibly give rise to a 
discontinuous utility function. Hence, the difference between WTA and WTP reflects an 
interval within which the ‘true’ value is located. Consistently higher values of WTA 
may also be the result of the respondent’s perceived property rights, which lead her to
21 Income effects are the effects on demand due to changes in income, whereas substitution effects arise 
because other goods (i.e., substitutes) have become relatively less or more expensive when the price of 
the good changes. However, according to Hanemann (1991), the concepts are quite different for natural 
resources since they involve quantity changes rather than price changes; for these types of goods, the 
‘consumer’ is not free to choose the desired level of quantity and in case her preferences are 
lexicographic (that is, a certain level of the good can never be replaced by any amount of another good), 
or close to being lexicographic, large differences in WTP and WTA will result. For example, if the 
individual expects and prefers the existing amount of the resource, she is only willing to pay a very 
small (if anything) for an increase in this, whereas the required compensation in case the resource is to 
be withdrawn may indeed be very large or infinite.
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think in gains or losses regarding access to the resource. The perception of fairness also 
plays an essential role here. It suggests that, when asked to estimate their WTP to 
acquire an environmental amenity that has never been available, people will consider 
this as an extra achievement not necessarily needed, nor deserved. On the other hand, 
when posed with a WTA question, implying that something will be taken away from 
them, this is more likely to be regarded as unacceptable and accordingly result in 
large(r) responses of value.22
Whatever the true reasons for the WTP - WTA disparity is, it provides an indication that 
the CVM may not accurately measure underlying economic values. The inconsistency is 
not, however, amended by adopting a conservative approach as suggested by the NOAA 
panel (Arrow et al., 1993), because the acceptance of a Tower-bound’ estimate does not 
provide an answer to what responses of WTP and WTA are principally reflecting.
2.3. Hypothetical Bias
Hypothetical bias was originally defined by Rowe et al. (1980) as “the potential error 
induced by not confronting ... [the respondents] ... with the real situation” (p. 6). 
However, there is some confusion in the CV literature concerning the meaning of this 
notion; whereas some papers discuss its causes and sources of origin, others, such as 
Schulze et al. (1996), are solely concerned with outcomes, whatever their reason may 
be. Yet another definition is that the notion ‘bias’ is simply misleading in this context, 
because the effects arising from a lack of realism is random error not attributable to 
specific reasons (Mitchell and Carson, 1989). This is reflecting the idea among many 
CV practitioners that people do possess economic values for environmental amenities 
and other public goods, and that hypothetical bias arises due to the lack of realism in the 
particular scenario presented to respondents. Here I will mainly focus on the origins of 
hypothetical bias, but also discuss whether hypothetical value statements correspond to 
actual behaviour.
22 Related examples are found in Lewis (1990), who discusses fairness with respect to costs, prices and 
profits.
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2.3.1. Origins o f Hypothetical Bias
An obvious factor that determines the outcome of a CV study is the nature of the 
amenity being valued. Hypothetical bias, or information bias, is likely to arise if the 
respondents do not fully comprehend the amenity they are supposed to value and its 
terms of provision, or alternatively, are not convinced by the market scenario presented 
to them. A number of researchers argue that respondents’ familiarity with the 
environmental amenity is a prerequisite for providing meaningful answers to CV 
questions (e.g., Cummings et al., 1986). Whitehead et al. (1995) found that responses of 
WTP were more reliable for users of the resource, and among those who had some 
information about this prior to participating in the survey. Carson et al. (1996a), on the 
other hand, argue that familiarity is not a crucial condition, calling attention to the fact 
that familiarity is only one factor in the economic decision process; consumers make 
use of other cues, such as advertising. The authors also speculate that the time and effort 
spent on familiarising the respondents in a CV study are longer and more elaborate than 
what is normally the case for introducing consumer goods. Therefore, the eventual 
decision to buy any of these goods, public or private, may be equally arbitrary.
Nevertheless, the sort of consumer-related information the authors refer to is generally 
not available for environmental amenities. The respondents may be thoroughly 
informed about the amenity, but this information is of another kind and most likely 
unrelated to consumption as defined in market transactions. This problem is commonly 
used as a basis for more philosophical critiques of the CVM, which centre on natural 
resources being incommensurable (e.g., Anderson, 1993; Barry, 1995). This implies that 
environmental amenities are simply not comparable with anything else, particularly not 
things that are traded on markets. They carry with them aspects and dimensions (such as 
ethical views about the relation between man and nature) that have no clear substitutes, 
and involved values can therefore not be adequately captured by a single currency.
23Hanley et al. (1995) discuss the implications of poorly informed respondents in a CV survey, who 
found that a significant number of people were partly or completely ignorant about the meaning of 
biological diversity. The implications are firstly that CBA on the basis of stated preferences will lead to 
inefficient, or at best sub-optimal policy decisions, and secondly that CV responses may be highly 
sensitive to small variations in the information provided.
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When we face the decision to, for instance, buy a book or go to the cinema, it is not only 
the content and quality of these goods per se that matters. What also matters is the 
context within which these goods are valued, that is, what role they play in the overall 
framework of consumption. First of all we have to decide whether to pursue these 
activities at all, whereby we compare the book with, for instance, an article of clothing, 
and perhaps the film by going to a restaurant. These goods belong to a ‘consumption- 
domain’, something that environmental amenities normally do not. Thus, the latter are 
not easily weighted against other consumption alternatives.
There is however a major problem of restricting CV studies to familiar and tangible 
commodities. Indeed, most environmental amenities are unfamiliar and may not have 
any direct or personal relevance to people, and by excluding these from Cost-Benefit 
Analysis (CBA) also undermines the rationale of the methodology. Therefore, the 
nature and terms of provision of amenities that are complex and for which the benefits 
are unforeseen must be rigorously and clearly described in the CV scenario, because it 
cannot be taken for granted that respondents have sufficient prior information about the 
resource. The level of knowledge should therefore be ascertained at the piloting stage 
and form the basis of what would be an adequate amount of information in the valuation 
scenario (Hutchinson et al., 1995). The scenario may also be modified in a way that 
translates a global and complex resource into its local or specific effects, thereby 
making the amenity more tangible and accessible.
The question still remains of whether these efforts are sufficient in order to yield an 
unbiased valuation. Ajzen et a l (1996) conclude that the quality of information and 
arguments presented in the scenario, although having a stronger impact under conditions 
of high personal relevance, had only a moderate influence under conditions of low 
personal relevance. The authors further found that the motivational orientation altered 
the responses; an altruistic motivational orientation, unlike an individualistic 
orientation, provoked in the scenario resulted in significantly higher WTP, and the 
effect was reinforced for goods not personally relevant (Ajzen et al., 1996). This 
indirectly suggests that the valuation of geographically extensive, and therefore 
unfamiliar, amenities is not particularly responsive to further clarification.
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These findings have two important implications. Firstly, a detailed description of the 
good and its provision may not offer a satisfactory solution to the problem of 
hypothetical bias. No matter if all the relevant facts and criteria are presented in the 
scenario, this may not have the intended effect on responses. Secondly, it is important to 
define the commodity’s ‘degree’ of public character before the study is conducted. 
Either an altruistic (for public goods) or individualistic (for private goods) orientation 
should be emphasised in order to establish an appropriate basis of valuation. When 
valuing pure public goods, altruistic collective, rather than individualistic, arguments 
should be put forward since, theoretically, these are most relevant according to 
assumptions in economic welfare theory. Apart from these constraints, providing an 
extensive and rigorous valuation scenario may for some respondents result in 
‘information-overload’, which would prevent them from developing a lucid picture of 
the amenity and its provision (Mitchell and Carson, 1989).
2.3.2. Correspondence with Real Economic Commitments
A strong test of validity is to compare hypothetical values with real economic 
commitments. Although occasions that permit such tests naturally are very rare, some 
attempts have nevertheless been made. According to a brief summary by Schulze et al 
(1996) of auctions in laboratory experiments with real money trade-offs, these more 
frequently seem to support rather than reject the CVM. However, no unequivocal 
conclusion can be drawn from these examples; whereas in some studies hypothetical 
bids perfectly predict actual payment, in others the former overstates the latter by a 
factor of up to 9.1. The authors seem reluctant to discuss thoroughly this lack of 
correspondence, but intuitively it depends on the character of the good; the more private 
it is in its character, the more familiar would the valuation task be, and consequently 
more likely to reflect underlying preferences. Furthermore, rather than using split 
samples, generally in these experiments the same respondents first make hypothetical 
bids and are subsequently asked to pay for the good. The reliance on within-subject 
designs, instead of between subject designs, underestimates the impact of cognitive 
dissonance and self-image effects that lead subjects to strive for consistency, whereby 
value statements are being held irrespective of their consequences and regardless of 
changed opinions (e.g., Festinger, 1957; Abelson, 1986).
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On the basis of the growing acceptance of experimental research in economics, Schulze 
et al. (1996) conclude that “the experimental approach has the advantage of obtaining 
true values” (p. 98). This interpretation, however, ignores the fact that the individual is 
an actor in a dynamic environment. Experimental choices may be consequential by 
involving real payments, but these settings still lack “those social institutions and 
processes that form the key part of ... [people’s] current reality - their paramount 
reality” (Gaskell, 1990; p. 253). This is not to argue that the experimental approach is 
necessarily inappropriate. On many occasions it may indeed provide important insights, 
particularly of highly structured markets such as the stock exchange. Because of the 
ability to manipulate key conditions, experiments present the possibility of researching 
phenomena that are otherwise difficult to isolate.
Nevertheless, it would be overoptimistic to believe that they can perfectly represent 
behaviour in real-world contexts. There are several reasons for this. First and foremost, 
experimental settings constitute largely context-free environments, but the general 
conclusion from research in cognitive psychology is that more or less all problem­
solving is context-dependent. An illustrative example is provided by Ross and Ward 
(1996), who demonstrate that the outcome of a prisoner’s dilemma game {i.e., selfish 
versus cooperative behaviour) is dramatically different whether the ‘Wall Street Game’ 
or ‘Community Game’ is played. Besides such framing effects, social norms in a real- 
life setting may lead to very different choices than in an experimental context where 
people are faced with gambles and procedures alien to everyday life.
Participants are furthermore seldom indifferent to the experiment they take part in, and 
their concern for outcomes could lead them to convey stories and responses they believe 
the experimenter is hoping for {e.g., Brown, 1986). Rosenthal (1966) reports that 
sometimes respondents are more worried about whether they have performed their role 
as experimental subjects, rather than focusing on the actual task, and respondents are 
likely to search actively for cues about how they are ‘supposed’ to behave. Lowenstein 
(1999) put forward another interesting criticism relating to the importance of repetition 
in order to represent real-world behaviour. In experimental economics, it is the last of a 
number of trials that is considered to be the most representative, and focus is, as a rule,
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placed on the final outcome (e.g., Coursey et al., 1987; Shogren et al., 1994).24 
However, stationary replication is not a normal feature of economic life. In real-life 
contexts people rarely have the ability to repeat choices in close succession, whereby 
the trial and error feedback eventually leads to a rational choice.
In a CV study, Seip and Strand (1992) show a rather poor correspondence between 
hypothetical and actual WTP for membership of an environmental organisation; only 
9% of those who stated that they were willing to pay the membership fee actually did so 
when given the opportunity. Yet, this result may not come as a surprise; the issue has 
from a more conceptual perspective been widely discussed throughout the history of 
social psychology, evolving from LaPiere's (1934) early study of the link between 
attitudes and behaviour. Later research has concluded that, when people are confronted 
with ‘consequential* choices that encompass influencing social conditions, they tend to 
act in an entirely different way than in a situation where the same task is posed as 
hypothetical or superficial (e.g., LaPiere, 1934; Janis and Mann, 1977).
2.4. Strategic Behaviour
Strategic bias occurs when people deliberately shape their answers in order to influence 
a project’s outcome. This could work in either of two directions. If they are concerned 
that they later will have to pay the amount stated in the survey, they may provide lower 
amount than their true WTP. On the other hand, if they truly believe that the 
implementation of a project that they are essentially positive toward depends on the 
aggregated WTP across interviewed individuals, they have an incentive to overstate 
their responses. The scenario should therefore be formulated so that it is not obvious 
whether it is good or bad for the respondents to provide high or low amounts. However, 
this carries the risk of making the valuation task appear less plausible, and it reduces the 
incentives among respondents to carefully consider their budget constraints.
24 The most common approach is the use of a so-called Vickrey auction, in which people’s responses are 
elicited in repeated rounds. The key idea is that individuals must first be experienced with the 
mechanism in order to announce assumed ‘true’ estimates.
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The fact that strategic behaviour may pose a problem was realised early among CV 
researchers. On the basis of Samuelson's (1954) theory of public goods, it was argued 
that it is in the interest of the selfish person to give false signals and to pretend to have 
less interest in a given collective consumption activity than she really has. There is thus 
a concern with the ‘free-rider’ problem, which is hypothesised to result in 
understatements of WTP. Nevertheless, studies testing for strategic bias have not been 
able to demonstrate that people actually behave strategically in CV contexts, and the 
issue is no longer regarded as a major methodological problem (Mitchell and Carson, 
1989). A noteworthy reflection, however, is that this belief largely draws upon one 
particular study by Bohm (1972). Posavac's (1998) article is interesting in this respect as 
it shows that there is a tendency toward overbidding when this is ‘encouraged’ in the 
valuation context. Posavac found that students who were told that some facility 
improvements at the campus would be paid for by the school, provided higher WTP 
than those who were told that this would be financed through increased tuition fees.
Bearing in mind the conceptual criticism discussed earlier, experimental research offers 
another source of evidence for the negligible impact of strategic bias. The introduction 
of financial incentives to hypothetical choices seems to make little difference; the same 
patterns of behaviour are found irrespective of such incentives (Sugden, 1996). 
Research about social dilemmas nonetheless suggests that people act selfishly, not so 
much due to purely strategic reasons, but because they are aware of or suspect that other 
people are cheating. A possible explanation is that the agent identifies with the group, 
making it a prerequisite that everyone acts in a similar way (Garling and Biel, 1995). 
These findings suggest that game theory is an adequate approach for studying the 
phenomenon, within which expectations about other agents’ behaviour is the key issue.
2.5. Anchoring Effects
The effect is also called ‘starting-point’, or ‘psychometric’, bias and occurs when the 
respondents’ WTP is influenced by the value introduced in a scenario. Closed-Ended 
(CE) questions pose a threat of this kind, since they directly confront the respondent 
with a proposed amount that is supposed to be accepted or rejected, either as a 
Dichotomous Choice (DC) question, or in a Multiple Bounded (MB) format. In a
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situation where the respondents are uncertain about their valuation, the proposed 
amount may be regarded as conveying an approximate ‘true’ value of the amenity, and 
the respondents’ adjustment up or down from this would be insufficient. Ericson and 
Svedsater (1994) similarly found that respondents tend to interpret the suggested 
amount in a valuation scenario as the real cost for the amenity and feel inclined to pay 
this because they are expected to, or because it would be unfair to fellow citizens not to. 
The problem is also likely to occur when a payment card is used as a guidance to an 
Open-Ended (OE) elicitation question, as it has been found that people anchor their 
responses to roughly the median of the range of proposed values or numbers (Schwarz 
et al., 1985).25
Although anchoring is a well-documented phenomenon in CV surveys (Mitchell and 
Carson, 1989), there is a prevailing disagreement among CV practitioners over which 
elicitation format is optimal. Favouring the CE format (e.g., Hanemann, 1994), it is 
argued that this reduces the burden on the respondents in answering a WTP question; 
while we generally know if we are willing to pay the posted price for a certain good, it 
is a novel task to decide what is the most we would like to pay for it. People are simply 
inexperienced in such procedures. An additional argument for the CE format is that it is 
less ‘incentive compatible’, and hence would reduce strategic behaviour (Hanemann, 
1994), whereas OE questions invite respondents to understate their true values. On the 
basis of these and other alleged advantages, the NOAA panel has recommended CV 
practitioners to rely on a referendum format (Arrow et al., 1993).26
However, it is questionable whether the advantages of this approach outweigh its 
disadvantages. Firstly, anchoring may be a more serious problem than is suggested. The 
effect is not confined to CV surveys, and it has been demonstrated in diverse contexts
25Anchoring is not just confined to economic or numerical decision problems. It has also been 
demonstrated for non-numerical problems, for instance in the form of positive and negative statements 
that subsequently affect opinions (Quattrone, 1982).
26In a referendum format, people are posed with a take-it-or-leave-it question. The rationale is to avoid 
the effect of anchoring by presenting respondents with different amounts allocated on a random basis.
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7 7and for various populations of respondents, including experts. Furthermore, when 
people are ambivalent about their answer, they tend to use whatever anchor is at hand, 
no matter if they know that this is randomly produced and thus completely unrelated to 
the task, as in Tversky and Kahneman's (1974) experiment, in which the respondents’ 
belief about the percentage of African countries in the United Nations was anchored to 
the outcome of a wheel-of-fortune. Finally, anchoring does not seem to disappear with 
monetary incentives for accuracy (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
Secondly, the assumption that CE questions in CV contexts would produce more 
reliable answers has not been unanimously verified. Loomis (1990) found no significant 
difference in a test-retest correlation between the two formats. The NOAA panel’s 
recommendation to rely on a conservative design is also misguided since the DC format 
has actually resulted in higher, not lower value estimates as expected (e.g., Lunander, 
1998). In a summary of six independent studies that have applied both elicitation 
formats, Schulze et al. (1996) assess this upward bias to a factor of 1.9. Thirdly, the DC 
format requires at least a three or fourfold increase in sample size in order to yield the 
same statistical precision as an OE format (Schulze et al., 1996), thereby making 
surveys and studies very costly to carry out. Fourthly, in cultures and societies where it 
is customary to answer questions in an affirmative manner and where any ‘negative’ 
response may be considered as ‘rude’ behaviour, the effect of implied value cues are 
likely to be even more pronounced (Ericson and Svedsater, 1994).
Finally and conceptually more important, it is not certain that the referendum format 
will actually reduce possible incentive bias. In fact, both protocols can be framed to be 
incentive compatible if subjects are economically rational and think that their responses 
will be decisive. Respondents who are aware of the link between survey statements and 
(project) outcomes have exactly the same incentive to misrepresent their preferences in 
a CE format. To me the argument for incentive compatibility is unconvincing. Drawing 
on experimental economics and auction behaviour, Hanemann (1994) argues that, when
27 For instance, estate agents were shown to be influenced by a modified listing price of a property, even 
though they were given complete information about the characteristics of the property and the price 
level in the neighbourhood (Pious, 1993).
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presented with a blank box to state a value for something, people are more likely to 
understate (or overstate) this due to strategic considerations, whereas when a value cue 
is implied, the temptation to deviate from their true preferences is reduced, since 
. .there is no reason for the respondent to do other than answering truthfully” (p. 23). 
However, even if this rather strong assumption is true, an implied value cue does not 
only meritoriously prevent strategic behaviour. Simultaneously it is ‘manipulating’ 
underlying preferences.
To summarise, while OE questions may yield ‘unbiased’ estimates with wide 
confidence intervals (due to the higher frequency of outliers and zero responses), CE 
questions result in anchored estimates but with tighter confidence intervals. I believe 
that it would be more sensible to start from an unbiased estimate and develop robust 
methods to reduce confidence intervals, rather than go in the other direction. One way 
of trying to solve the problem is to regularly ask the respondent for the reason(s) behind 
their answers, another to exclude outliers and zero responses of WTP from the statistical 
analysis in order to arrive at a more satisfactory distribution of responses.
2.6. Payment-Vehicle Bias
When subjects are asked to value a natural resource, they are, explicitly or implicitly, 
also told how the amenity should be paid for. There are typically two different types of 
payment schemes in a CV context; either a tax payment, or a voluntary contribution. In 
specific circumstances, entrance fees, access licenses, duty charges, etc. are used. 
Generally, payment-vehicle bias arises when the respondents dislike or are unconvinced 
by the suggested payment scheme. For example, people may have an aversion against 
raised taxes and for this reason vote against the provision of the good by stating a low or 
a zero WTP, even though they otherwise value the environmental initiative. These 
responses are classified as protest-bids and they result in an underestimation of benefits.
Thus, when valuing a natural resource, people are, similar to other types of 
consumption, unlikely to do so without considering other aspects of the proposal, 
including how this should be provided and paid for. A CV scenario should preferably be 
designed so that other influencing aspects are removed from people’s responses of
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WTP. However, these are often inseparable from the amenity, and although we may 
argue that the valuation context is relevant and that the whole ‘package* should be 
considered, this is problematic for subsequent welfare analysis that aims to capture only 
the value of the resource per se. It is nonetheless recommended to ask follow-up 
questions about attitudes toward the payment scheme, trust in responsible authorities, 
belief in the effectiveness of the suggested intervention, etc. The impact of the payment 
scheme may be specifically investigated by presenting people with different modes of 
payment and examine how WTP varies accordingly.
2.7. Compliance and Interviewer Effects
Social researchers believe that people are prone to shape their answers in order to please 
the interviewer, especially when they do not have a well-defined view of the survey 
topic (Schuman and Presser, 1981). This has lead critics to conclude that responses to 
CV questions are little more than expressions of political correctness that are 
demonstrated for the benefit of the researcher (Arrow et al., 1993). Mitchell and Carson 
(1989), and Carson et al (1996a), on the other hand, conclude that compliance bias does 
not represent a major problem in CV studies. In a study by the latter authors, half of the 
respondents answered the valuation question in a standard way, the other half was asked 
to write down their answer on a piece of paper, seal it and put it in a locked ballot box, 
and no significant difference was found between the groups.
Irrespective of such results, we know from research in social psychology that 
compliance is a complex phenomenon that should not be neglected. Apart from the 
mere desire to comply with fellow citizens and behave in an expected way, Milgram 
(1974) demonstrates that the profession and position of the researcher have a significant 
effect on authoritative behaviour; when the research leader was portrayed as an eminent
28Kelman (1958) identifies three processes of attitude change. Compliance occurs when respondents 
express views or change attitudes in order to please the majority or a significant person, internalisation 
when people are convinced by the validity of other people’s views, and finally, identification when 
individuals alter their opinions to become more alike someone they admire. In this context we are 
concerned with the former of these processes.
55
CHAPTER TWO
scientist, people were much more prone to co-operate with the research objectives. The 
main point is that authorities are more or less automatically accepted, and in order to 
resist their powerful influence, people must be given the opportunity to actively search 
for their sincere opinions and beliefs. Compliance is also more likely to occur in 
countries where people are framed by an ‘accepted-type’ of answer, may it be for 
cultural reasons or due to political constraints. The effect is also related to strategic 
behaviour in the sense that responses are affected by the decision-power or presumed 
influence on the project by the interviewers (e.g., Ericson and Svedsater, 1994).
In order to reduce the undesired influence of compliance, respondents should be 
reminded that the study aims to capture their ‘own’ private opinions toward the issue. 
They may for instance be informed that there are no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answers to the 
questions asked, and they should be convinced that responses will be treated 
anonymously, whereby no association is made between their name and their answers. In 
addition, although important for other reasons, the respondents should be encouraged to 
think through all relevant aspects of valuation, such as their budget constraint, whether 
they at all support the project, or believe in the institutional arrangements before a 
response is elicited. Finally, interviews should be conducted by experienced 
practitioners and enumerators, and procedures should be designed in ways that make 
each interview as uniform in structure as possible.
2.8. Embedding Effects
Embedding has received prominent attention in the CV literature and is considered as 
one of the most important objections to the use of CV studies. The notion was originally 
defined by Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) and is distinguished into two different kinds 
of effects. Perfect embedding, or insensitivity to scope, occurs when the WTP is the 
same, or not sufficiently differentiated, between environmental amenities that 
(substantially) differ from each other in their quantities or qualities. In other words, 
perfect embedding is a demonstration of a non-increasing (or monotonic) utility 
function since the respondent’s valuation is insensitive to the magnitude of the good, 
and it violates the fundamental axiom of economic theory that more of a good should be 
valued higher, provided that it encompasses positive values. Regular embedding, or
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part-whole bias, on the other hand, arises when “...the same good is assigned a lower 
value if WTP for it is inferred from WTP for a more inclusive good rather than if the 
particular good is evaluated on its own” (Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992; p. 58). The 
WTP of an environmental commodity is thus determined by how many other (public) 
goods are included in the scenario and valued simultaneously, which pose problems for 
the standard economic assumptions that values are context independent.
Despite the demonstration of embedding in a variety of studies covering a wide range of 
resources (e.g., Strand and Taraldset, 1991; Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992; Desvousges 
et al., 1993; Diamond et al., 1993; Kahneman and Ritov, 1994), there remains a wide 
disagreement whether the effect constitutes a major problem for the CVM. The major 
reason is that studies that have demonstrated such effects are, generally, judged by CV 
practitioners to be of poor quality in terms of questionnaire design and survey 
administration (e.g., Hanemann, 1994; Carson et a l, 1996a). Most importantly, CV 
advocates commonly emphasise that these attempts do not at all, or only to a limited 
extent, follow the NOAA panel’s guidelines for conducting CV studies.29
2.8.1. Perfect Embedding
Two diametrically opposed explanations for perfect embedding have been proposed in 
the CV literature; (i) poor quality in survey design and administration that either fail to 
establish a plausible scenario, or tend to mask differences in scope (e.g., Smith, 1992; 
Carson et a l, 1996a), or (ii) the methodology violates economic theory (e.g., Kahneman 
and Knetsch, 1992; Diamond and Hausman, 1994). Advocates of the CVM quite 
naturally subscribe to the former of these explanations, and Hoevenagel (1996) states 
that “...perfect embedding correlates with the use of poorly defined goods and with the 
use of goods which are only slightly different from each other” (p. 60). Hanemann 
(1994) resumes the argument by claiming that there are only two studies that have found 
a statistically significant effect of scope, and highlights at the same time the deficiency 
in study design of both these experiments. For example, he points out that these have 
used an OE valuation format, rather than a CE format, and further that the interviews
29 The details of this criticism will be explored in chapter four.
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have had the character of brief shopping-mall intercepts. Hutchinson et al. (1995) 
present a summary of other common objections against demonstrations of perfect 
embedding, such as insufficient piloting, lack of statistical power used to detect 
differences in value, and misleading or inappropriate context(s) for valuation.
These observations thus suggest that perfect embedding may be possible to overcome 
with improved questionnaire designs and interview techniques, or with more 
sophisticated statistical instruments, with the implicit conclusion that the opponents of 
the CVM have not completed their task with accuracy. For familiar environmental 
amenities, which to a large extent constitute use values, there ought not to be any severe 
problems of perfect embedding, and these should be possible to avoid or at least be 
minimised by careful survey implementation. On the contrary, for complex unfamiliar 
amenities mainly encompassing non-use values, the prospects are not as promising. 
Embedding is most likely to occur when respondents are poorly informed about the 
amenity, particularly if the hypothetical market and its provision are not presented as 
realistic. Some support for these assumptions is found in a number of independent 
studies (e.g., Hoevenagel, 1996; Smith and Osbome, 1996; Carson, 1997).
However, the conclusion that WTP would be responsive to scope as long as people are 
accurately and completely informed about the valuation issue, becomes somewhat 
problematic when the following is considered. The majority of studies rejecting the 
embedding hypothesis have relied on within-subject, rather than between-subject tests 
(e.g., Propper, 1990; Boyle et al, 1994). Since respondents ought to be strongly 
influenced by their previously stated value, no clear answer as to whether people have 
the ability to articulate unbiased estimates is provided. Furthermore, although the 
criticism of poorly elaborated surveys no doubt is warranted, CV researchers putting 
forward such arguments tend to present the goods in a way that pictures the magnitudes 
as ‘implausibly’ different between scenarios.
Fisher (1996) argues that monotonic preferences may in fact be reconciled with 
principles of economic theory, at least when assumptions are modified to allow for a 
non-increasing utility function. Standard consumer theory assumes a concave utility 
function as presented in Figure 2.1. It shows that value increases as a function of the
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quantity consumed, but the marginal value of an additional unit decreases as more of the 
good is consumed due to diminishing marginal returns. Hence, the marginal value of an 
increase from 1 to 2 units is larger than from 4 to 5 units. If we in addition assume that 
there is some kind of satiation point at which no more of the good is wanted, we would 
expect a very limited or no increase in utility beyond this point, which is illustrated by 
Figure 2.2. Fisher (1996) speculates that if many environmental amenities result in such 
utility functions (for instance, the number of birds saved may not have any value 
beyond a minimum level required for species survival), then any consumption above 
this level would add nothing to utility. Therefore, if the scope is varied from point Q1 to 
point g 6 between scenarios, the same value would be assigned to each of these states.
WTP
Quantity
WTP
Quantity
Figure 2.1. Concave utility function Figure 2.2. Satiation point
A major problem of this hypothesis is that not all environmental amenities are 
characterised by such distinct satiation points (e.g., visibility conditions at national 
parks, or beautiful landscapes). A fundamentally different interpretation not 
accommodated by conventional economic theory is suggested by Kahneman and 
Knetsch (1992), who conclude that WTP reflects the moral satisfaction derived from 
making donations to environmental goods, rather than being an indication of economic 
value. Their reasoning is an extension of Andreoni's (1990) hypothesis of the ‘warm 
glow’ that arises from the mere act of giving to a ‘good cause’, which presumably is 
enhanced through interaction with other people, as in the interview context. The 
hypothesis is also supported by a verbal-protocol analysis conducted by Schkade and 
Payne (1994), in which it was observed that WTP was constructed from a variety of
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considerations, including an obligation to pay a fair share of the cost of the proposed 
solution, and a signal of their concern for a good (environmental) cause.30
2.8.2. Regular Embedding
Regular embedding has been explained by the fact that respondents unconsciously 
include environmental, as well as other types of public (and sometimes private) goods, 
in their valuation of a more confined amenity (Mitchell and Carson, 1989). For instance, 
if a survey is designed to estimate the WTP for a reduction of hydrocarbonides, 
respondents may think of the total reduction of air pollutants and anchor their amount to 
this latter ‘imagined’ scenario. The bias may also occur because the respondents simply 
forget about other (public) goods that possibly need funding, and when reminded of 
these, their budget constraints force them to reduce their spending on the targeted 
commodity.
In a study of the WTP for a reduction of air pollutants by Strand and Taraldset (1991), 
one subset of the population was asked about their WTP for measures against air 
pollution, whereas in the other subset respondents were also presented a list of other 
environmental problems to be considered. They were subsequently asked to rank six 
different environmental problems that they found most important to take measures 
against. The respondents in the former subset were willing to pay significantly more for 
the reduction of air pollutants. This reflects respondents’ inability to consider other 
environmental problems that they value and that may need funding, but when they were 
informed of other possible public and environmental issues, WTP was reduced. Other 
studies suggest that simply reminding the respondents of other environmental problems, 
either related or unrelated to the specific good being valued, is not sufficient to alter 
people’s valuation {e.g., Halvorsen, 1993). A simultaneous valuation of a set of 
amenities is necessary in order to have an impact on respondents’ valuations, at least 
when these are complex and unfamiliar to the respondents. Thus, something beyond a 
mere description of budgetary substitutes seems necessary if properties of demand are to 
be properly reflected in contingent values.
30 The theoretical bases of these hypotheses are developed in chapter three and in the empirical section.
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A plausible explanation of regular (and perfect) embedding is the mental account 
hypothesis proposed by Thaler (1990), asserting that people have mental accounts for 
various classes of goods, and that monetary budgets for each of these are not 
transferable between sub-groups of goods, neither possible to separate into specific 
events. Consequently, money will not be ‘moved around’ in a rational way. For 
example, rather than considering how much money people would like to spend on the 
cinema, restaurants or concerts, they tend to bulk these types of expenditures into a 
broader category, perhaps called ‘entertainment’, from which they are reluctant to 
transfer money to other but different consumption alternatives. As a result, people tend 
to focus on their total valuation of a larger set of goods, in this case possibly 
environmental amenities in general, instead of the particular object to be valued.
2.9. Sequence Effects
Akin to part-whole bias is the so called sequence effects, which involves the influence 
exerted on the estimated value by the order in which the good is valued in a sequence of 
goods. The typical empirical finding is that the value falls, often dramatically, the later 
the amenity is valued in a sequence (Diamond et al., 1993; Carson et a l, 1996a). CV 
proponents are again keen to assert that these effects are due to defective survey 
instruments. It has been argued that in many instances the goods valued in a sequence 
have been described to the respondents as quite similar, thereby making them perfect 
substitutes for each other. We would therefore expect that the value falls substantially 
the later the targeted amenity is valued. The effect has also been called ‘positional’ bias 
in the literature, since the order in which different goods are presented may also suggest 
their order of importance (Mitchell and Carson, 1989). Similar types of ‘primacy- 
effects’ have been demonstrated in various contexts of social research, which entail 
higher endorsements of items presented early in a list of alternatives, whereas other 
alternatives, particularly presented in the middle, are assigned less importance (Schwarz 
etal., 1991).
Randall and Hoehn (1996) show theoretically why adding together independently 
valued goods should be higher, compared to when these goods are valued 
simultaneously in a package. This effect occurs also for marketed private goods and the
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anomaly may be explained by income and substitution effects (Randall and Hoehn, 
1996). However, the effects ought not to be as strong as that which has been 
demonstrated in CV studies.31 An alternative explanation is that people do not consider 
their total income in their valuation. Similar to Thaler's (1990) mental-account 
hypothesis, WTP is conditioned by the disposable or ‘marginal’ income that has to be 
allocated over a number of classes and sub-classes of good, one of which may be 
reserved for environmental amenities. In the event that this ‘environmental account’ is 
consumed as the first commodity is valued, and assuming that this is a close substitute 
of the commodity valued subsequently, we would expect large substitution effects.
Irrespective of the search for plausible explanations of sequence effects, a major 
problem still remains; what constitutes an appropriate context in which environmental 
goods should be valued? When different goods are valued independently, their benefits 
will be grossly overestimated, compared to when the same goods are valued in a 
package, and since it is not feasible to value all possible public goods simultaneously 
(environmental as well as others), the problem remains unresolved. Hoevenagel (1996) 
has offered a criterion regarding in which context the benefits of an environmental 
amenity should be derived, suggesting that the number of substitutes presented in the 
survey depends on the time span over which the particular project is realised. Over a 
shorter period it is not necessary to inform the respondents of any substitutes, but the 
longer the period of time, the more appropriate would it be to adjust for budget 
alternatives by introducing substitutes in the scenario. However, I do not believe that 
this provides any viable solution to the problem, since it is difficult to approximate the 
length of the period over which the actual project extends. It is very problematic, if not
31 However, as mentioned previously, there is a pronounced difference between private and public goods 
in the derivation of substitution and income elasticities.
32 According to Diamond and Hausman (1994), the assumption of a large substitution effect between 
various environmental amenities is inappropriate since preferences should be defined over the natural 
resources remaining, not over the amount of resources available. Consequently, WTP should be larger 
the smaller the quantity remaining, and thus the WTP for preserving two amenities should be higher 
than the sum of WTP for each amenity valued alone. However, this prediction assumes that the amenity 
valued is the only one threatened. When both are threatened but only one is considered in the question, 
we should expect diminishing values over a sequence of goods as postulated.
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impossible, to envision all potential future environmental and public (or private) goods 
that need funding, even in the shorter term. Thus, it is very difficult to find a single 
context of valuation that is ‘theoretically’ correct.
2.10. Population and Sample Selection Bias
Of concern when determining welfare effects is to specify what is the relevant 
population. Population choice bias arises when the defined population does not 
adequately correspond to the population to whom the benefits and costs of the amenity 
will accrue. This issue is particularly important when the environmental resource is 
geographically dispersed, or when it involves large non-use values. As argued before, in 
these situations the researcher or policy maker must decide who’s value should be 
accounted for. For example, is it appropriate to take into account ‘all’ citizens, since 
anyone may derive a benefit from the resource being valued, or should focus be placed 
on agents that use the resource in some way or the other?
The next problem facing the CV researcher is to actually identify the population that 
fulfil the chosen criteria. Furthermore, the level of measurement must be decided. A 
choice ought to be made between individuals or households as the agents. Theoretically, 
the household’s WTP should be the sum of individual WTP among members of this 
household. However, in a CV study, values will be underestimated if the individual 
representing the household fails to realise and include the economic value on behalf of 
other household members. Obviously, the level of measurement should be decided 
according to what respondents automatically think of when stating WTP. For example, 
if they tend to consider the benefits accrued to the household and how much the family 
on the whole can afford to pay, despite being informed that they should consider their 
individual value, WTP should preferably be measured at the household level.
Other problems to avoid are sample selection bias and to minimise item non-response 
bias. The former entails similar problems as in other areas of social research and may be 
avoided by using a proper method of probability sampling. Yet, in CVM and other 
Stated Preference Methods (SPMs), there is a specific problem of self-selection bias, 
arising for instance when only people who have an interest in the resource (or of
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environmental issues in general) respond to the survey. It is further not unlikely that 
these respondents represent a particular viewpoint, and thereby the results will not 
necessarily be representative of the targeted population. In cases when the overall 
response rate is low it is therefore recommended to carefully follow-up those who did 
not respond to the survey in the first place and examine whether these people seem to 
differ from the respondents regarding factors and characteristics that influence WTP.
Item non-response bias occurs when people fail to answer various key questions, and 
there is a problem of deciding how to exactly treat those who do not answer these 
questions; does it imply that they have misunderstood or simply forgot to answer the 
question, or does it reflect a protest against the proposal? Similar problems arise in the 
case of zero-responses of WTP; should these be treated as ‘true* zero WTP, or is it more 
adequate to view them as protest bids against the methodological procedure, or other 
aspects of the scenario? Generally in survey research, item non-responses above 10% 
are rare, but in CV contexts, non-response rates as high as 20-30%, or higher, are not 
uncommon (Mitchell and Carson, 1989). The frequency of zero responses has also been 
demonstrated to be rather high in CV studies. The most straightforward solution to this 
problem is to explicitly ask for the reasons behind stated WTP, and on the basis of this 
separate respondents who do not place any value on the resource from those who do but 
find the valuation scenario inappropriate, implausible or unconvincing.
2.11. Conclusions
In this chapter a number of theoretical problems and potential biases and anomalies of 
CV responses have been presented, some of which are common for measurement in 
other areas of social research (e.g. anchoring, sequence (or order) effects), and others 
that are specific for the CVM (e.g. embedding effects, payment-vehicle bias, the 
inclusion of non-use values). The validity of a measure reflecting a theoretical notion or 
construct, whether it is an attitude or an economic value, depends on how well it 
represents real behaviour or traits among the group of people being investigated. In the 
case of economic values for environmental resources, measured either as WTP or WTA, 
four types of validity deserve closer attention; usefulness, content validity, criterion 
validity, and construct validity.
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Any measure, whatever it is reflecting, must be judged according to how useful it is. 
Very often in social science this condition is not paid sufficient attention to. The CVM 
is warranted by the alleged effectiveness of including public issues in cost-benefit 
analysis in order to prevent an excess provision or use of these. Nevertheless, although 
on the whole useful, some CV studies have aimed at assigning monetary values to 
issues that reasonably may not be possible, nor meaningful, to incorporate within 
welfare economic analysis, either because they are too complex, or due to the lack of 
feasible institutional arrangements in order to capture estimated values. However, I will 
in this thesis focus on cases when an institutional arrangement may be established, or at 
least appears plausible. Continuing with construct validity, this may be separated into 
two categories (Mitchell and Carson, 1989). Theoretical validity reflects how well 
estimates of WTP or WTA can be predicted by various characteristics among the 
respondents (such as gender, income, age, etc.), whereas convergent validity is judged 
on the basis of to what extent CV estimates correspond to the results of alternative 
methodological approaches of valuing the resource.
The former criterion is in CV studies regularly assessed by capturing socio-economic 
characteristics of respondents, and the results from most CV studies show that stated 
economic values are fairly well predicted by these.33 However, this only indicates that 
different people value the same amenity differently, and provides no information 
regarding how the same individual responds to various levels of this, nor how much 
value is assigned to different amenities. On the basis of these limitations, embedding 
emerges as a relevant anomaly to study in order to assess the validity of CV results. 
With respect to convergent validity, Carson et a l (1996a) conclude that, on the basis of 
a meta-analysis comparing CV results with those derived from Observed Indirect (01) 
approaches of benefit estimation, such as the travel cost method or hedonic price-based 
measures, the CVM does reasonably well. The ratio between CV responses and revealed 
preferences is estimated to fall within the range of 0.78 and 0.92, indicating that CV
33 The usual result is that income, level of education and geographical proximity are positively correlated 
with WTP, whereas age is negatively correlated with WTP (Carson et al., 1996a). The arguments are 
that richer people can afford to pay more, and more highly educated and younger people are better 
informed of the value and importance of environmental preservation.
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studies slightly underestimate economic value. However, there are relatively few studies 
that have applied more than one approach to benefit estimation to the same good, and 
the goods included in the meta-analysis are rather familiar and locally well-defined, for 
which non-use values are absent or very limited. Thus, no implications regarding the 
validity of CV responses in general can be drawn from these results.
The major problem with the notions of validity discussed above is that they are internal 
in the sense that they all make comparisons within a hypothetical domain, or rely on 
indirect measures of economic value. A stronger test of validity is obviously to compare 
hypothetical statements with real payments, or ultimately, the extent to which derived 
WTP and/or WTA represent economic values as purported by cost-benefit analysis. 
Criterion validity is rarely if ever assessed in the context of CVM since no markets exist 
for the amenity. Yet, a handful of studies have been conducted that compare 
hypothetical WTP with consequential payments in experiments, and as mentioned 
previously, these generally suggest that hypothetical WTP seems to be a poor predictor 
of real behaviour (e.g., Seip and Strand, 1992; Neill et a l, 1994), although no 
conclusive evidence is provided regarding this aspect.
On the whole, the performance of the CVM regarding the above aspects of validity 
seems to be inferior to most types of assessment in social research. More importantly 
though, as far as content validity (or face validity) is concerned, this criterion has been 
largely or completely overlooked in the CV literature. Exceptions that put emphasis on 
the link between assessed economic values and the underlying theoretical construct are 
usually written by researchers who are not directly involved in empirical research (e.g., 
Anderson, 1993; Barry, 1995; Keat, 1997), and therefore very few empirical test have 
been carried out. Accordingly, it will form an important part of this thesis and the 
validity concept will play a central role in the theoretical chapter that follows. I will put 
the methodology within a broader framework and discuss whether lay people 
understand or consent to the idea of assigning economic values to natural resources, or 
how they otherwise interpret and evaluate CV questions. In order to enlighten this 
discussion, theoretical perspectives traditionally viewed as being outside the CV 
literature will be utilised.
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The empirical studies and experiments will build on this theorising and put emphasis on 
issues and anomalies that have implications for the validity of the underlying value 
construct, that is, if people at all have any (‘true’) economic values for environmental 
resources commonly being valued in CV studies. In particular, among the problems 
reviewed in this chapter, embedding effects, the correspondence between hypothetical 
statements and actual behaviour, and to a certain extent compliance bias and the 
inclusion of non-use values, will be specifically investigated. Additionally, focus will be 
placed on issues that have not received much attention in the previous literature. It is 
envisaged that these effects and their variance (or invariance) with methodological 
approaches of benefit estimation will provide useful information about the possibilities 
and limitations of assigning monetary values to natural resources, whereas the other 
types of biases presented here are more of isolated methodological problems not 
necessarily linked to content validity. Although the results may not always clearly 
distinguish between content validity and measurement validity, the latter that assumes 
that there is an underlying value that the methodology fails to adequately capture, both 
which are interesting in their own respect, qualitative analyses will be performed in 
order to ascertain the origin of observed anomalies in CV studies and other approaches 
to environmental benefit estimation.
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Having summarised the literature on potential problems with the Contingent Valuation 
Methodology (CVM) in the previous chapter, I will now discuss the theoretical 
underpinnings of hypothetical value statements. The purpose is not necessarily to 
provide exact explanations for empirical anomalies, but aims to present a broader 
framework wherein results of Contingent Valuation (CV) studies may be interpreted. 
The major objective is thus to illuminate theoretical notions and perspectives that may 
help to improve our understanding of economic values in these contexts. In the 
introductory chapter of this thesis I argued that the literature on the CVM has somewhat 
lost its relevance due to its focus on isolated anomalies and methodological procedures, 
whereas little effort has been made in order to explore the basic nature of CV responses. 
The touchstone for assessing validity has been how well data fit with established 
economic models, whereas the processes of valuation have been largely ignored.
Two theoretical areas will be explored in this chapter, each of which have the potential 
to enhance our understanding of how and why people value public goods in hypothetical 
market scenarios. Firstly, I will present findings from research directly related to 
preference and value formation, reviewing some important hypotheses that challenge 
the idea of economic rationality, and setting out a discussion that explores the 
implications for environmental benefit estimation. Secondly, I will address the broader 
issues of attitude formation and structure, such as the attitude-behaviour link, construal 
processes of preference formation, the functional (or expressive) value of attitudes, 
mental models and interpretations of CV scenarios, and the social processes of public 
opinion. This section adopts a social-psychological perspective on the assessment of 
economic values that aims to facilitate a more constructive analysis of CV results.
3.1. Economic Rationality and Preference Formation
A fundamental axiom of standard economic theory is that individuals will act rationally 
upon changes in their environment. Choices are interpreted as reflections of individual 
preferences only, and as such they define whether the individual is acting rationally or
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not, and preferences are finally assumed to be independent of contextual factors. Thus, 
economic preferences are seen as mechanistic reactions to the existence of and changes 
in environmental conditions, no matter in which context, culture or society, they occur. 
The problems and anomalies discussed in the previous chapter quite clearly demonstrate 
that this model of economic behaviour is merely normative, with limited capacities to 
explain how and on what basis people actually make choices. This is by no means a 
controversial statement. Numerous artefacts of conventional economic theory, such as 
preference intransitivity, Ellsberg paradoxes, endowment effects, framing and response­
mode effects, are well known through their occurrence in a vast number of experiments, 
employed in a variety of contexts (e.g., Tversky, 1969; Fischhoff et al., 1988; Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1988; Kahneman et al., 1990; Kleindorfer et a l, 1993).
Past research in the psychology of human decision-making and judgement-making 
abilities further suggests that such inconsistencies are not temporary effects, but rather 
behavioural regularities (e.g., Simon, 1986; Harris et al., 1989; Gregory et al., 1993; 
Conlisk, 1996). This has resulted in alternative theories and hypotheses that recognise 
the limited access to information and computational capacities among humans, such as 
‘satisficing’ (Simon, 1955), simplification of decision rules (Kahneman et al., 1982), 
and (narrow) choice bracketing (Read et a l, 1999). Apart from explanations of various 
deviations from normative models, the mere definition of rationality is assumed to be 
dependent on societal and cultural underpinnings (Etzioni, 1986), which presents 
additional problems in deciding what in fact should be interpreted as irrational 
behaviour. In the following I will review some descriptive models of economic 
behaviour that are relevant for the CVM, such as heuristics o f economic decision­
making and prospect theory.
3.1.1. Heuristics o f Econom ic Decision Making
In their widely cited book, Kahneman et al. (1982) summarise a series of papers about 
the judgement and decision-making under various forms of uncertainty. The starting 
point of this research is that many decisions in such contexts are based on a variety of 
beliefs reflecting the likelihood of uncertain events. However, rather than searching 
their mind for the objective likelihood that something will occur, this is expressed by
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individuals in statements such as “’I think that...’, ‘chances are...’, ‘it is likely that...’, 
and so forth” (Kahneman et al., 1982; p. 3). Thus, the perceived likelihood is dynamic 
and vaguely represented, rather than being a precise estimate. The most important 
finding is nevertheless that the occurrence of events are considered as more or less 
likely, even on occasions when exact probabilities are explicitly provided. This 
necessitates a distinction between objective and subjective probability, the latter which 
may deviate significantly from the former, and is expressed as an approximate range 
that may or may not enclose the underlying ‘true’ probability.
The research by Kahneman et al. (1982) centres on three ‘rules of thumb’ that are 
employed under conditions of uncertainty; representativeness, availibility, and 
anchoring. ‘Representativeness’ implies that an event is evaluated on the basis of to 
what degree it is representative of another event, or class of events. The subjective 
probability that something will occur thus depends on how similar this is to another 
event for which the characteristics or outcomes are known. Key words in this evaluation 
process are ‘resembles’, ‘similar to’, and ‘reminds o f. The ‘availability-heuristic’ 
reflects the idea that the evaluation of the probability of an event depends on the ease to 
which other but similar events can be brought to mind. For example, the subjective 
probability of winning on the lottery depends on our own and friend’s experiences of 
winning. Finally and as discussed previously, anchoring hypothesises that people start 
from an initial guess that is subsequently adjusted in order to generate a final answer.34
On many occasions, the shortcut that these decision-rules offer seems to be quite useful 
in order to arrive at satisfactory decisions. However, I will argue that the viability of 
such techniques becomes more fragile as the situation becomes less familiar and more 
complex. Environmental resources most commonly are unfamiliar (since we normally 
cannot expect the respondents to have any previous experience of using them) and 
complex (since they carry with them an array of different attributes that are either
34 The hypotheses by Kahneman et al. (1982) have been complemented and modified by more resent 
research. Gigerenzer (1996) and Todd and Gigerenzer (1999) argue that the focus on three main 
heuristics is insufficient since there are many more types o f heuristics that are likely to be employed in 
human decision-making. The ‘original’ heuristics are too vaguely defined and should rather be seen as 
broad categorisations of more specific decision rules.
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unknown or not easily distinguished from each other). Moreover, private goods entail 
one important aspect that makes them differ from environmental amenities; we are used 
to making decisions about them on a daily basis, implying that our heuristics are applied 
in an appropriate context in which our previous experience comes to help. Hence, the 
valuation of marketed goods is made within a relevant framework that does not yet exist 
for the majority of environmental resources.
The strategies discussed above generally suggest that people do not think abstractly 
about (complex) social issues. The ‘availability-heuristic’ is similar to Abelson's (1976) 
theory of script processing in attitude formation, which postulates that an attitude is 
determined by particular episodes or symbols that can be recalled. This challenges the 
recommendations set out by the NOAA panel (Arrow et al., 1993), which urge CV 
researchers to completely and rigorously inform respondents about the amenity and its 
terms of provision. This perspective on judgement-making abilities is well illustrated in 
major microeconomic textbooks, which devote significant space to explore asymmetric 
and imperfect information among economic agents since assuming that these are the 
main reasons for market dis-equilibrium. However, the provision of additional 
information may be insufficient in order to alter respondents’ behaviour and avoid 
involved anomalies of decision-making. Abelson (1976) argues that;
Specifically, the impact of abstract base-rate information about the consensual frequency of 
an event has virtually no effect on judgments about the motives or future behavior of an 
actor, in comparison to “distinctiveness” information about other episodes involving the 
actor, (p. 41)
As argued in chapter two, the quality of information and arguments presented in a CV 
scenario, although having a strong impact under conditions of high personal relevance, 
has only a moderate influence under conditions of low personal relevance (Ajzen et al., 
1996). This finding is also in accordance with the elaboration likelihood model of 
persuasion developed by Petty and Cacioppo (1986), which predicts that involvement is 
positively correlated to the susceptibility of qualitative information. It is worthwhile to 
contemplate what implications this has regarding people’s judgements of environmental 
issues. For example, embedding effects may partly be explained by this phenomenon, 
since the scope, urgency and severity of a (global) environmental problem generally is
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not reflected in stated Willingness To Pay (WTA), despite attempts to make these 
aspects explicit to the respondents. To conclude, since probabilities for quite well- 
defined issues are (at best) approximately interpreted, we may question to what extent 
people can comprehend and report precise opinions about unfamiliar events. This aspect 
will be addressed in the empirical sections that follow.
3.1.2. Prospect Theory
Prospect theory, unlike Expected Utility Theory (EUT) originally proposed by von 
Neumann and Morgenstem (1944), predicts that choices will depend not only on actual 
outcomes, but how the problem is framed (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). If given a 
sum of £100, in addition to what they already own, and then presented with the 
alternatives A (50% chance of winning £100), and B (sure win of £50) in a choice set, 
the majority choose B. However, when given a sum of £200 and presented the 
alternatives C (50% of losing £100), and D (sure loss of £50), the majority choose C. 
According to EUT, the expected utility of all options are equal (0.5 * 100 = 50), and 
therefore the individual should be indifferent between these alternatives. If nevertheless 
one specific alternative is considered as better, we would according to principles of 
invariance expect that particular choice to be repeated in the next choice set.
The major conclusion proposed by the authors is that people in their decision strategies 
do not primarily focus upon final outcomes, but on incremental stages and isolated parts 
of the choice set (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). They are likely to adopt sub-optimal 
strategies by ignoring shared components and concentrating on distinguishing features. 
These outcomes are similar to those that result from ‘narrow choice bracketing’ (or
-1C
mcomplete weighting of alternatives) proposed by Read et al. (1999). In the above
35 When people bracket their choices broadly, they consider all choice alternatives simultaneously, and 
when the bracketing is narrow, each choice alternative is considered in isolation. Whereas ‘broad 
choice bracketing’ allows the decision maker to take account of all possible consequences of a choice, 
in ‘narrow choice bracketing’ only a limited number of consequences are considered. Often these 
consequences are immediate and local to the specific event, implying that more global and long-term 
consequences are restrained or ignored (Read et al., 1999).
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example the distinguishing feature is whether the problem is presented as a gain or loss, 
and it is evident that we attach more weight to the latter than the former (Kahneman et 
al., 1990). In addition to the framing of alternatives as gains or losses, individuals tend 
to assign higher weights to low probabilities for losses and risks, compared to 
probabilities associated with gains, and are assumed to prefer certainty over uncertainty 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Figure 3.1. illustrates the value function according to 
prospect theory.
Value
Gain
Loss
Value
Figure 3.1. Prospect theory and the framing of values.
Contrary to EUT, which anticipates a symmetrical function, value increases or 
decreases proportionally more when this is framed as a loss rather than a gain. The 
functional relationship is not only relevant for people’s understanding of probabilities, 
or how they process information depending on how the task is framed. It may also 
reflect their acceptance of the procedure. If this is not taken on board, many people will 
reply with protest bids that do not necessarily imply a ‘worthless’ amenity. 
Identification and perception of property rights are key concepts here. Firstly, losses 
evoke different emotional and behavioural responses than gains. Losses are a threat to 
the individual that she is programmed to react more decisively to (Schroeder and 
Dwyer, 1988), and in the same way that children have a stronger attachment to teddy 
bears in their arms than those on store shelves, one’s possessions partly define one’s
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identity (Heberlein, 1988). These effects are therefore commonly referred to as 
‘endowment effects’.
If CV responses are measuring the intensity of such emotional arousal, which according 
to some studies they are (e.g., Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992), logically, losses would be 
assigned significantly greater weight than gains, simply because giving up something 
‘costs more’. We would therefore expect people to provide larger monetary values for 
the prevention of environmental deterioration, compared to equivalent improvements. 
The CV scenario also provides information regarding the origin of the problem, which 
involves political judgements regarding who caused this and, therefore, is responsible. 
Hence, the CV researcher is deliberately or unwittingly assigning rights that the 
respondents possibly have not thought about before, or which may be against what they 
consider appropriate. Furthermore, Walker et al. (1999) found that the disparity between 
WTP and WTA was far greater for damage caused by human intervention than naturally 
caused damage. Implicit in the former framing is that someone is responsible for the 
damage, and the respondents are likely to make a moral statement when demanding 
compensation. On the other hand, when the environmental change is naturally caused it 
does not carry the same moral implications, and measures against it may not seem 
warranted.
3.1.3. Implications for Environmental Benefit Estimation
On the basis of the various anomalies that have been demonstrated in CV research, 
Diamond and Hausman (1994) conclude that “...with a pattern of results that is 
inconsistent with the usual economic assumptions, two interpretations are always 
possible; the survey was defective, or the CV method does not measure with accuracy” 
(p. 53), the latter which imposes major restrictions on the applicability of the 
methodology. However, a third interpretation appears possible, namely that core
36 This thereby offers an explanation for the large differences found between WTP and WTA estimates 
for the same environmental amenity. Whereas for the former the good is presented as a gain {i.e., ‘my 
WTP to achieve this environmental improvement is ... ’), for the latter it is generally framed as a loss 
{i.e., ‘my WTA compensation for this environmental deterioration is.. . ’).
74
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
assumptions of economic theory are misplaced or irrelevant, since people do not seem 
to possess well-behaved preferences for marketed goods.37 This may at first sight bear 
relevance for environmental valuation, because if we find that rational economic 
reasoning applies to other examples of economic decision-making, this indicates that the 
CV methodology is flawed. On the other hand, if it is demonstrated that people are also 
acting irrationally in the decision process regarding ordinary marketed goods, then the 
argument against CVM becomes problematic since otherwise any sort of economic 
preference has to be disqualified.
However, although irrational behaviour is not restricted to CV contexts, the deviations 
from anything called rational are much more pronounced within the latter. Moreover, 
regardless of how irrational or inconsistent market decisions are, they still represent real 
behaviour. Revealed preferences fundamentally differ from stated preferences in the 
sense that they are based on observation of choices people actually make. They carry 
with them economic consequences, and economic theory is about measuring such 
consequences. No matter if these choices make sense or not, and irrespective of to what 
extent these represent something we can call ‘true’ value, they are still consequential in 
determining economic growth and wealth distribution. As Keat (1997) puts it, “market 
transactions take place without reference to the reasons for which consumers prefer 
what they ‘happen’ to prefer: the market is, as it were ... ‘blind to reasons’” (p. 36). A 
different problem arises when value is hypothetically stated and does not meet the 
criteria of welfare estimation, that is, when it does not properly reflect the states of 
affairs and physical consequences it is supposed to measure.
Stated preferences nonetheless carry some desirable properties. They avoid some of the 
problematic assumptions that underlie revealed preferences, such as what is true in the 
past will remain true in the future, and that existing social and economic circumstances 
will prevail. The elicitation of stated preferences may further be valuable for the 
development of economic theory;
37 It has been indicated, for instance, that embedding effects are standard economic phenomena, even 
though the effects are more pronounced for public than for private goods (Randall and Hoehn, 1996).
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In fact, the critical scrutiny directed at the contingent valuation method has led some 
economists to think more deeply about cognitive processes, rationality, and the nature of 
preferences for all goods, public or private. We may, in other words, come out of this debate 
with an improved theory of preference and choice (Portney (1994); p. 15; emphasis in 
original)
Unfortunately, few CV researchers seem to be taking these possibilities on board. A 
common strategy among CV advocates has predominantly, if not exclusively, been to 
propose improved methodological procedures that would overcome involved problems. 
This agenda, as argued previously, evolve to the experimentation and development of 
new elicitation techniques, methods for ‘trimming’ data, sophisticated models of 
explanation, or simply adding auxiliary hypotheses, whereas little effort has been made 
to understand the very basis of people’s perception of natural resources and their 
comprehension of economic value in these contexts. As argued by Fischhoff (1991), this 
‘fallacy’ originates from the dominating paradigm in economics, which alludes to 
people’s ability to articulate and express values on the most diverse topics as long as 
questions are unambiguously described and adequately interpreted by respondents. 
However, the complexity of value formation and expression are likely to go far beyond 
the scope of economic models, which suggests that alternative theoretical perspectives 
and notions are relevant for studying these phenomena.
3.2. Attitudes and Social Psychological Perspectives
The discussion so far reveals that the analysis of CV results within the standard 
economic framework is insufficient to explain how people perceive and value the 
environment. An implication is that CV responses represent more, and perhaps 
something different, than economic value as understood in market transactions. 
Therefore, rather than see WTP purely in the context of a purchase model, it should be 
considered as a special type of attitude that involves more than physical states of the 
world, and which acknowledges the ambiguities involved (Ritov and Kahneman, 1997; 
Kahneman et al., 1999). Attitudes have in the literature been defined as “...a 
psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some 
degree of favor or disfavor” (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; p. 1). As such they are not
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directly observable, but manifest themselves as indicative statements. A CV response 
may be considered as an attitude in the sense that it is an evaluation of an object, the 
natural environment, and it is expressed in monetary terms, which may be regarded as a 
particular attitude scale. By treating CV responses as attitudes we confront some basic 
issues that run through the literature, and in this section I will discuss some important 
theoretical developments in these fields. Specifically, I attempt to address the following 
aspects; the predictive power of attitudes, their meaningfulness, structure, and (social) 
construction.
3.2.1. The Attitude-Behaviour Link
Throughout the last century, attitudes’ impact on behaviour has received prominent 
attention by sociologists and psychologists alike. Probably the most significant 
theoretical development in this field is the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) proposed 
by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980). The theory distinguishes three important factors that 
guide behaviour; attitudes, social norms, and behavioural intentions. Attitudes represent 
beliefs about the consequences of a behaviour, or about the object itself, whereas social 
norms are perceptions of how significant others would act, or what they would think 
about a particular behaviour. Both these factors determine the individual’s intention to 
pursue a behaviour, which is the proximal cause of eventually engaging in this (Eagly 
and Chaiken, 1993). Thus, whereas attitudes only indirectly predict behaviour, the direct 
influence is exerted by behavioural intentions. Although being widely criticised over the 
years, mainly since it offers an incomplete description of the causes of behaviour (Eagly 
and Chaiken, 1993),38 the TRA still represents a powerful framework for studying the 
link between attitudes and behaviour, in this particular case to what extent hypothetical 
value statements correspond to real economic commitments toward natural resources 
and other public goods.
38 For instance, Fredricks and Dossett (1983) compared it with the Bentler-Speckart model and found 
direct paths from prior behaviour to intention in a circular fashion, something which is overlooked by 
the Ajzen-Fishbein model. Furthermore, Fazio (1990) distinguishes between spontaneous and 
deliberative cognitive processing that ultimately depends on the type o f behaviour. Generally, the TRA 
has been criticised for its simplification that causation flows in a single direction (Liska, 1984).
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Attitudes’ predictive power of subsequent behaviour strongly depends on the context 
within which attitudes are expressed. In order to serve as valid means of prediction, 
attitudes ought to be assessed within a context that imitates the one within which 
behaviour actually takes place. Moreover, the time-span between attitude assessment 
and behavioural action needs to be limited (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980), because 
otherwise influencing external and internal conditions are likely to change. These key 
features are clearly not fulfilled in the majority of CV studies; monetary valuation of 
environmental resources does not comply with the procedures upon which public action 
is normally taken, and the time-span before policy measures are eventually introduced, 
if ever, is considerable. If people cannot comprehend a link between the CV study and 
policy implementation, their answers to this may not carry with them any intentions. 
They are, as LaPiere (1934) has argued, symbolic responses to imagined events.
Furthermore, Krosnick (1986) demonstrates that the attitudes people consider to be 
important are more stable over time, whereas unimportant attitudes show evidence of 
considerable change over a relative short time frame. This implicitly suggests that 
important attitudes are more strongly correlated with behaviour. For example, attitudes 
that are important tend to be relatively intense and reported at extreme points along 
attitude scales, whereas unimportant attitudes are expressed more neutrally at the 
midpoint (Krosnick, 1986; Bishop, 1990). The meaning of a neutral attitude is less 
obvious, and it does not tell us too much about subsequent behaviour since this may be 
pursued in either direction. The question is whether CV responses should be seen as 
reflections of important or unimportant attitudes. Despite the fact that environmental 
issues commonly are important, they are not necessarily perceived as personally 
relevant to the individual, which reasonably influences the strength, and therefore 
importance of an attitude. Eagly and Chaiken (1993) argue that unimportant or ‘un­
involving’ attitudes are structurally isolated and less resistant to change. Furthermore, 
importance is determined by past experience of the attitude object, something that 
generally does not exist with respect to (complex) environmental issues.
Abelson (1986) advocates public commitment as an important factor in determining the 
strength of a belief, and accordingly in predicting behaviour. He states that “an 
individual who with apparent sincerity espouses a particular belief to a public audience
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must seem to that audience really to have that belief’ (p. 232). Aware of this reflected 
appraisal, the individual will regard this belief as a possession, and Abelson further 
argues that she will behave toward it as such. Another factor having implications for 
whether an attitude is ‘strong’ or not is the extent to which it has been elaborated, or 
traced in its origin. A belief that has been elaborated at great length is likely to be more 
accessible and strongly held than beliefs that are constructed on the spur of the moment, 
and therefore more strongly correlated with behaviour (Kokkinaki and Lunt, 1997). 
Again, ‘opinions’ uttered in a CV interview or survey are hardly well elaborated, nor do 
they have an evident origin since the respondents presumably have not been confronted 
with a similar inquiry before, and we may therefore question if and to what extent CV 
responses are predictive of future actions, conceptualised as actual subsequent payments 
in real-world contexts or experiments. This will hence be investigated in this thesis.
3.2.2. Value Construction and 'Non-Attitudes*
According to theoretical assumptions in economics, preferences are exogenous. The 
utility that the individual derives from a certain good or service determines preferences, 
which in turn define market prices. A radical interpretation put forward by Hollis and 
Nell (1975) is that the influence does not only flow in this direction; prices and costs 
simultaneously define value, giving arise to endogenous preferences. The value of an 
outcome is thus not independent of the resources and efforts required in order to attain 
this goal. An informative example is put forward by Schwarz (1997), who argues that 
our reaction to a $800 bill for a car repair would be dramatically different if only a loose 
wire has to be fixed, compared to a complete replacement of the engine, although the 
outcome is the same. Values are both determined by end results as well as the means of 
achieving these, and furthermore, they depend on judgements of what would be a 
reasonable or fair price (e.g., Lewis, 1990). Extending this argument, we may claim that 
money in many contexts is merely a means of realising certain goals, rather than being a 
measurable continuous concept genuinely reflecting value or worth.
Apart from implying problematic circularities for economic theory, the influence of 
prices and costs has important consequences for environmental valuation. The efforts 
needed to achieve a particular environmental improvement are likely to signal the
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implicit price of this, which subsequently determines WTP. For instance, Baron and 
Maxwell (1996) demonstrate that the cost of a public good, either when explicitly stated 
or indirectly suggested according to how this would be provided, influence WTP. The 
anticipated flow from values to prices is presumably more apparent the more 
experienced we are with the good, and value may establish itself more correctly when 
we are familiar with the benefits and characteristics of this (Whitehead et al., 1995). 
On the other hand, in the valuation of novel amenities, we are more dependent on prices 
and costs as a benchmark for what would be a reasonable response of WTP. Since we 
cannot predict to what extent we will use these goods in the future, neither are we aware 
of their relative importance to us, which ultimately determines underlying values. Thus, 
apart from realising the future consequences of environmental changes, people must 
also predict their preferences for these, which is an inherently difficult task.
Some may argue that the mere statement of value is sufficient for valid preferences, but 
I am reluctant to agree with this statement, because value is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for the existence of preferences. Value in its purest form, as in ‘I 
value the right to express ones view’, exists across a vast number of contexts and finds 
innumerable ways of expression, but the crucial task is to capture these in a single 
format. Even though accepting a ‘weak’ definition of preferences, we ought to ask 
ourselves; do such preferences make sense, and is it sensible to estimate welfare effects 
and draw policy recommendations on the basis of these? I am inclined to argue, 
therefore, that economists wishing to capture economic value in such contexts are trying 
to bridge a gap between fundamental values and economic preferences before the 
relationship between these entities are sufficiently and widely understood in society.
As a consequence of the complexity involved, and the fact that people are not used to 
thinking about environmental resources in monetary terms, some researchers have 
concluded that people construct their preferences at the time of being interviewed, 
rather than retrieve a previously established value from memory (Gregory et al., 1993;
39 However, bearing in mind that even on equity markets, which often are assumed to be the most perfect 
of markets, investors are quite clearly influenced by price movements in their buying and selling 
behaviour, and they do not solely base their decisions on exogenous factors (Shiller, 1990).
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Schkade and Payne, 1994). Schuman (1996) argues that for novel public goods, it is 
hard to see how respondents could bring with them or on the spot construct a definite 
preference entirely on their own and without any cues at hand. Taking these aspects into 
consideration, the prospects of deriving valid and reliable values for such intangible 
commodities as climate change or a threatened species in a remote part of the world 
appear dubious. If people continuously make decision errors in experiments on ordinary 
private goods, traded on established markets, what makes us believe that they would act 
rationally in their valuation of public goods? And if people do not base their valuations 
on relevant ‘exogenous’ factors (as postulated by economic theory) for goods that they 
are largely familiar with, how likely is it that they will do so for ‘goods’ that are located 
in a non-market domain? Tversky et al. (1988) hence express;
The lability of preferences implied by the demonstrations o f framing and elicitation effects 
raises difficult questions concerning the assessment of preferences and values. In the classical 
analysis, the relation o f preference is inferred from observed responses (e.g. choice, 
matching) and is assumed to reflect the decision maker’s underlying utility or value. But if  
different elicitation procedures produce different orderings of options, how can preferences 
and values be defined? And in what sense do they exist? To be sure, people make choices, set 
prices, rate options and even explain their decision to others. Preferences, therefore, exist as 
observed data. However, if these data do not satisfy the elementary requirements of 
invariance, it is unclear how to define a relation of preference that can serve as a basis for the 
measurement of value (p. 383)
Thus, rather than interpreting CV responses as stable and accessible constructs that 
fulfil the necessary properties in order to serve as viable predictors of behaviour, these 
may on many occasions represent ‘non-attitudes’ (Converse, 1970), which are either 
constructed according to whatever considerations are on the respondent’s mind when 
being asked, or expressed irrespective of any knowledge or belief about the attitude 
object. It has further been shown that the frequency of non-attitudes is particularly high 
for (political) issues that are not immediate to people (Converse, 1974), and a 
fundamental question to ask is therefore if any economic values exist for environmental 
amenities. It is interesting to note that, whereas the finding that respondents do not seem 
to act strategically in CV studies is assumed to provide support for the idea that people 
will truthfully reveal their preferences when asked, an overlooked possibility is that this 
may in fact be due to the lack of any meaningful values for the amenity being valued,
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which imply that no incentives exist to overstate or understate WTP. Non-attitudes are 
further surprisingly consistent over time and linked to other relevant issues (Schuman 
and Presser, 1981), which give rise to additional problems of distinguishing these from 
‘true’ attitudes (or values). This thesis addresses this aspect and the following sections 
discuss the various inferences respondents make about the valuation task, and therefore, 
what CV responses possibly represent, if not corresponding to economic value as 
assumed by the researcher.
3.2.3. The Functional Value o f Attitudes
A fundamental requirement of a CV study, along with all approaches to Cost Benefit 
Analysis (CBA), is that responses are based on instrumental, or outcome-related, 
considerations (Blarney, 1998). What we want to do in a CBA is to compare one state of 
the world with another and in that way calculate their relative importance. It rests on the 
assumption that people are always motivated by values that correspond to an external 
reality. The problem is that attitudes in many contexts are symbolic expressions that 
comprise much more than their intrinsic content and that are quite unresponsive to 
rational arguments {e.g., Morgan et al., 1983; Herek, 1986). The attitude object is in this 
case “... a means to an end -  it provides a vehicle for securing social support, for 
increasing self esteem, or for reducing anxiety” (Herek, 1986; p. 105). The attitude may 
include more than actual states of the world, or may not at all be related to actual 
outcomes, since, by definition, the benefits arise primarily from its expression.
The basic argument here is that CV responses comprise other factors than those which 
are the target of the CBA. They reflect a desire to gain approval from respected persons 
(Kelman, 1958; Herek, 1986), for instance the interviewers, but a more sophisticated 
interpretation recognises CV responses as partly determined by important moral norms, 
core values, institutional characteristics, etc {e.g., Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992). The 
evaluative tendencies that represent values, or attitudes, manifest themselves in three 
different ways; cognitive, affective, and conative {e.g., Ajzen and Peterson, 1988). The 
first is founded upon beliefs regarding the nature and characteristics of an attitude 
object, the second expresses feelings toward this, and the third represents behavioural 
inclinations, intentions, and commitments (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). These response
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categories do not necessarily converge, nor harmonize, since they reflect different 
theoretical components. Thus, a conflict may arise between what we believe, what we 
feel, and our intentions. An illustrative example would be people’s attitudes toward 
maintained and open landscapes; they may indeed find these beautiful, and therefore 
tend to like the sight of them (affective part), but they may not believe that these 
amenities are threatened or serve any particularly important environmental function 
(cognitive part), and finally, they may not have any intentions to visit any of them 
(conative part).
Similarly to the above interpretation, Katz (1960) suggests that attitudes serve four 
distinct personality functions. Firstly, they have a utilitarian function that acknowledges 
the behaviourist and economic principle that humans are motivated to gain rewards and 
avoid punishment. They furthermore serve a knowledge function that aims at achieving 
a meaningful, organised and stable view of the world. An ego-defensive function has the 
purpose of protecting the individual’s self concept and avoiding anxiety, and finally, a 
value expressive function mediates the need for self expression and self realisation. The 
latter function is realised in two ways; whereas Katz (1960) focuses on the need to 
develop and defend deeper personal ideals, which will reassert the individual’s self- 
image, Herek (1986) refers to a social function that involves both identification with and 
conformity to key persons or groups of people. Again, these constructs may be in 
conflict with each other, implying that attitudes are expressed differently depending on 
what particular dimension(s) receive focus. For example, instrumental goals do not 
always correspond with normative needs, and discomfort is likely to arise if 
instrumental desires conflict with deeper held ideals, or when personal opinions fail to 
meet social expectations (Blarney, 1998).
The assumption that attitudes serve such diverse functions pose problems for 
utilitarianism, which serves as the guiding moral principle in neo-classical economic 
theory. Utilitarianism rests on the elementary requirements that “ ...the goodness of a 
state of affairs be a function only of the utility information regarding that state .. [and] 
that every choice, ..., be ultimately determined by the goodness of the consequent states 
of affairs” (Sen, 1987; p. 39). Consequently, it only recognises outcome-related 
considerations. Some researchers reason that any value, whatever its source, should be
83
CHAPTER THREE
accounted for in welfare analysis {e.g., Kopp, 1992). Yet, if these values are not 
exclusive to the good under valuation, nor are they necessarily dependent on its 
realisation, and therefore the same welfare estimate may be achieved due to the 
existence or preservation of other related (or unrelated) amenities. For instance, values 
seemingly attached to the resource may in fact be based on factors that relate to a much 
broader class of issues, and therefore the same value would be assigned to each 
commodity within this class. Given that this value cannot be accounted for more than 
once, since by definition it is explicitly associated with one specific resource, it would 
be conceptually inappropriate to include such values in welfare analysis other than at a 
level that incorporates and aims at estimating the total value of all issues within a 
broader category. More elaborated discussions regarding this issue are provided by 
Fisher (1996) and Milgrom (1993).40
The attitude concept in psychology thus differs fundamentally from the value concept in 
economics in so far as the underlying dispositions of an attitude are understood as being 
difficult to represent along one dimension, whereas economic value is assumed to 
inherently capture all aspects involved and resolve any conflicts between these. 
Heberlein (1988) argues that this focus originates from the use of very abstract concepts 
in sociology and psychology, such as status, power and intelligence, which are 
intrinsically difficult to measure. Moreover, concepts traditionally studied are not only 
multidimensional, but often also conceptually loose, characteristics which have given 
arise to sophisticated models such as Keeney and Raiffa's (1976) theory of multiple 
objectives in value trade-offs, Schwartz and Bilskys (1987) multi-attribute theory, or 
Rosenberg and Hovland's (1960) hierarchical model that recognises cognition, affect 
and conation as first order factors and attitude as a second order factor evaluated at a 
higher level of abstraction (Ajzen and Peterson, 1988). Attitudes may hence be seen as 
the mere ‘observable’ output of a higher dimensional order, guiding what is right or 
wrong, important or unimportant, relevant or irrelevant, etc. (Schwartz and Bilsky,
40 It is important at this point to distinguish symbolic attitudes from existence values; whereas the latter 
by definition are determined by physical outcomes or states, whoever benefits from these, the former 
are independent o f outcomes. In the case of existence values, the controversy lies in whose welfare 
should be accounted for, rather than what should qualify as welfare.
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1987). Given that natural resources are symbolised by multiple use (they involve 
dimensions reflecting life-support, aesthetic, scientific, religious, moral, economic, and 
symbolic functions), and accrue benefits that may be either consumptive or non­
consumptive, the value of these are therefore not easily reducible into a single monetary 
measure, particularly in the absence of any established framework guiding individuals 
in their valuation attempts. Blarney et al. (1999) capture this point in the following;
Respondents seeking to express support for (or opposition to) an environmental proposal, 
while at the same time indicating they object to the some aspects of the scenario, or that they 
cannot afford payment, are [through WTP] restricted to giving a simple indication of their 
uncertainty, without specific reference to its cause, (p. 128-129)
There is thus a likelihood that many people reason in the following manner: ‘I support 
the idea of X, but on the other hand I do not consent to the procedure of Y’, or ‘I think it 
is very important with such measures, still I am doubtful about whether this approach is 
appropriate’, and finally ‘I realise that this is an important problem, however I simply 
do not believe the proposed program will be effective in solving this’. To my 
knowledge there has only been one serious attempt at developing a CV format that 
accommodates multiple value dimensions, and which aims at minimising the 
ambivalence arising from the inherent requirement to make trade-offs between 
competing motives and objectives. In Blarney et al. (1999), people responded to four 
different aspect of an environmental project; direct support, worth, affordability, and 
appropriateness. The authors argue that their approach provides more refined economic 
values by giving room for conflicting beliefs related to outcome and expressive 
considerations. On the whole, the functional approach for the study of attitudes is 
central in this thesis and will constitute a valuable theoretical framework in the 
interpretation of the results of subsequent empirical studies.
3.2.4. Mental Models and Interpretation o f Valuation Scenarios
The perspectives of the researcher, and the consequent effect on how an issue is 
presented, have important consequences for how various states of the world are 
interpreted by interviewees. A number of studies and experiments suggest that the
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probabilities of various outcomes are not appreciated unless there is a plausible story 
embedded to it, and that the valence of outcomes and probabilities depends on these 
stories (Dawes, 1999). Underlying this notion of moral anchors is the psychological 
principle that much of human thinking and action is not quantitative, but rest on 
storytelling to make the narrative coherent (Pennington and Hastie, 1993). For example, 
the explanations of a particular event or behaviour alter people’s perceptions of this, and 
therefore their choices. Cultural theory similarly assumes that people are active rather 
than passive receivers of information (e.g., Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982), and 
embedded in risk evaluations are institutional structures that comprise much more than 
objective measures of likelihood. Contemporary psychometric theories, traditionally 
emphasising framing and cognitive misperception of probabilities, also acknowledge the 
subjective and value-laden nature of risk assessment (e.g., Slovic, 1997).
Particularly interesting are those instances when aspects not explicitly mentioned in the 
valuation scenario play an important role, aspects that often are remote or seemingly 
unrelated to the issue being evaluated. For example, Macnaghten and Jacobs (1997) in 
studying the acceptance and uptake of sustainable economic development, recognise the 
political context wherein the meaning of this concept is examined. The salience of 
sustainability, they argue, is not judged according to its environmental implications per 
se, but on the basis of people’s trust (or mistrust) in governments, the availability of 
individual agency, etc. This highlights “the [good] relationships between government 
and citizens ... required for its successful promotion” (Macnaghten and Jacobs, 1997; p. 
22). Gaskell et al. (1997) similarly found that the public’s assessment of risks related to 
biotechnology depends on people’s trust in regulating authorities, the usefulness of the 
technology, and its moral acceptability.
Embedding effects may be explained within a similar framework. CV researchers 
commonly assume that respondents will pay attention to all factors included in a 
valuation scenario (e.g., Mitchell and Carson, 1989). The problem is that they are asked 
to value something that they generally have no experience of. Instead they have to 
imagine implied states and changes, because the words uttered in the scenario cannot 
present a complete picture of what is under valuation. In other words, they have to form 
a mental representations of the good in order to make the question real enough to
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answer, which may differ from the one intended by the researcher (Fischhoff, 1997; 
Schwarz, 1997; Fischhoff et al., 1999). The respondents are hence likely to make 
inferences about the inclusiveness of the good that differ from the scenario description 
either because the amenity is seen as being naturally or logically related to other 
resources (e.g., migratory water fowls may by respondents be associated with 
undamaged wetlands), or simply because they do not accept or find the specification of 
scope plausible (e.g., Schuman, 1996; Schwarz, 1997). Eagly and Kulesa (1997) 
similarly emphasise the intra-attitudinal structure of environmental opinions, which 
encompass prior beliefs about environmental causes and effects that guide respondents 
in their valuation.
Apart from the difficulty of separating relevant from irrelevant considerations among 
respondents, a philosophically grounded criticism of the CVM is that a monetary 
valuation of environmental resources is inappropriate in so far as responses encompass 
aspects that are not comparable with other goods (i.e., incommensurable events), and 
furthermore, although choices are being made between goods, this may not imply that 
these are valued in a higher or lower order (Raz, 1986; Anderson, 1993). Vatn and 
Bromley (1994) further argue that the separation into use, option and existence values 
reflects a commodification of environmental goods that does not find consent among lay 
people. There is an eagerness to estimate precise values, which further demands 
perfectly demarcated objects to which property rights can be assigned, or at least 
demanded. However, what is overseen in this categorisation is the fundamental value of 
the eco-system. An illustrative example is the ‘commoditisation’ and acquirement of 
land by immigrants to the U.S. in 17th century, a concept that stood in sharp contrast 
with the Native Americans who claimed that man belongs to land, not vice verse. The 
urge to ‘commoditise’ the environment, I believe, may be founded in the paradigm and 
way of thinking within the economic discipline. Vatn and Bromley (1994) state that;
Denying the commodification of the environment forces one to try to comprehend 
environmental goods and service in a more holistic way -  although economists tend to reject 
holism because it undermines the presumption of the analytical sufficiency of a world 
usefully defined as consisting of atomistic agents acting on atomistic objects (p. 137).
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It is thus relevant to ask how many citizens that would support the reliance on economic 
values in political decision-making processes about natural resources. If the underlying 
principles of economic impact analysis are not widely agreed upon by the public, CV 
responses are less meaningful. A major problem here is that, since both the attitude 
object (the natural resource) and the valuation task are novel, the presentation in itself is 
likely to facilitate perspectives on the appropriateness and the feasibility of the proposal 
(Messick, 1999). If the adequacy of an economic valuation is generated and imposed by 
the CV researcher, due to the absence of alternative perspectives, and because the 
respondents do not find any reasons to question this, people may as a result answer 
valuation questions affirmatively, despite any genuine consent (Schwarz, 1994). As 
indicated earlier, the fear of appearing uninformed or socially irresponsible may induce 
respondents to conjure up opinions on issues they had not given any prior thought to 
(Schuman and Presser, 1981; Schwarz, 1994), and it should therefore be an interest to 
examine this aspect in CV contexts.
3.2.5. Communicative Processes o f Attitude and Value Formation
Public opinion may be viewed as a special category of attitudes; it ought to reflect 
public issues, it therefore has social implications, and it needs to be expressed in order 
to serve a purpose. A CV response should therefore be seen, not only as a notion of 
attitude (Kahneman and Ritov, 1994), but also as a statement of public opinion. 
Himmelweit (1990) acknowledges the ‘need of expression’ by referring to Moscovici's 
(1984) theory of social representations, and depicts public opinion as shared by many 
individuals and as the product of the interaction between people. It is thus implied that 
socialising experiences, providing by family, friends, relatives, work-place, peers, 
marriage, etc., have important influence on public opinion (Himmelweit, 1990; Morgan 
and Schwalbe, 1990). Yet, this interpretation is not unique to ‘sociological’ perspectives 
of the ‘attitude’ construct. Although perhaps being more static by partly ignoring the 
dynamic aspects of people’s reaction and interaction with each other, similar views are 
put forward by generalised theories of social impact (e.g., Kelman, 1958), social 
influence (e.g., Latane, 1981), and social comparision, (e.g., Fazio, 1979; Kruglanski 
and Mayseless, 1987), and theories specifically related to the construction and
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validation of public opinion (e.g., Nowak et al., 1990).41 For example, Nowak et al. 
(1990) argue that;
In part, these [types of] preferences reflect common reactions to events and images shared 
through the mass media and diverse concerns arising out of economic and social 
circumstances. In part, however, they reflect a process of group interaction as people discuss 
their beliefs and impressions with relatives, friends, coworkers, and others, (p. 363)
An attitude is therefore not a static product that is well suited to be studied in isolation, 
since this is likely to prevent us from understanding the involved processes in its 
formation. The importance of social interaction in the creation and establishment of 
public opinion is that it constitutes as well as affects the schemata people use in order to 
interpret and subsequently develop an opinion toward an issue. They are necessary, I 
will argue, in order for people to understand, not only the issue per se, but also how to 
evaluate this. It provides a shared frame of reference that helps to reduce uncertainty 
and stabilise a judgement on a complex issue (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955; Nowak et al.,
1990), thereby making it more consistent over time (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996). 
The influence of social processes takes various different forms; they clarify supportive 
and non-supportive reasons for a particular attitude position (Zimbardo and Leippe,
1991), the discussions between people are likely to make them more involved and 
therefore more aware of their standpoints (Bligh, 2000), social processes reinforce 
subjective opinions toward issues that the individual is already familiar with (Fazio, 
1979), and people tend to strive for conformity within social groups (Herek, 1986).
41 Although recognising the social origin of attitudes, explanations resting on traditional 
conceptualisations of attitudes, such as social cognition, differ from social representation mainly in that 
the latter also acknowledge that these are widely shared and constitute a part of social reality itself 
(Jaspars and Fraser, 1984). ‘Psychological’ perspectives are also to a larger extent based on laboratory 
experiments, rather than ‘real-world’ research procedures. A major critique against social cognition is 
that it lacks a research agenda that aims to take full account o f intervening factors such as social 
interaction, motivation and social context. Nevertheless, in this context I am not concerned with the 
way social networks and communities cultivate our general perception o f the world, but rather how 
people develop and express opinions and attitudes toward specific issues and events.
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Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) summarise these factors by arguing that when lay 
people assign (economic) values to natural resources, their social environments define 
what they see and what they do not see. It must therefore be seen as inadequate to 
expect that respondents to a CV survey can respond with well-considered answers, since 
they have not been given the opportunity to consult friends, relatives or the media in 
order to develop an opinion in the matter. Hansen (1991) and Mazur and Lee (1993) 
report how media coverage and news stories ascribing the importance of various issues 
ultimately determine environmental concern, which emphasises this factor as a crucial 
component of social opinion. Moreover, in the process of judging appropriateness, 
expectations arise regarding how other people would act, which justifies one’s own 
decision or choice. As a result, respondents to CV studies are often keen on knowing 
how other people would act and how much they would pay for the amenity (e.g., 
Schkade and Payne, 1994).42
The role of social processes is associated with the previous argument that people may 
not perceive or understand the valuation task as intended since it does not comply with 
or stand in sharp contrast with institutionalised procedures of public policy-making. The 
attempts at standardising the interaction between researcher and respondent in order to 
examine certain events tend to overlook the need to put inquires into a context within 
which ordinary people can make sense of them, and in which the interaction becomes 
meaningful. As Schwarz (1994), Clark and Schober (1992) and other researchers have 
noted, conversations in research settings differ from everyday conversations by being 
highly constrained and sometimes they are completely inadequate, either in the sense 
that they modify real-world events, or that they are invented by the researcher. Thereby 
they lack a common ground between speaker and listener that define backgrounds, 
underlying meanings and intentions among communicative agents.
One approach toward clarifying meanings and intentions of the research task, and 
giving room for the expression of disagreement among respondents, is to encourage
42 We may thus at this point re-connect to the earlier discussion related to the attitude-behaviour link, and 
assert that people are searching for important social norms, or values, that act as guidance in the 
establishment of attitudes and behavioural intentions.
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communicative processes before economic values are elicited. Since constructing 
preferences seems to be a much more socially profound process than organising oneself 
in an interview, a collective discussion ought to precede the valuation task, on the basis 
of which people could develop and define the values they then would adhere to. No 
matter if these correspond to the principles underlying economic value assessment, if 
people have been given the opportunity to discuss and reflect on the purposes of the 
study, they are likely to be less vulnerable to expectations imposed by the researcher. 
The present research therefore aims to examine the influence of such contextual factors.
Apart from such influencing factors on public opinion, Sen (1987) hypothesises that 
people are often experiencing a conflict between self-oriented motives and moral 
commitments, and that people therefore have difficulties in making decisions over 
issues and events that involve more than their own welfare. Vatn and Bromley (1994) 
and Vatn (1999) have on the basis of such arguments emphasised the value of 
communicative processes in CV contexts, whereby they conclude that different contexts 
of valuation result in the realisation of different interests and motives. Thus, in an 
individual context, private welfare is likely to be more prominent, whereas a collective 
discussion preceding the valuation question is likely to make altruistic welfare more 
salient. We may further hypothesise that communicative processes will enlighten what 
should be valued, why, by whom, etc. Thus, individual and social contexts of valuation 
are likely to result in a different interpretation and evaluation of the valuation task. CV 
studies are unmistakably conducted as individual interviews, but it appears reasonable 
to firstly discuss in what particular contexts economic values should be assessed 
considering the objectives and implications of the environmental proposal.
3.3. Conclusions
No other branch of social science has so frequently imported scientific tools from 
mathematics than economics. The value attached to mathematical formalisation has two 
foundations; firstly, it provides a precise and universal language for expressing ideas, 
and secondly it allows for quantitative predictions. Yet, complete mathematical 
representations of economic behaviour are simplifications rather than complete accounts 
of reality since they have to leave out a number of important influencing factors. As
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argued by Liabson and Zeckhauser (1998), parsimony has proved to be an 
extraordinarily good principle of organisation in the natural sciences, but it is doubtful 
whether it can provide a sufficient explanation of economic behaviour, which is 
inherently dynamic and complex. Empirical tests have generally revealed that 
mathematical modelling does not do too well in predicting behaviour (Laibson and 
Zeckhauser, 1998), but more importantly, this level of analysis conceals deeper ideals, 
motives and objectives behind actions.
Before the positivistic revolution in economics, occurring in the early years of the 20th 
century, economists were much concerned with definitions of wealth, measures of 
happiness, distribution of economic fortune, etc., which may ultimately provide answers 
to what is right or wrong in society. However, as a result of the works of Marshall, 
Pigou, Pareto and others during the first half of the last century, the focus of economics 
shifted from normative to positive. It was even explicitly stated that economics is solely 
about efficiency, (i.e., how things should be carried out), and ought not bother so much 
about effectiveness, (i.e., what kind of things that should be carried out). Indeed, an 
adequate conclusion according to economic analysis may stand in sharp contrast to what 
is desirable or wanted, but it is not the task of economists to engage in the latter inquires 
(Mulberg, 1995). It is hence suggested that economics cannot really offer guidelines to 
political action. Marshall, for example, realised the limits of mathematical 
formalisation, and was concerned that models should be reflected in practical life. 
Despite his critique of theoretical developments and regardless of his aim to provide 
guidance in the practical conduit of life, he is most famous for the elaborated theory of 
(Marshallian) consumer surplus, which constitutes one of the most significant 
cornerstones of neo-classical economic theory. The ‘failure’ of breaking grounds with 
tradition is brilliantly illustrated by the following advice to one of his students:
1. use mathematics as a shorthand language, rather than as an engine of enquiry;
2. keep them till you are done;
3. translate into English;
4. then illustrate by examples that are important in real life;
5. bum the mathematics;
6. if  you cannot succeed in (4), bum (3). This last I did often.
(source; Mulberg, 1995)
92
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This thesis is an attempt to surpass the middle stages of this analytical procedure. This 
chapter illustrated that standard economic theory is insufficient to understand how 
people perceive and value the environment, and it is indicated that hypothetical value 
statements represent something more or different than economic preferences. In this 
respect, Sen (1987) distinguishes between the ‘well-being aspect* and the ‘agency 
aspect’ of a person; whereas the former focuses on personal achievements and 
opportunities, the latter additionally encompasses other objectives, motives and values, 
sometimes extended well beyond the pursuit of one’s own well-being. Sen (1977) and 
others {e.g., Vatn and Bromley, 1994; Nyborg, 2000), accordingly, recognise two 
different categories of preferences; ethical and economic. These exclusively belong to 
either a political context or a market context, and there are limits to importing an 
economic approach into spheres wherein people do or do not believe things for ethical 
reasons. The distinction between such foundations of value, the former which is 
expressing our most dearly held concerns and the latter being devices for satisfying 
(basic) desires, is not only problematic for utilitarian principles of welfare estimation. In 
addition, a conflict often arises between the various aspects of well-being that further 
complicates the analysis.
The theoretical notions and insights emphasised here suggest that the economic 
framework ought also to incorporate perspectives and insights from other disciplines. 
Rather than purely see WTP in the context of a purchase model, it should be considered 
as a special type of attitude that involves more than physical states of the world, and 
which sometimes are constructed during the course of the interview rather than 
reflecting a pre-defined value available in people’s minds. Even when being anchored to 
developed views about the issue, various motivations of preferences may not coincide 
with each other, which result in difficulties of refining these into a summary judgement. 
Moreover, the context in which these attitudes are captured is likely to play a significant 
role, which implies that the individual perspective should be extended to accommodate 
the social processes behind public opinion on environmental issues. Finally, in these 
processes the mental models people have of the environment must be realised and 
incorporated in a model that does not merely focus on how respondents react to the 
information specifically provided by the researcher in a valuation scenario.
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4. Test of Perfect and Regular Embedding
In the previous chapters I have reviewed the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM), and 
provided a theoretical framework with the aim to shed light on the origin of various 
problems of the methodology that have been demonstrated and discussed in previous 
research. The main argument put forward is that the Contingent Valuation (CV) debate 
has been characterised by an unwillingness to consult perspectives and theoretical 
notions traditionally viewed as outside the field of economics. This thesis adopts a 
broader perspective on people’s responses of economic value in hypothetical market 
scenarios, and the empirical section that follows examines various conceptually 
important anomalies of the methodology and how these may be explained or 
understood on the basis of insights in social psychology.
This first empirical chapter examines the internal consistency of Willingness To Pay 
(WTP) assessed for four environmental amenities. Particularly, the occurrence of 
embedding is investigated by performing between-subject tests of insensitivity to scope 
(perfect embedding) and part-whole effects (regular embedding). Thus, the study 
focuses on anomalies that, if verified, question whether stated preferences are founded 
in economic value, or if these have a basis in other motives not directly associated with 
the amenity being valued, and which are irrelevant for the valuation task. Additionally, 
it relies on a design similar to a typical CV study and employs stronger tests of 
embedding than have normally been used in previous studies rejecting the embedding 
hypothesis. Four different measures or intensifiers of scope (i.e., absolute magnitudes, 
percentages, number of events, and verbal cues) are applied in order to evaluate their 
prospective influence on scope sensitivity. In addition to examining embedding in CV 
contexts, I also compare the consistency of the WTP estimate with Categorical Rating 
(CR) as an alternative measure of environmental priorities. Kahneman and Ritov 
(1994) found that opinions measured on a conventional rating scale of attitude strength 
showed more responsiveness to scope than estimates of WTP, and that the 
psychometric properties of the latter seem to be inferior to those of traditional scales of 
attitudes. In order to gain a better insight into the basis of and motivations for people’s 
responses, in-depth interviews are conducted in parallel with the main study.
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4.1. Internal Consistency of Stated Willingness to Pay
In chapter two it was asserted that CV results are vulnerable to embedding. What this 
means is that WTP estimates are insensitive to the magnitude of the good or service 
being valued (e.g., Desvousges et ah, 1993; Diamond et al., 1993; Kahneman and 
Ritov, 1994), and further that they are highly sensitive to whether the good is evaluated 
on its own or inferred from a larger package of goods (e.g., Strand and Taraldset, 1991; 
Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992). Summarising the origins of the effects discussed 
previously, Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) propose that WTP reflects the moral 
satisfaction derived from making donations to environmental resources, rather than 
being an indication of economic value. Their reasoning is an extension of Andreoni's 
(1989) hypothesis of the ‘warm glow’ that arises from the act of giving to a ‘good 
cause’, and thus implies that economic values in these contexts represent symbolic 
expressions that are not necessarily based on specific characteristics of the resource 
being valued.
Despite the demonstration of embedding in a variety of empirical studies, this has 
failed to clarify if and to what extent respondents base their value assessments on 
instrumental considerations, the major reason being that studies that have highlighted 
problems with the CVM are, generally, judged by CV practitioners to be of poor 
quality in terms of questionnaire design and survey administration (e.g., Hanemann, 
1994; Carson et al., 1996a). This study therefore aims at applying a procedure more 
similar to a typical CV study. It is envisaged that the results will provide better 
indication of whether embedding occurs primarily due to flawed methodological 
approaches, or if WTP estimates violate economic theory, even when ‘properly’ 
assessed on the basis of a complete and rigorous description of the environmental 
resource.
4.1.1. Empirical Demonstration o f Embedding
Smith and Osbome (1996) conducted a meta-analysis of five separate CV studies of 
improved (or declined) visibility at national parks. Their conclusion was that the 
method is responsive to the magnitude of the environmental amenity since a positive
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and statistically significant relationship between WTP and improvement in visibility 
range was found.43 However, I am inclined to argue that a meta-analysis is insufficient 
to adequately judge whether CV estimates are responsive to scope. Apart from being 
conducted by different research teams, the five studies differ in a variety of aspects that 
are likely to influence the outcome, such as the type of interview, elicitation format, 
where the interview took place, in what way the visibility condition was described, etc. 
Although the authors seem to realise this shortcoming and accordingly try to control 
for the prospective influence of such features, it is still doubtful whether the five 
studies are comparable in this manner.44 Conducting a CV study, whether or not it is 
administered as a mail survey or as face-to-face interviews, involves a number of 
factors that are not always possible to identify, let alone control for. The mere fact that 
the studies were conducted by different research teams is likely to influence the results. 
A more rigorous analysis requires that the interviews are made by the same person(s), 
using an identical questionnaire with only the scope altered, and directed toward two 
populations rather similar in terms of some key characteristics.
On the basis of a survey comprising 30 CV studies that each separately investigated the 
occurrence of embedding, Carson (1997) similarly to Smith and Osbome (1996) 
concludes that only a handful support the embedding hypothesis, whereas the majority 
clearly reject it. However, their criteria chosen for assessing the occurrence of 
embedding deserve attention. Most of the studies referred to have performed within- 
subject tests, rather than between-subject tests (Propper, 1990; Boyle et a l , 1994). As 
mentioned before in this thesis, a major problem with the former is that the respondents
43 The authors make this conclusion on the basis o f the NOAA panel’s recommendation that the 
requirement for a CV study to pass a scope tests is that the WTP estimates are not ‘implausibly 
unresponsive’ to the magnitude of the good being investigated. It is not clear-cut what the term 
‘implausibly unresponsive’ implies, but this is arguably a weaker criterion than that proposed by 
Diamond et al. (1993), who argues that WTP ought to increase more than proportionally to scope. 
However, this latter assumption is not generally applicable since it is conditioned on the idea that 
preserving a small part of the resource is not (environmentally) worthwhile, whereas a larger part is.
44 For instance, whereas one study was administered as a mail-survey with telephone follow-ups, the 
others were conducted as face-to-face interviews. Moreover, both the elicitation format and ways of 
presenting magnitudes varied across studies; in some cases the amenity was presented as the number of 
days each year with ‘clear skies’, in other as a permanent and stable improvement in visibility range.
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are likely to be influenced by previously stated values when subsequently asked about 
several levels of the good, and most likely try to act in an internally consistent way by 
providing higher bids for larger magnitudes of the good (Festinger, 1957). Although 
this drawback is mentioned in the paper, the author is more convinced by the 
advantages of a within-subject test, such as its lower costs and that the main interest of 
a Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) is the curves defined over levels of the good, not a 
single point estimate (Carson, 1997).
Furthermore, one study included in the survey examined the respondents’ ex-ante 
perception of scope and how this determined WTP, whereby responsiveness to scope 
was found (Whitehead, 1992). In this case the pre-established perception of scope is 
likely to determine WTP, and the study provides no clear answer as to how people 
respond to the information provided in the CV scenario. Finally, at least one of the 
studies presents some mixed results that may as well be interpreted as supportive of the 
embedding hypothesis. For instance, in a study about forest protection, Loomis et al. 
(1993) found evidence of scope sensitivity between two levels of the good (70,000 and 
6,000 ha), but when other levels were presented (122,000 and 70,000 ha), people did 
not respond to this difference.
Turning to studies that have performed between-subject tests of embedding, 
Desvousges et al (1993) assessed the WTP for preventing 2,000, 20,000 and 200,000 
migratory waterfowl deaths, and found mean responses of 80, 78 and 88 dollars 
respectively, with no statistically significant difference between the amounts. The 
discrepancies are much smaller than expected, and the most troublesome outcome is 
that the value of 20,000 fowls is actually smaller than the value of 2,000 fowls. Other 
examples are provided by Fischhoff et al. (1993), who assessed the WTP for 
preserving 110 and 10,000 hectares of wetland in New Jersey, Beattie et al. (1998) who 
estimated the WTP for improved road safety, and Kahneman and Ritov (1994) who 
valued a vast number of different environmental and public issues. In the latter study, 
for most issues the scope was specified by qualifiers such as ‘large’, ‘major’, severe’, 
etc., which were hypothesised to illustrate the importance and urgency of each 
problem. Finally, regular embedding, or part-whole bias, has been demonstrated by 
Strand and Taraldset (1991), and Kahneman and Knetsch (1992), who valued issues
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such as air pollution, national parks, toxic waste disposal, and endangered wild 
animals. Regular embedding implies that the valuation depends on how many other 
issues are included in the valuation scenario, and the general finding of these studies is 
that assessed WTP is significantly higher when the amenity is valued on its own, 
compared to when the value for this is inferred from a larger package of goods.
A major critique of the Desvousges-study is that, although the number of birds differed 
largely between scenarios, in order to give a more comprehensive picture of the issue, 
respondents were told that the total number of migratory water fowls residing in the 
area covered were 8.5 million. Seen in this light, the birds saved constitutes less than 
0.1%, less than 1% and about 2% of the total number of birds. It is hence indicated in 
the scenario that a very small part of the bird population will be prevented, and due to 
diminishing marginal returns, perhaps especially prominent for amenities that involve 
large non-use values, and which are valued according to whether the levels provided 
are sufficient to prevent their extinction, a reasonable explanation of why the WTP is 
roughly the same in all three scenarios emerges. Another problem with the study is that 
the interviews were made as brief shopping-mall intercepts, with the risk of 
jeopardising the credibility of the study in the eyes of the respondents (for a more 
extensive picture of similar criticism, see Hausman, 1993).
Similar criticism is made against other studies demonstrating scope effects, which 
suggests that other measures of scope may be more capable of making the WTP 
estimate responsive. Interesting in this respect is Kahneman and Ritov's (1994) study 
since it uses adjectives instead of quantitative measures in order to vary the magnitudes 
of the amenity. However, this study is based on a rather different questionnaire design 
than a typical CV study, which, I anticipate, would lead CV proponents to respond 
sceptically. For instance, instead of providing a rigorous and complete description of 
the good, respondents were shown brief statements (or headlines) in single sentences 
referring to various types of environmental problems, some of which were even 
presented as fictitious. Respondents were then asked to provide WTP estimates for 
proposed interventions associated with each of these, also presented in single 
sentences. Furthermore, rather than being given time to think carefully before 
answering, people were requested to respond ‘as quickly as they could’ and according
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to whatever the questions meant to them. Finally, the study comprised WTP questions 
for as many as 37 environmental issues and it is questionable that informative and 
well-founded judgements can be made on all of these, particularly considering that the 
interview was completed in less than 15 minutes.
It appears from the discussion above that, no matter how the reasoning is turned and 
twisted, we will unmistakably find ‘valid’ objections to what at first seem to be rather 
clear evidence in favour of one hypothesis or the other. As a consequence and as 
discussed in earlier chapters, two diametrically opposed explanations for the 
occurrence of embedding have been proposed in the CV literature; (1) poor quality in 
survey design and administration which either fails to establish a realistic scenario, or 
tends to mask differences in scope (Hanemann, 1994; Hoevenagel, 1996; Carson et al, 
1996a), or (2) WTP estimates derived from CV surveys violate economic theory 
(Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992; Diamond and Hausman, 1994; Kahneman et a l, 1999). 
Proponents of the CVM quite naturally subscribe to the former of these explanations. 
Most importantly, studies supporting the embedding hypothesis are criticised for not 
following the NOAA panel’s guidelines for conducting reliable CV studies (Arrow et 
al, 1993). Thus, it is suggested that embedding may be overcome with improved 
questionnaire design, interview techniques and administration modes, or that 
underlying true differences in assessments can be detected with more sophisticated 
statistical analyses, with the implicit conclusion that the CV critics have not completed 
their task with accuracy.
In this study I therefore attempt to apply a more extensive and rigorous CV design than 
in the studies reviewed above. For example, the nature of each environmental issue and 
the likely consequences of a deterioration is clearly described in the valuation scenario. 
The objective here is to present a credible approach to solving these problems, which 
takes account of how the good or service is to be provided, who is responsible for this, 
and in what way interventions should be administered and maintained. Additionally, 
before presenting the WTP scenario, respondents are informed about the rationale of 
assigning monetary values to environmental amenities, thereby enabling them to place 
the enquiry in an appropriate context.
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However, I do not attempt to strictly follow the guidelines established by the NOAA 
panel (Arrow et al., 1993). Although the general interpretation among CV practitioners 
seems to be that each study ought to do exactly this, this is not the implication of the 
panel’s recommendations, and the authors explicitly state that a CV study “does not 
have to meet each of these guidelines” (Arrow et al., 1993; p. 4608). As suggested in 
the literature on ‘good* CV practice, neither are all these recommendations 
indisputable, something which will be discussed in the text where appropriate. The 
main point is that between-subject tests of embedding are performed, by applying a 
procedure and a design similar to a typical CV study. The rationale of this research is 
thus to evaluate whether the occurrence of embedding can be explained by ‘improper’ 
(or different) methodological designs, or if the procedures commonly used by CV 
practitioners are likely to give rise to similar results.
4.2. Design of Field Study
Data were collected between November 1997 and May 1998. The main study was 
conducted using two different administration modes. In order to yield a sufficient 
sample for subsequent quantitative analyses, 1076 questionnaires were distributed to 6 
student halls throughout London and randomly selected households in Sweden by mail. 
The sample thus includes people from a range of backgrounds, although students are 
somewhat over-represented. In addition to these mail-surveys, 152 students were 
randomly approached at the dining hall of the London School of Economics (LSE) and 
asked to participate in an interview about environmental priorities. Respondents in this 
group completed the survey directly under supervision of the interviewer. Hence, the 
interviewer was in this case accessible to answer various questions that arose and make 
clear the purpose of the study as well as the intention of specific questions.45 The 
survey format and interview design, along with the choice and description of 
environmental issues, are primarily based on a pre-test conducted in two sessions prior 
to the main study, comprising 42 interviews.
45 By conducting both mail surveys and face-to-face interviews, the latter which are generally considered 
more reliable, we are able to investigate whether the format has any influence on the results. No 
differences were recorded between the two administration modes.
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4.2.1. Interview Procedure and Questionnaire Design
After a general introduction to the interview that explained the intention of the study 
and principles of Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA), respondents were asked to read through 
the whole list of issues and think carefully about their household income and future 
expenses before answering any questions. Subsequently, information about the nature 
of the environmental amenities and the effects resulting from a deterioration of these 
was presented. In order to enhance the impression of a realistic scenario, a feasible 
intervention to solve each problem was in addition provided.46 Except for one sub­
sample, for which the payment vehicle was put forward as a yearly tax payment, WTP 
was framed as an annual voluntary contribution. The WTP was further elicited using 
an Open-Ended (OE) format. The validity of this format is considered inferior to a 
Dichotomous Choice (DC) format by the NOAA panel (Arrow et al., 1993), mainly 
due to the fact that the incentive compatible setting of the DC format is likely to reduce 
strategic behaviour since it creates a situation where it is in the person’s interest to 
reveal his or her true preferences. However, on the basis of various empirical tests, a 
number of researchers are questioning the restriction to DC formats (Loomis, 1990; 
Schulze et al., 1996).47 The CR scores were assessed on a 7-point scale, ranging from 0 
(‘does not concern me at all’), to 7 (‘one of the issues that concerns me most’).48
46 Hence, some important differences prevail compared to the Kahneman and Ritov (1994) study in 
which respondents were requested to respond as quickly as they could to issues that, in some cases, 
were explicitly presented as fictitious.
47 A study by Lunander (1998) shows that overbidding occurs to a greater extent when using a DC 
format, at least when the simple majority rule is modified into a provision and payment rule. This result 
is problematic for the NOAA panel’s recommendation o f a conservative design that “the option that 
tends to underestimate willingness to pay is preferred” (Arrow et al., 1993; p. 4608). Furthermore, 
estimates derived from DC questions are statistically inefficient and require at least a threefold increase 
in sample size in order to attain the same statistical precision as OE formats (Schulze et al., 1996). 
Finally, the possible gain in incentive compatibility must be weighted against the anchoring effects 
evoked by pre-established values of WTP.
48 Categorical Rating (CR) is a technique commonly used in psychological research for assessing the 
strength o f attitudes or opinions, and implies that the respondents rate their concern for the specific 
issue in question on a discrete scale from, for instance 0 (‘not at all important to me’) to 5 ( ‘one of the 
issues that is most important to me’). Attitudes are normally assessed on a 5-graded or a 7-graded scale.
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In order to test for perfect and regular embedding the respondents were in the main 
study randomly divided into eight sub-groups. In three of these, WTP estimates were 
derived for four environmental amenities presented in the following order; rain forests 
in South America, endangered wild animals, air-pollution in central London, and 
global warming. One of these three samples was used as benchmark or reference point, 
whereas in the other two the scope was varied simultaneously for two issues at the time 
(see table 4.1. below for an explanation of this design). Thereby a tool is provided that 
enables us to test for scope insensitivity. The valuation scenarios are presented below. 
Alterations of scope are illustrated in brackets, and each respondent is presented with 
either of two quantities (or qualities) for each of these four amenities.
Preservation of the rain forest in Bolivia (South America). Rain forests contain the largest 
number of habitats and are therefore a source of much irreplaceable material for medicine, 
industry and agriculture. The main causes of deforestation are timber exploitation and 
conversion of forests into grazing land and agriculture. International initiatives have been 
taken to establish national reserves throughout the country, implying a sustainable use of the 
rain forest. The results will be that the current deforestation rate o f 50,000 ha (2 million ha) 
annually is prevented.
Saving o f the endangered African elephant (five most endangered animals, including the 
African elephant). This animal is threatened by extinction due to illegal (ivory) hunting and 
the exploitation of important habitats and breeding grounds. The foundation of an 
international wildlife fund, the establishment of game parks and stricter hunting laws will 
entail its survival.
An improvement fa major improvement) of the air-quality in the London area, by imposing 
stricter emission controls and subsidising more environmentally friendly fuels. High 
concentration of substances such as carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, sulphur dioxide, lead 
and black smoke, reduce plant growth, cause visible damage to sensible crops and add to acid 
deposition (acid rain). Moreover, they are toxic for humans, and high concentrations or acute 
exposure might cause breathing problems.
A reduction of 20% (60%) of the gases that cause global warming. The emission of 
greenhouse gases give arise to global warming, and to stop this we need to be more efficient 
in the way we use energy for heating, transport and industry. The effects o f global warming is 
somewhat uncertain, but it is believed that some areas will get too hot, leading to that some 
types o f agriculture will no longer be possible. There are also considerable risks of rising sea-
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level and the frequency o f droughts, tropical storms and other unexpected changes to the 
climate.
The same procedure as above, also using three sample groups, was applied to see 
whether measures of categorical ratings are more or less responsive to scope than 
WTP. In the remaining two sample groups, respondents were only presented with and 
asked to value one environmental issue, specified either as a 20% or a 60% reduction 
of the gases that give rise to global warming. The WTP estimates derived from these 
two sample groups were compared with the WTP of global warming evaluated as part 
of four different environmental issues, thereby providing a test for part-whole bias. 
Table 4.1. gives a description of the sample groups.
Table 4.1. Division of sample groups
Sample group Environmental issue(s) Dependent variable
# 1 Rain forests, endangered animals, air pollution, global warming WTP
# 2 Rain forests, endangered animals, air pollution, global warming WTP
#3 Rain forests, endangered animals, air pollution, global warming WTP
# 4 Rain forests, endangered animals, air pollution, global warming CR
#5 Rain forests, endangered animals, air pollution, global warming CR
# 6 Rain forests, endangered animals, air pollution, global warming CR
# 7 Global warming; 20% reduction WTP
# 8 Global warming; 60% reduction WTP
Note: Bold text indicates that issues are presented as major in scope, whereas normal text indicates minor scope
By using four different scales of measurement or intensifiers of scope (i.e., absolute 
magnitudes, percentages, verbal cues, and number of events) to specify the extent or 
severity of each problem, it is possible to test whether the unit-type influences people’s 
perception of how extensive or important the environmental problem is. Although the 
nature of the amenities differ from each other in two important respects (i.e., they may 
be more or less familiar, and they may differ in the degree of personal relevance to
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people), I do not anticipate that these dimensions have any significant impact on the 
occurrence of scope insensitivity since all amenities should be considered as rather 
unfamiliar and not personally relevant or immediate to people. Therefore I hypothesise 
that any difference in terms of responsiveness to scope will mainly be due to how 
magnitudes and importance are specified.
After the main task of assessing WTP, or alternatively CR scores, respondents were 
asked some follow-up questions that captured their main motivations for WTP and CR 
responses, how difficult they found the task, and how confident they were with their 
answers. Since there may be many differences in socio-economic characteristics 
between the student sample and the Swedish sample (e.g., age, income, culture, etc.), a 
dummy variable was introduced in order to assess these differences.
4.2.2. In-Depth Interviews
In addition to the main study described above, 12 in-depth face-to-face interviews were 
conducted. These were elaborated using a procedure similar to a retrospective protocol, 
through which respondents are asked how they come up with their answers 
immediately after a decision has been made (Ericsson and Simon, 1984). Respondents 
were presented with the same CV scenario as in the main survey and subsequently 
asked for their WTP. The remaining part of the interview was set aside to ask follow- 
up questions in order to gain insight into how people respond to the CV question, such 
as what they were thinking before making their decision, motivations of WTP, how 
difficult they found the task, how confident they were with their answers, etc. Some of 
these questions were identical to the ones presented to the respondents in the main 
sample, however for the latter group they were framed as closed-ended rather than 
open-ended questions. The findings of these in-depth interviews are presented in a 
separate section below, and are not included in the statistical analysis that follows.49
49 The main part of the questionnaire may be found as an appendix to this thesis.
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4.3. Results
Among the 1228 subjects targeted in the main study, 438 replied to the mail survey or 
chose to participate in a face-to-face interview. Eleven of these respondents were 
sorted out in the evaluation process due to incomplete responses, meaning that the 
results in all are based on 427 observations. These observations consist of 278 mail 
surveys (response rate = 27%), and 149 face-to-face interviews. Out of the 427 
complete responses, 337 respondents answered WTP questions associated with either 
one or simultaneously four environmental issues, whereas 90 respondents reported 
their attitudes toward the same four issues on the basis of the CR format.
4.3.1. Descriptive Statistics
Altogether 313 respondents, or 92.9%, replied with a WTP > 0 for at least one of the 
issues, and for each environmental issue taken separately, non-zero responses varied 
between 77.9 and 90.6%. On average, people were willing to pay roughly 3.5% of their 
yearly income for the four issues in total. Inspection of Figure 4.1. reveals the nature of 
the distribution of total WTP for all four issues. Roughly it follows a normal 
distribution with a heavy right tail. The same basic pattern in distribution of WTP is 
found for each specific issue. Responses above £400 are extremely unevenly 
distributed, ranging from £400 to £12,000, indicating that these respondents possibly 
have misunderstood the purpose of the survey. The sample is therefore truncated at this 
point, leaving us with a total of 317 observations of WTP.50 Among these, 148 
respondents provided WTP estimates for four issues, whereas the remaining 169 
valued global wanning only.51 The mean WTP for each issue, with median in brackets,
50 An alternative approach would be to censor the sample by setting outliers bid equal to £400. This 
procedure was also tested, but yielded no alterations to the main results. Moreover, since respondents 
providing extreme WTP estimates (i.e., above £400) may have partly or completely misunderstood the 
purpose of the survey, or alternatively are acting very strategically, there are no foundations for 
standardising these responses. I therefore consider truncation as most appropriate in this case.
51 Since the sample groups overlap each other (e.g., a number of respondents assign WTP for all four 
issues), the observations reported in the tables do not necessarily add up to the total number of 
observations.
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is presented in Table 4.2. Respondents were after truncation on average and in total for 
four issues willing to pay 1.4% o f their yearly income. All subsequent analyses are 
based on truncated data unless otherwise stated.
Oh 30- 
H
£u-,
0 40-60 100-120 160-180 220-240 280-300 340-360 >400
Total WTP (four issues)
Figure 4.1. Frequency distribution of total WTP
Note: Frequencies are divided into classes of £ 20 (i.e. first pile reflects the frequency
of £ 0, second pile the interval of £ 0.1 - 20, third pile £ 20.1 -  40, etc.)
Table 4.2. Mean and median WTP
Rain Forests Animals Air Pollution Global Warming" Global Warming*
Grand
Truncated
£ 52.24 (20) 
£ 37.82 (20)
£30.59(10)
£24.04(10)
£ 54.70 (10) 
£ 30.90 (10)
£ 161.43 (30) 
£ 53.00 (30)
£ 60.60 (22.5) 
£45.41 (20)
Note: a represents the overall mean and median values of global warming
b represents mean and median values for global warming when evaluated as part of four issues
The WTP estimates seem to lack the statistical properties to serve as robust measures 
o f economic value. As demonstrated above, mean WTP changes substantially when 
outliers are excluded, and an important question is, to what extent should data obtained 
from CV studies be censored or truncated in order to constitute a valid basis o f the
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welfare effects involved? The percentage of income people on average are willing to 
spend on these amenities also cast a shadow of doubt. At first glance 1.4% may seem 
to be a rather reasonable figure, and generally in CV contexts it is considered as such, 
but taking into account all possible expenses people are and may be facing in the 
future, associated with public as well as private goods, their income will soon be 
consumed if this amount of money is maintained over time and for other equally 
important issues.
4.3.2. Parametric and Non-Parametric Analysis
Table 4.3. presents mean WTP estimates for all four environmental issues along with 
ANOVA and Kruskall-Wallis test statistics. Although a significant difference between 
the issues is found in terms of mean values according to both parametric and non- 
parametric analyses, these are, nonetheless, rather close to each other.52 Following this, 
we may intuitively argue that the monetary figures provided are not necessarily related 
to the specific attributes and characteristics of the amenity. In our case, the WTP 
estimates fall within the range of £24 to £45, and since the environmental issues in 
many aspects differ from each other in their nature and importance, we may suspect 
that these values are not solely based on instrumental considerations. I consider it 
rather implausible, for example, that a ratio of roughly 1:2 represents an adequate range 
for the economic value assigned to these amenities. When comparing WTP with 
categorical ratings, the latter estimates equally fail to distinguish clearly the issues from 
each other in terms of their relative importance. However, except from the global 
warming issue, both measures seem to rank the environmental issues in the same order. 
Thus, the relative importance of the four issues may be supported by the convergence 
of these alternative measures of environmental priorities.
52 A criticism that has been raised against the CVM is that the technique most commonly produces 
estimates within a very restricted range, regardless of what is under valuation (Kahneman and Ritov, 
1994).
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Table 4.3. Differences between WTP for each environmental issue
Environmental Issue Global Warming*1 Rain Forests Animals Air Pollution
Mean WTP 45.41 37.82 24.04 30.90
Overall Mean WTP 36.11
One-Way ANOVA F =  5.28***
Kruskall-Wallis test S 2 = 29.56***
Mean CR score 4.46 3.94 3.39 4.48
Overall Mean CR 4.07
One-Way ANOVA F =  13.41***
Kruskall-Wallis test **=36.62***
Note: - *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level
- "sub-samples which are only presented the global wanning issue are excluded
The validity of the CV study is further assessed through 4 OLS regression equations 
presented in Table 4.4. On the basis of a Box-Cox regression, a semi-log functional 
form was chosen in which the dependent variable is kept linear.53 According to 
additional econometric tests performed, no major problems of heteroscedasticity or 
underspecification of the chosen models were found. The WTP for each issue is 
explained by roughly the same individual characteristics; predominantly income and 
gender, with women bidding higher, but also age and non-human interest as the main 
motive of WTP, serve as mainstays in the analysis, with the expected sign. Thus, 
people who do not only consider their own self-interest but intrinsic values, such as 
non-human welfare, as well, are likely to provide higher bids. Most importantly, it is 
indicated that people who are confronted with only one environmental issue (i.e., 
global warming), are willing to pay significantly more for this issue than are 
respondents who simultaneously provide WTP for three other environmental goods.
53 A Box-Cox regression tests for the functional form of the econometric model and provides information 
about how specific variables should be scaled. For example, due to the underlying relationship between 
independent and dependent variables, a linear, log-linear, or exponential function may be used. Various 
econometric models were tested but yielded no significant differences between the results.
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The overall results are independent of whether a tax or a voluntary contribution is used 
as the payment vehicle, and finally, no significant difference is found between the LSE 
and the Swedish sample according to a dummy variable capturing this influence.
Table 4.4. Determinants of WTP
Variable Global Warming Rain Forests Animals Air Pollution
Intercept 5.31 -63.40 -89.63 -146.6*
(0.09)° (-0.77) (-1.36) (-1.70)
InAge -20.99* -13.56 -4.50 -3.81
(-1.63) (-0.58) (-0.24) (-0.16)
lnlncome 12.06“ 17.14“ 13.50" 23.56*“
(2.00) (2.16) (2.09) (2.86)
Gender[l]* -21.45*“ -22.33“ 4.06 -26.45***
(-3.17) (-2.44) (0.55) (-2.75)
Easy Task[l]6 -7.09 -13.31 3.82 -8.78
(-0.94) (-1.34) (0.47) (-0.84)
Confident[l]* -0.10 8.17 -0.50 -6.11
(-0.02) (0.82) (-0.06) (-0.59)
Non-Human Interestfl]6 5.45 16.71* 14.50* -6.89
(0.74) (1.74) (1.86) (-0.68)
Tax Paymentfl]* 
WTP Reduced[l]* 
One Issue[l]* 
Swedish Sample [l]6 
Scope[l]6
16.71
(1.30)
9.05
(1.00)
46.81**’
(5.29)
17.16
(1.32)
-5.32 -8.04 -2.44 5.78
(-0.71) (-0.83) (-0.31) (0.57)
R-square 0.14 0.10 0.07 0.11
F-ratio 4.64*“ 2.22“ 1.49 2.29“
Durbin-Watson 1.84 2.18 2.02 2.02
Box-Cox statistics:
X (corresponding to Xi) 0.70 0.21 0.08 -0.14
(1.08) (0.14) (0.08) (-0.17)
0 (corresponding to Y) 0.96’** 0.95*** 0.93“ * 0.94***
(15.15) (11.72) (18.90) (10.79)
n *R2~ N 2t f 4.40 4.34 4.18 6.69
n 317 145 148 144
Note: - *, **, and *** denotes significance at the/? = 0.1,0.05, and 0.01 levels
- a t ratios in parenthesis
- 6 classification of dummy variables: 
gender: 1 if male
easy task: 1 if WTP estimation considered as an easy task 
confident: 1 if confident with stated WTP
non-human interest: 1 if non-human interest is an important motive for WTP 
tax payment: 1 if payment vehicle is a yearly tax rather than a voluntary contribution 
WTP reduced: 1 if willing to reduce WTP in the follow-up question 
one issue: 1 if WTP is asked only for one issue (global warming)
Swedish sample: 1 if the respondents is drawn from the Swedish sample population 
scope: 1 if the scenario comprise a larger scope of the environmental good 
- c White’s general heteroscedasticity test on the basis o f  the auxiliary regression: 
e2j= a i+ a2lnage,+a3lnincomei+ct4 (lnage)2i+as(lnincome)2i+a<s(lnagei *lnincomej)+Vi
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The consistency of WTP with respect to part-whole effects and scope insensitivity, and 
responsiveness to scope of CR scores, are more closely analysed by performing both 
one-way ANOVA and Mann-Whitney U tests, presented in Table 4.5. and 4.6. In Table 
4.5., a part-whole effect for global wanning is clearly demonstrated; whereas the mean 
WTP is £ 45.41 when the issue is evaluated as part of four issues, this figure increases • 
to £ 79.30 when the issue is valued on its own. The difference in the means is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level according to the relevant test statistic. Hence, 
we may assert that a part of WTP is based on other motives and considerations than 
those postulated by conventional economic theory. However, WTP does not seem to 
merely reflect the moral satisfaction or symbolic value derived from contributing to the 
environment as hypothesised by Kahneman and Knetsch (1992). If this were the case, 
we would expect that the total WTP would be roughly the same irrespective of how 
many other issues are included in the scenario (since symbolic value refers to the 
environment in general), but as illustrated in the table, total WTP for four issues is 
significantly higher (£115.21) than the value placed on the global warming issue when 
evaluated on its own (£79.30).
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the stated WTP is founded in a combination of 
symbolic expressions and other considerations, possibly economic value. Alternatively, 
if merely reflecting symbolic values, these are not unrelated to the specific 
environmental amenity, but depend on what and how many issues are under valuation 
(i.e., various amenities signal different symbolic values, which may vary in 
significance). Another plausible explanation for the effect is some people’s failure to 
realise their budget constraints; of a total of 214 respondents, 22% stated that they were 
willing to slightly or substantially reduce their monetary bid after explicitly calculating 
their stated total WTP in a follow-up question. This implies that, when valuing several 
issues, respondents are reminded of other potential issues that may require funding, 
which would possibly result in more conservative estimates due to limited monetary 
budgets.
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Table 4.5. Examination of part-whole effects
Valuation Scenario Mean WTP Global Warming Mean Total WTP
One issue evaluated: 79.30 79.30
As part o f four issues 45.41 115.21*
Between Groups Significance Z = -4.34* Z = 2.14a
(0.00) (0.03)
Note: - p-values in brackets
- a Mann-Whitney U test
- * mean total WTP for four issues
In table 4.6., the responsiveness to scope for both WTP and categorical ratings is 
analysed. The most important result is that perfect embedding is demonstrated for all 
four environmental issues. Furthermore, insensitivity to scope is independent of the 
way in which the magnitudes are specified; no difference is found with respect to type 
of intensifier or scale of measurement. The effect occurs no matter if absolute 
magnitudes, percentages, number of events or verbal cues are applied in order to 
specify the scope. These results are also verified by the regression analysis presented in 
Table 4.4., in which the dummy variables indicating the difference between minor and 
major scope are statistically insignificant across all issues. For some amenities, 
respondents valuing a larger scope of the issue actually provided lower bids, although 
the ‘misdirection’ of WTP is trivial and insignificant apart from for one issue 
(iendangered animals). Thus, the hypothesis that respondents are insensitive to scope is 
supported by these results. Finally, the alternative rating of importance, measured 
through categorical rating, does not result in greater responsiveness to scope than does 
economic value. However, since categorical rating is a relative measure that possibly 
lacks the properties of interval-ratio data, it may conceal the actual influence of scope.
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Table 4.6. Examination of insensitivity to scope
Mean WTP Mean CR score
Environmental Issue Minor Scope Major Scope Minor Scope Major Scope
Global Warmingc 46.39 43.23 4.62 4.10
Between Groups Significance F  = 0.16fl 
(0.69)
F  = 2.64° 
(0.11)
Rain Forests'* 40.34 33.03 3.89 4.03
Between Groups Significance F  = 0.57° 
(0.45)
F  = 0.23" 
(0.63)
Endangered Animals* 25.24 21.62 3.28 3.58
Between Groups Significance Z  = -2.26b 
(0.02)
F  = 0.90a 
(0.34)
Air Pollution^ 28.54 35.35 4.61 4.21
Between Groups Significance F =  0.45" 
(0.50)
F  = 2.04° 
(0.16)
Note: - p-values in brackets
- a one-way ANOVA
- b Mann-Whitney U test
- ca 20%  vs a 60% reduction of the gases that give rise to Global Warming
- d preservation of 50,000 ha in Bolivia vs 2 million ha in South America
- 'saving of the African elephant vs saving five o f  the most endangered mammals, including the African elephant 
-^an improvement vs a major improvement of the air quality
In order to test Fisher's (1996) hypothesis that people may not perceive any increase in 
value above a certain level of the good provided, some respondents were presented a 
follow-up question after they have assessed their WTP that read either of the following; 
‘after assessing the value of a 20% reduction in greenhouse gases, would you say that 
your value for a 60% reduction would be the same or higher, and how much would this 
be?’. A considerable proportion of respondents who were presented this question (9 out 
of 22) stated a substantially higher value after the change of scope, and on the 
aggregate there is a significant difference between WTP for 20% and 60% respectively. 
Thus, the respondents in this study do not indicate a flat utility function between the 
various levels of scope presented in the scenario, which implies that scope effects may 
not be explained by zero-marginal value above some minimum viable level. A more 
general conclusion is that it seems difficult to fully accommodate embedding by 
(modified) assumptions of economic theory.
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4.3.3. Qualitative Analysis
When asked about their motives and considerations for stated WTP in association with 
the CV scenario, it is clear that considerations other than those assumed by standard 
economic theory play an important role in determining economic value (e.g., Schkade 
and Payne, 1994). The most frequent responses, in the following order, were;
contemplation o f  who may be responsible fo r  (solving) the problem (i.e., what is my own 
responsibility, and thus how much ought I to pay?) 
what is needed fo r  an adequate solution(s) (what are the costs for it/them?) 
the importance and/or severity o f  the problem 
whether or not other people will pay and how much (‘a fair share’) 
what I  can afford to pay
to what extent I  am personally involved or do have an interest in the problem 
how much should society reasonably spend on the environment (collective ‘green’ accounts) 
how much do I  give to other charities (mental accounts for charities) or normally spend X  
dollars on 
consideration o f  future generations
Thus, motivations exist that are unrelated to instrumental consequences and specific 
features of the resource. It may not appear particularly strange that such motives are 
important for people, yet they are, as argued, problematic for the estimation of welfare 
effects in subsequent CBA since they are not necessarily confined to the specific 
resource being valued. Given this, an explanation is provided for why perfect and 
regular embedding tend to occur in CV contexts.
Apart from these motives of WTP, some respondents also said that they were thinking 
of the environment in general rather than specifically of the particular commodity 
under valuation. They further claimed that the environment is a complex issue not 
separable into specific events, or meant that as such they must be put in an appropriate 
context whereby projects and costs are rigorously described and subsequently decided 
upon. These statements thus indicate that a variety of ‘unconventional’ but subjectively 
important considerations play a major role in determining WTP, or attitudes, for which 
reason we may suspect that part-whole and scope insensitivity are not as ‘odd’ 
anomalies as they at first seem according to conventional analysis. It is also important
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to capture these reflections and reasons for WTP in CV studies, preferably in a 
qualitative format, since people who were asked the same questions in a closed-ended 
format, to a much larger extent, provided more ‘rational* and socially acceptable 
answers, such as making reference to the importance of the problem, the extent of it, 
the interest of future generations, etc.
As a follow-up section to this part of the questionnaire, people were also specifically 
asked if they reflected on the scope of the problem (31% said yes), if they paid 
attention to other public issues, environmental or others, that eventually require 
financial support (21%), if they would agree to support other issues with a similar 
amount (29%), and if they considered it appropriate to base policy-decisions on 
monetary valuation (41%). An important implication for the future application of CV 
studies is that 8 of the 12 respondents that were interviewed by the use of retrospective 
protocols said that extended information about specific project-costs and interventions 
may be of help in providing monetary values for these public goods.54
4.4. Conclusions
In recent years the CVM has encountered widespread criticism due to the variety of 
biases that potentially pose a threat to the validity of the method (e.g., Kahneman and 
Knetsch, 1992; Diamond and Hausman, 1994; Kahneman et al., 1999). Possibly one of 
the most discussed problems nowadays are the embedding effects that have been 
demonstrated in a number of studies (e.g., Desvousges et a l, 1993; Diamond et al., 
1993), and the main issue at stake is; do these effects arise due to flawed questionnaire 
designs and carelessly conducted CV surveys, or are such anomalies behavioural 
regularities that may not be easily overcome by improved methodologies? This study 
examined the internal consistency of CV responses by investigating the occurrence of 
embedding, and in order to make results comparable with those of other studies, a 
design similar to a typical CV study was applied. Between-subject tests of part-whole 
bias and insensitivity to scope were moreover performed, thereby providing a stronger
54 Since only 12 in-depth interviews were completed (i.e., retrospective protocols) which thoroughly 
looked into the inquires above, these latter results should be interpreted carefully.
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test than those employed in the majority of studies rejecting the embedding hypothesis, 
which mainly have relied on within-subject tests.
Willingness to pay was assessed for four environmental amenities; rain forests, 
endangered wild animals, air pollution, and global warming. The scope of these 
amenities was specified using four different scales of measurement; absolute 
magnitudes, percentages, number of events, and verbal cues. Hence, the procedure 
facilitates a test of whether the type of good and how magnitudes are specified have 
any influence on scope sensitivity. In addition to examining the occurrence of 
embedding in CV formats, I also compared the consistency of WTP with Categorical 
Rating (CR) as an alternative measure of environmental priorities. In order to gain 
better insight into how people respond to the CV questions, in-depth interviews were 
conducted in parallel with the main study.
The main findings were that neither an instrument of economic value nor a concept of 
attitude, as utilised here, seem capable of making the respondents responsive to scope. 
No significant difference was found between minor and major scope for WTP or CR 
for any of the issues. The weak relation between expressed economic value and the 
extent, urgency or character of the amenity is also supported by small variations in 
mean WTP across the four issues. The presumption that a measure of economic value 
should be psychometrically inferior to a more traditional notion of attitude, as proposed 
by Kahneman and Ritov (1994), is however challenged as neither instrument shows 
responsiveness to scope. The fact that a considerable portion of the respondents were 
willing to pay more if the scope was increased when directly asked subsequent to the 
valuation questions, indicates that within-subject tests are unlikely to properly reveal if 
and to what extent people are responsive to scope. Thus, apart from showing that 
embedding occurs even when a design similar to a typical CV study that adheres to the 
most important of the NOAA panel’s recommendations (Arrow et al., 1993), it also 
suggests that procedures employed by many CV practitioners in order to test for these 
and similar biases may be inappropriate.
Furthermore, a considerable part-whole effect was demonstrated for the global 
wanning issue. This inconsistency is, however, unlikely to be explained completely by
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the moral satisfaction hypothesis (Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992), since the total WTP 
for all four goods is significantly larger than the WTP for global warming when 
evaluated on its own. Thus, rather than merely reflecting value-expressive or symbolic 
objectives, which should result in the same WTP regardless of how many amenities are 
included in the scenario, WTP is presumably determined by a combination of such 
motives and other considerations. This is also in accordance with the theorising by 
Katz (1960) and Herek (1986), who hypothesise that attitudes serve multiple functions, 
rather than having one single purpose. As discussed in previous chapters, the results are 
further consistent with Thaler's (1990) hypothesis that people have ‘mental accounts’ 
for a variety of issues that are not easily separable into specific events. Rather than 
focusing on the particular issue being valued, most respondents seem to base their 
WTP on a more inclusive category of environmental resources.
Another plausible explanation for the effects is some people’s failure to consider their 
budget constraints; of a total of 214 respondents, 22% stated that they were willing to 
reduce their monetary bid after thoroughly contemplating their stated total WTP in a 
follow-up question. When valuing several issues, respondents are reminded of other 
potential issues that may require funding, which would result in more conservative 
estimates. This indirectly confirms the hypothesis that people tend to only reflect on a 
narrow or limited set of consequences of a particular choice, rather than its global 
consequences (Read et al., 1999). This ‘cognitive inertia’ implies that people take each 
issue as it comes; they tend to see it in isolation and as a single problem that needs to 
be solved, without thinking about other possible or necessary consumption alternatives. 
I believe this captures one of the key problems of CVM. Most CV studies are 
concerned with a ‘one-off event, which prevents respondents from considering other 
public goods and services that are important and may require funding. In order to make 
a more valid value assessment of a particular issue, it is reasonable to assume that 
people must have something to compare it with. Since it is more or less impossible to 
provide information about all alternative use of the monetary budget in the valuation 
scenario, and further, since there is no unequivocal way of determining to what aspects 
this information should be limited, the issue is difficult, if not impossible, to overcome.
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As a concluding remark, opponents of the CV method commonly assert that CV 
respondents do not have a clear and real value for the item being valued. Instead of 
relying on a well defined scheme interpreted in their minds, people seem to construct 
their preferences and make a decision rule whenever they need it (Schkade and Payne, 
1994; Fischhoff et a l , 1999). As a result, people’s responses in a CV context are likely 
to be arbitrary and unlikely to properly reflect instrumental considerations as required 
by CBA. Such misgivings seem well founded in the context of these results. Overall, 
these indicate that assessed economic value is quite insensitive to factors that ought to 
be important according to standard economic theory, such as the scope or importance of 
a particular issue, but instead are influenced by factors that should not be relevant and 
are problematic for subsequent welfare analysis. Given that the present study relies on a 
design similar to a typical CV study, whereby the amenities and suggested policy 
interventions are clearly described in the valuation scenario, these anomalies are further 
unlikely to be solely attributable to flawed methodologies as commonly asserted by CV 
practitioners (e.g., Carson et al., 1996a). This raises the question of to what extent they 
are behavioural regularities, at least in the context of more complex and global 
environmental resources.
It is easy to see why economic impact analysis of environmental improvements and 
deterioration is attractive as no other unit than monetary value is capable of providing a 
direct and relevant comparison with other competing projects, public as well as private. 
However and as argued previously, I am not inclined to think that a single measure 
such as WTP has the ability to accommodate the diversity of values encompassed by 
natural resources. It is important to understand that people’s ability to express 
articulated values on the most diverse topics is very limited. Rather than focusing on 
outcomes of specific questions, the valuation process itself ought to be highlighted. 
Therefore, as a logical step onwards from this study, the next chapter performs a 
qualitative analysis of what lies behind or underneath seemingly irrational and 
inconsistent responses in CV contexts.
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5. How People Make Sense of Contingent Valuation 
Questions
In the Contingent Valuation (CV) literature, various explanations have been provided as 
to why people behave inconsistently and irrationally, and how various empirical 
anomalies may be amended. Yet, these explanations have mostly been rather 
‘reductionistic’ in their character, whereas the broader issues of how people understand, 
interpret, and make sense of CV questions have been largely ignored. For example, 
embedding effects have been attributed to substitution effects (Hanemann, 1994), or 
diminishing marginal returns (Fisher, 1996), whereas modified notions of income 
effects have been proposed as a cause for unreasonably large discrepancies between 
Willingness To Pay (WTP) and Willingness To Accept (WTA) estimates (Hanemann,
1991). Other problems, such as overstatements of WTP, have more generally been 
explained by improper survey design or inappropriate elicitation formats (Mitchell and 
Carson, 1989; Hanemann, 1994; Carson et al., 1996a). On the whole, rather than 
looking beyond mainstream economic frameworks in order to understand the anomalies 
commonly observed in CV studies, assiduous attempts are made to integrate these 
within existing economic theories and knowledge.
Fischhoff (1991) captures this point by distinguishing between what he calls the 
philosophy o f articulated values on the one hand, and the philosophy o f basic values on 
the other; whereas the former assumes that people can provide articulated and perfectly 
meaningful answers to basically all issues, provided a complete description of the task, 
the latter hypothesises that people lack well-defined values for all but the most familiar 
of issues, of which they have an extensive experience. It is clear from this distinction 
that the core assumptions in economics stem from a strong tradition in the former of 
these paradigms. As a consequence, the CV research has mainly been focused on 
explaining and predicting specific effects and phenomena, which has resulted in a 
reluctance to accept findings that demonstrate deeper problems with the method. It is 
interesting to note that CV practitioners, who otherwise stress the importance of 
following the NOAA panel’s recommendations of ‘good’ CV practice (Arrow et al., 
1993), have not been particularly attentive to the panel’s advice that each CV study
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should check for the respondents’ understanding of the valuation task through some 
follow-up questions to this.
At the start of this thesis I argued that we ought to ask ourselves how and why people 
value environmental issues before we make inquires into how much they value these in 
monetary terms. This chapter explicitly takes notice of these questions by investigating 
how people spontaneously understand and interpret CV questions for environmental 
amenities, in this particular case global warming. It develops the qualitative analysis 
performed in the previous chapter, which indicated that people are motivated by factors 
that should be irrelevant for the valuation task, whereas factors that ought to be relevant 
seem to play a minor role. I will hence focus on content (or face) validity, whereby the 
process rather than the product of respondents’ thinking is brought into light.55 A 
qualitative analysis is applied in order to fulfil this aim, and although actual WTP 
amounts are assessed for the environmental resource under consideration, these will be 
of minor importance. Instead, focus is placed on the respondents’ thoughts and the 
discussion that revolves around these figures, which are envisaged to reveal whether 
these correspond to an underlying value construct, or if they represent expressions of 
‘non-attitudes’ with little bearing on economic value (Converse, 1970).
5.1. Thought Processes and Interpretation of WTP Questions
There are surprisingly few studies that have performed qualitative analyses of people’s 
answers in CV contexts, investigating how people respond to a typical WTP question. 
The most reported of these, and which has also caused an animated debate regarding the 
validity of stated preferences, is Schkade and Payne's (1994) study of the preservation 
of migratory water fowls in central United States. On the basis of a verbal protocol
55 The mainstream research in the field have been excessively concerned with construct validity and 
reliability of WTP estimates. The usual process has been to investigate how WTP bids vary with factors 
that a-priori are expected to have influence on these (theoretical validity), and later examine to what 
extent results are repeated across different studies (convergent validity). Generally, it is believed that 
assessed economic values and their internal relationship is a sufficient criterion of validating the 
methodology.
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analysis (Ericsson and Simon, 1984),56 the main findings from the study are that the 
monetary figures provided are motivated by a variety of considerations, most of which 
ought not to be relevant according to mainstream theoretical assumptions. Rather than 
considering the scope or importance of the problem, and how this may be weighted 
against other demands on their wealth, people are keen to reflect upon how much they 
otherwise spend on charitable contributions (mental accounts), they want to pay a fair 
share of the cost of the solution, and they tend to signal a concern for a much larger set 
of environmental amenities. Most problematic though is the fact that 20% of the 
respondents reported guessing or were just making up an answer. These results, 
therefore, not only suggest that standard economic theory is insufficient to explain CV 
results, but also confirm the hypothesis that responses seem to be arbitrarily constructed 
during the course of the interview.
Vadnjal and O'Connor (1994), although not using a think-aloud technique, arrived at a 
somewhat similar conclusion when examining how people interpreted CV questions 
about the urban development of a marine park in Auckland, New Zealand. However, 
instead of looking specifically into thought processes and cognitive strategies used by 
respondents, their study was focused on what people in, a broader sense, thought about 
a monetary valuation of this issue. Respondents were also encouraged to express then- 
general views about the appropriateness of destroying the natural resource in favour of 
urban development. Results of the study suggest that people are concerned about what 
ought to be right or wrong in society, which is symbolised by very large WTP estimates, 
and as such they are un-associated with economic decision-making as traditionally 
defined. Generally, respondents argued that the environment is beyond choice and 
therefore not well represented by economic value. Nevertheless, if necessary, people are 
willing to pay significant, in some cases indefinite, amounts, but these do not represent 
compensation for any actual loss of the resource. Instead they are based on an 
underlying principle of what ought to be ethically right, no matter what the costs. In this 
sense, expressed WTP amounts are more likely to be gestures in a political process
56 The aim of this technique is to investigate how people respond to a particular inquiry or question by 
capturing the cognitive processes people utilise when generating answers. Hence, people are probed to 
reveal for the researcher everything that comes to mind when working on a particular problem.
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toward which people respond as ‘morally responsible’ citizens, not as self-oriented 
consumers. Some empirical support is thus provided for theoretical arguments 
developed by Sen (1987) and others (e.g., Boyce et al., 1992; Vatn and Bromley, 1994).
Building on these findings, I will in this study investigate, not only to what extent 
people ‘relevantly’ respond to CV questions, but also in what context they tend to 
spontaneously place such an inquiry. This will indicate if and to what extent the public 
identify with the procedure of valuing unfamiliar and complex environmental resources 
in monetary terms through hypothetical markets. Thus, apart from the strategies people 
employ in order to provide an answer and what they otherwise think about the 
procedure, I will also examine how people make sense of a typical CV study, what 
meanings they attach to their answers, and how they, ‘un-probed’, interpret the 
questions being posed. The approach tries not to ‘force’ people to comply with the 
particular inquiry, but aims at giving respondents as much freedom and time as possible 
to respond in a way that is most natural to them. One may interpret this as starting from 
the other end, that of the respondents; rather than dismissing some responses, or part of 
responses, because they do not relate to or fit into the frame of the question, these are 
exactly the responses I am interested in. Instead of excluding utterances when people 
seemingly have completely or partly misunderstood the purpose of the WTP question, I 
consider those answers meaningful for my research. I will subsequently guide these 
respondents into an appropriate path of thought, but it is the whole story, including its 
contradictions, that is important, not just those parts corresponding to the interpretation
cn
by the researcher.
57 All CV studies so far, to my knowledge, even those that have been critical o f the methodology and 
conducted from a qualitative standpoint, have reported thought processes that more or less fit into the 
frame of the scenario, whereas very little has been said about what possibly precede these. To give an 
example, if  as researchers we are asking a particular question and people spontaneously respond in a 
way that is irrelevant or when people simply do not understand the question, we firstly guide them by 
elaborating our explanation, and then focus on the answer that (hopefully) corresponds to the intention 
of the task. However, by ignoring this preceding process of thought, I believe valuable information for 
the future development of the CV methodology will be lost.
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5.2. Conversational Norms
Schwarz (1994) argues that at the heart of all processes of conversation exist certain 
assumptions that constitute a common ground between speakers and listeners. This 
common ground is crucial in order to establish an understanding between the 
communicative agents, and thereby a meaningful conversation. For example, a 
discussion about whether to vote against or for the introduction of the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) is unlikely to be meaningful unless there is an established 
context of democratic principles that both parties realise, in this particular case the 
referendum. It does not imply that they have to agree upon these principles, but they 
have to be familiar with them and the basic rationale underlying such political 
processes. Reflecting a more fundamental dimension, everyone taking part in this 
discussion ought to be familiar with the monetary and financial system (e.g., the role of 
banks, employer-employee relations, market transactions, etc). To attempt a discussion 
about EMU with someone who is not familiar with the Western concept of money-use is 
doomed to be quite meaningless in this respect.
In most real-world contexts, such ‘common grounds’ of conversation are mostly 
obvious to the communicators, and therefore rarely questioned. In the communication 
over a wide variety of issues, there exists some background to statements that are made, 
and these can normally be put in a context whereby links to associated issues are 
simultaneously being established.58 However, in research settings these kinds of 
backgrounds are not always established. As Schwarz (1994) and some others have 
noted, conversations in research settings differ from everyday conversations by being 
highly constrained (e.g., Clark and Schober, 1992), and sometimes they are completely 
inadequate, either in the sense that they deviate from how similar enquires are posed 
and interpreted in real-world situations, or because they are invented by the researcher. 
Attempts at standardising the interaction between researcher and respondent in order to
58 As an everyday example, a discussion about the weather between non-meteorologists as the Swedish 
summer holiday is approaching, does not simply involve temperatures, winds and rainfall. In addition, 
it carries with it imaginations and anticipations of vacation plans, possible frustration or joy resulting 
from particular forecasts, drinking and eating habits, the consequences o f living in the Northern part of 
the world, and, although presumably more obscured, implications of the protestant work ethic.
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isolate and examine certain events tend to overlook the need to put this into a context 
within which ordinary people can make sense of the same, thereby preventing the 
interaction from becoming meaningful. Schwarz (1994) notes that:
Most importantly, the standardisation of instructions, or of the questions asked, precludes the 
tailoring of utterances to meet different common grounds. Moreover, when research 
participants ask for clarification, they may often not receive additional information. Rather, 
the previously given instructions may be repeated or a well-trained interviewer may respond, 
“Whatever it means to you”, when asked to clarify a question’s meaning...As a result, a 
mutual negotiation of intended meaning is largely precluded in many research situations (p.
127).
To summarise, the foundations of conversation that define its meaning are missing in 
many research settings. Yet, a more serious problem is probably that, in their attempts 
to make the inquiry ‘real* enough to answer, respondents will assume that there must be 
a meaning somewhere, and therefore they are unlikely to protest against the task, no 
matter how odd it seems to be, and regardless of whether or not they are familiar with 
the event being researched. They have no reason to question the intention of the 
researcher, because “communicated information comes with a guarantee of relevance” 
(Sperber and Wilson, 1986; p. vii), and rather than asking for clarification, since this 
may reveal their ignorance, they are likely to engage in a constant search for cues about 
what the questions really mean, and make educated guesses about what the researcher is 
possibly aiming for (Nadeau and Niemi, 1995).59
5.2.1. Making Sense o f Valuation Scenarios
On the basis of the above discussion, we may argue that the hypothetical market of an 
otherwise non-marketed good does not encompass a common ground that both 
researchers and subjects anticipate, let alone agree upon. The former has after some, 
usually thorough, contemplation assumed that one may construct a market for this, and
59 Most problematic are cases when respondents have no knowledge about the issue whatsoever, and it 
has been demonstrated that as many as 30% of survey respondents provide answers to fictitious issues 
that are invented by the researcher, (Converse, 1970; Schuman and Presser, 1981).
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as soon as this is done, it is ‘just’ a matter of asking people the right questions and 
consistent and well-behaved preferences will be obtained. However, whereas the 
researcher may have spent years in conceptualising and developing an understanding of 
this, no doubt facilitated by academic tradition and training, the respondents are only 
given the time of the interview to comprehend this construct. Admittedly, this is realised 
by the CV practitioner, who will devote significant efforts to elaborating the scenario 
and explaining carefully its underlying purpose. This is therefore the key consideration 
among CV researchers.
However, it is doubtful whether the basic foundations of the valuation task can be 
(properly) realised during the course of the interview, despite thorough explanation. In 
the same way that the translation of a book or a film into a foreign language is unlikely 
to convey (all) hidden meanings and intentions of conversations and scenes, a similar 
problem is arguably present in a CV study, in which the interviewee lacks the prior 
knowledge and experiences that are necessary in order to put this in an adequate 
context. The clarification of the valuation task can surely provoke an answer from the 
respondents, but the questions we must ask are: Does the procedure correspond with the 
respondents’ assumptions or mental representations of how these and similar issues are 
normally decided upon? Do they put this in an appropriate context? If not, how 
‘genuine’ will responses of economic value be, and what do these essentially represent? 
A major problem for subsequent welfare estimation arises if the comprehension of the 
task by the respondent deviates from what the question is intended to measure. I will 
argue that this problem is widely overlooked in the CV literature. Although in many 
cases a misunderstanding is revealed in the beginning of and during the interview, this 
nuisance is eagerly corrected for by further explanations, without any serious attempts 
at analysing the respondents’ spontaneous interpretation of the valuation task.
Apart from the likely difficulties of comprehending the purpose and rationale of a CV 
study, since this suggests a way of making environmental priorities that is unheard of by 
the respondents, and that further does not correspond with established procedures of 
public policy-making, there are other aspects surrounding the valuation task that guides 
the respondents in their task. For instance, they may reflect upon who is sponsoring the 
study, who is responsible for the implementation of environmental measures, their
124
HOW PEOPLE MAKE SENSE OF CONTINGENT VALUATION QUESTIONS
eventual trust or mistrust in involved parties, etc (Fischhoff, 1997; Macnaghten and 
Jacobs, 1997). Schwarz (1997) offers an alternative explanation of embedding effects 
that proceeds from this reasoning; rather than attributing this anomaly to the 
respondents’ failure to realise the extent of, or specific characteristics of the good, their 
mental representation of this may differ from that of the researcher. Overall they are 
likely to consider the resource as an inseparable part of a larger part of an environmental 
issue (Thaler, 1990), and therefore, their valuation captures a number of effects that are 
unknown to the researcher.
5.2.2. Social Context and Environmental Valuation
A related issue to the discussion above is the social context in which the valuation 
question is being asked. A few papers discuss this aspect (e.g., Harris et al., 1989; Vatn 
and Bromley, 1994), but it is commonly ignored in the CV literature. Except from at the 
piloting stage, a CV study is typically conducted as individual interviews. A potential 
problem with this approach is that, since individual preferences are likely to be context 
relative, we do not know which context is pertinent to a particular choice. As Vatn and 
Bromley (1994) argue, if decisions about natural resources can be categorised as pure 
consumer choices, then individual WTP would be appropriate. If, on the other hand, 
these choices have more to do with moral norms and social commitments, then 
monetary bids from isolated individuals have little to offer.
A collective discussion may, as argued, be crucial in order to establish a shared 
understanding and a coherent basis for forthcoming choices. If given the opportunity to 
discuss the matter with other people, whereby important social processes of value 
formation are facilitated, respondents may become more confident regarding what 
should be valued and why, which in the long run should have implications for the 
character and consistency of WTP. In CV studies, people are asked to respond to a 
procedure that has not yet been institutionalised, and unless citizens are given an 
opportunity to contemplate and discuss the foundations of a monetary valuation of the 
environment, we may not expect them to have a well-developed idea how much specific 
resources are worth to them.
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5.3. Research Hypotheses
On the basis of the previous discussion, a number of hypotheses for this study emerged. 
Some of these relate to how people spontaneously interpret and make sense of the 
valuation scenario, whereas the remainder look into how people respond to the WTP 
questions when they are guided into the thoughts relevant for the inquiry.
H\: People will not necessarily interpret the CV question as intended.
Since assigning economic values to environmental issues is a novel task, there is a risk 
that they will misunderstand or interpret the task differently from what is intended; 
instead of thinking about and responding on the basis of how much the environmental 
improvement is worth to them, or what they otherwise are willing to pay for this, they 
may discuss other environmental and/or public issues not comprised by the question.
# 2  ■ People will not perceive the valuation scenario as consequential.
According to Blarney (1998), statements of WTP in CV studies are not perceived as 
consequential by the respondents. If they do not believe that suggested environmental 
measures will be implemented in the foreseeable future and on the basis of aggregated 
WTP, and if they do not view it as credible that they eventually have to pay stated 
amounts, these are less likely to be associated with the characteristics of the resource 
and less bound by real budget-constraints. Although the link between economic value 
and policy interventions is anticipated, the consequences of statements will be 
negligible since the individual is only one of very many voters.
H^: Economic value is (completely or partly) based on factors that ought not 
to be relevant according to standard economic theory.
Corresponding to the findings of chapter 4 and of previous research, factors such as the 
moral implication of the policy intervention, costs of solving the problem, the 
respondents own responsibility, and thereby duty of paying, are important determinants 
of WTP {e.g., Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992; Schkade and Payne, 1994).
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H\: People refer to the environment in general when stating WTP, rather than 
on the particular issue to be valued.
Part-whole effects (i.e., regular embedding) imply that WTP will be overstated since it 
is based on a larger and more inclusive amenity than what is the object of subsequent 
Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) (e.g., Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992).
H$: Answers derived in a social context (including more than two persons) 
are different from those assessed through individual interviews.
A discussion between individuals in a focus group may facilitate a different perspective 
on the issue, possibly resulting in a different ‘conceptualisation’ or understanding of the 
valuation task. Assuming such differences, estimates of WTP will be sensitive to 
whether these are assessed in an individual or in a social context.
5.4. Design of Interviews and Focus-Group Discussions
Two different groups of people were recruited for this study. Approximately half the 
sample consists of graduate and undergraduate students at the London School of 
Economics (LSE), and the remaining half consists of people with various different 
backgrounds and socio-economic characteristics. These respondents were randomly 
targeted in two different ways; subjects in the former group were informed about the 
study through e-mail, whereas the remaining respondents were notified by leaflets put in 
their mailboxes. Although both students and non-students participated in the study, I do 
not attempt to achieve a perfectly representative sample since the aim is to isolate 
interviewer effects and investigate the influence of contextual factors, rather than 
empirically estimate actual welfare effects.
The study used focus groups and individual in-depth interviews in order to investigate if 
people understand and how they identify with an economic valuation of a global 
environmental issue, in this particular case global warming. Altogether 2 focus-groups, 
each including 4 respondents, and 21 individual face-to-face interviews were conducted, 
the former lasting roughly 90 minutes, whereas the latter took on average 40 minutes to
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complete. The focus groups started by some initial statements made by the interviewer 
that relate to the environmental issue being valued and the purpose of the valuation task. 
Further on, the valuation scenario was presented and some open-ended key questions 
were asked, including the WTP question, but mainly the group was left on its own to 
discuss the research inquiry. Thus, the objective was to let the respondents interpret and 
assign meaning to the valuation scenario by themselves.
In individual interviews, respondents were asked to ‘think-aloud’ while answering the 
valuation question. In this particular case a concurrent protocol was applied, in which 
respondents report everything that comes to mind at the moment of their decision­
making (Ericsson and Simon, 1984). Hence, similar to the focus-group setting, the 
technique offers a way to learn how people spontaneously respond to the valuation 
question, if they interpret and understand this as intended, and whether they consent to 
the idea of a monetary valuation of the environmental resource being valued. The 
procedure also discloses how they arrive at the particular figure stated, such as the 
motivations, considerations, and strategies of WTP. In addition to the WTP question, 
respondents were asked to think-aloud while answering some follow-up questions, such 
as what they thought about the procedure, if they considered this appropriate, and how 
ambivalent or uncertain they were about their stated amount. Thus, some more general 
opinions revolving around the issue among respondents who adequately interpreted the 
valuation question are also captured. The instructions preceding the verbal protocols are 
presented below.
Before coming to the next question, I want to inform you that one important purpose of this 
research is to find out what people are thinking when answering questions about 
environmental values. Therefore I am asking you to think-aloud while you are working on 
the question given below. By thinking aloud I am simply interested in everything that you are 
thinking, from the moment you have read or heard the question until you give me an answer 
you are satisfied with. In this process it is important that you do not plan what to say, nor do 
you have to explain what you are saying unless probed to do so. Just speak out loud what 
comes to mind. If you are silent for some time I will remind you to continue talking.60
60 As a clarification of what this implies, the respondents were presented a fairly easy mathematical task 
and asked to describe the process of solving this.
128
HOW PEOPLE MAKE SENSE OF CONTINGENT VALUATION QUESTIONS
In contrast with the usual quantitative approach in the Contingent Valuation Method 
(CVM), a qualitative approach such as the one employed here provides a means of 
examining what lies behind people’s answers to survey questions and what meaning 
they attach to various research issues. Particularly when responses are not well-founded, 
this information is indeed valuable, and it is also expressed in the respondents’ own 
language.
The particular ‘good’ being valued was global wanning, for which respondents firstly 
were given a thorough explanation regarding its causes and environmental effects. They 
were further carefully told about the scientific uncertainties involved and the debate 
between various interest groups and scientists. As in other CV studies, the aim was to 
present a realistic scenario of how to solve the problem and how it should (or could) be 
paid for. The scenario built on the Kyoto treaty, but with an extended policy that 
prevented ‘all’ known problems of global warming. Hence, the scenario originates from 
a ‘strong’ version of sustainability. The valuation scenario read;
Global warming results from the emission of greenhouse gases, primarily carbon dioxides, 
which are bi-products o f manufacturing, heating and transportation. The effects of global 
warming is somewhat uncertain, and there prevail some disagreement among involved 
researchers what and exactly how large the effects would be. However, it is believed that 
some areas will get too hot, leading to that some types of agriculture will no longer be 
efficient nor possible in the future. Whereas some places will get warmer, other will become 
colder, leading to changes in the liveability at different places. Due to alterations in global 
and regional temperatures, there are considerable risks of rising sea-level and the frequency 
of droughts, tropical storms and other unexpected changes to the climate. Conservation 
biologists are further concerned with the effects on biodiversity, from extinction of single 
populations o f highly habitat-specific endangered plants to the extirpation of entire species 
and communities. On a more broader level, these changes might cause yet unknown but 
possibly serious effects on the global eco-system.
In order to stop this we need to be more efficient in the way we use energy for heating, 
transport and industry. As a first step toward solving the problem, a treaty was signed by 38 
countries in Kyoto Japan, agreeing to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases 7 percent below 
1990 levels by the year 2012. Yet, there are a significant number o f people, including 
environmental groups, climate scientists and governmental officials, who argue that these 
efforts are not sufficient and who therefore urge for much tougher restrictions. However, by
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imposing higher charges on the emission o f greenhouse gases, along with making more use 
of biological fuels, various fuels and other forms of energy will become more expensive. 
Apart from the direct effect on taxes, such measures will eventually have an impact on the 
prices of various consumer products.
Suppose now that a policy is implemented that will ensure that the emission of greenhouse 
gases are reduced to the extent that the above problems are prevented. There has been some 
approximation of how much such a policy will cost for the average citizen in terms of higher 
prices and taxes, and the core question is if people are prepared to pay this. I would therefore 
like to know how much such initiatives are worth to you.
In addition, the rationale for capturing economic value for environmental resources and 
their subsequent input in policy analysis was briefly explained before the valuation 
scenario. The respondents were informed that the WTP involved a yearly payment, 
either in the form of higher prices for products and services giving rise to global 
warming, or higher taxes. Finally, in focus groups, respondents answered the WTP 
question individually after the procedure was discussed between participants and 
interviewer. They were explicitly told that WTP ought to reflect what they as 
individuals thought it was worth, not what the group in the aggregate would be willing 
or could afford to pay. Therefore, although being captured as an individual response, 
this was, presumably, guided by other people’s opinion and preferences. The WTP 
question was elicited in a standard Open-Ended (OE) format;
How much would the proposed intervention have to cost you before you would vote no to 
this? To put it differently, what is your annual maximum willingness to pay for this 
environmental improvement in terms o f higher prices and taxes?
The maximum amount I am willing to pay is £ .............  annually
After the interviews and focus-group discussions had been completed, all recorded 
responses were firstly transcribed and thereafter coded. In this specific case, the coding 
scheme originated from previous research regarding how people typically respond to 
CV questions (e.g., Schkade and Payne, 1994). However, initial categorisations were 
modified and new codes emerged during the process according to what was found to be 
common considerations among respondents. Hence, a combination of a pre-established
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scheme and an inductive approach was employed. In the end, the following six 
categories, reflecting various key considerations, were chosen; (1) references to the 
specific resource under valuation, (2) reference to more general issues (environmental 
resources, public goods in general, charitable contributions, etc.), (3) references to 
political issues and issues of fairness, (4) references to economic constraints and factors, 
(5) references to other than economic solutions, and (6) other references (more specific 
categorisations are presented in table 5.1.). Since these categorisations were intended to 
capture motivations of WTP in general, rather than for each respondent individually, 
each subject may have more than one category assigned to him or her. After the 
categorisations were allocated to respondents, transcripts were once more examined, 
and utterances and citations illustrating ways of thinking or tackling the elicitation 
question were isolated.61,62
5.5. Results
This section is divided into five parts. The first focuses on how people spontaneously 
respond to the CV scenario, that is, if they identify with this, or how they otherwise 
make sense of the inquiry. The second and third sections report what people in more 
explicit terms thought about the procedure when this was clarified by the researcher. 
The fourth part focuses on responses that, at least to some extent, correspond to the 
intention of the question and aims at identifying the strategies used by the respondents 
in order to arrive at a certain estimate of WTP. The final part discusses the uncertainty 
respondents experienced when faced with the valuation scenario.
The findings of this research are furthermore presented in two different ways. Partly 
responses will be categorised into various key themes on the basis of the coding scheme 
presented in the previous section in order to illustrate the frequency of various 
considerations, reflecting shared meanings and perceptions among respondents, partly
61 Ideally, someone ‘impartial’ to and without any direct interest of the research issue may have been 
consulted for the transcription and coding of responses, but due to budget constraints this was not 
feasible.
62 The questionnaire may be found as an appendix to the thesis.
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people’s remarks and comments will be reported exactly as these are expressed by 
themselves. Responses are mainly un-edited, but in order to make sense of fragmentary 
comments and establish a coherent text, on some occasions these are supplemented. 
Words and phrases taken directly from the transcriptions are reported in italicised text, 
whereas supplemented comments are presented in brackets.
5.5.1. Interpretation o f and Identification with the Valuation Scenario
A quarter of the people interviewed did not interpret the valuation question as intended. 
Instead of thinking in terms of individual economic value, which ought to have a basis 
in what the individuals themselves think the improvement is worth to them, many 
respondents convey a discussion about other issues. These are commonly of political 
significance, but the crucial point is that they are not comprised by, nor directly related 
to the question being asked. They may revolve around issues of environmental 
preservation, but they have little if anything in common with economic value as defined 
by the CV researcher. For instance, a number of respondents discussed more general 
issues of taxation, stating whether or not they thought that this is an appropriate basis of 
environmental policy-making, others were concerned with what ought to be done to 
solve the problem, and some respondents were keen to mention the broader conflicts 
between environmental preservation and economic development. One respondent 
illustrates this point;
"How would I  work through that is, I  mean I  have a belief in a progressive taxation system, 
so I  would always be willing to accept a reasonable amount o f  the burden, irrespective to 
questions like that. What is most important is that the burden [fall differently] on particular 
groups o f  the economy, so I  would not have a fla t tax. So, based on that, how much would it 
be allocating..." (respondent #5)
What is striking for these respondents is that they are referring to other people and the 
society as a whole. Instead of focusing on their own opinion, preferences, behaviour and 
WTP, they are concerned with what other people would do, or fail to do, discussing 
whether there is a problem of citizen consciousness, whether or not other people would 
reject the idea of making these and other environmental problems the object of taxation,
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if other people are willing to pay anything, or otherwise change their behaviour, etc. 
Consider the following examples;
"Well it depends, I  mean you got things like education, health, transport, hmm, these issues, 
and you got [to] prioritise where environmental issues are to be placed. Having said that,
...if the environment is not friendly, i f  you don't think about the environment, then we will all 
be dead. It all depends, as I  said, on how you prioritise things. I  would definitely put 
environmental issues, say in the top five, but personally speaking with an overgrowing 
population, health is going to be [a] major issue. ...[Therefore] it is only a small amount o f  
money that we can do [for environmental issues]. One o f  the issues maybe, in terms o f  
taxation is charging more fo r petrol and things like that, but then people are not going to be 
happy with that because you take the freedom o f  the car away from people, you know. And i f  
you put prices up, you got to have a better transport system, ...and another way would be [to 
establish] car-tolls, ...or stop people from using the car in cities. But you know it is very very 
difficult, ...it is a small amount o f  resources, and we got to prioritise, and unfortunately I  
don't think that environmental issues are among the top priorities fo r  most people, 
environment issues are not there." (respondent #9)
"I'm thinking the US versus like the most Scandinavian, or most European countries, where 
there is really high taxes, and you get lots o f  benefits from it, whereas in the States it is very 
individual, you know, you want to get the benefits that you pay fo r  yourself, and something 
like environmental things, that type o f  [global] benefits, individual people are not willing to 
pay for. Like universal health care, they tried to start that up in the US, you don't get free 
healthcare [there] you see, ...and it failed. So I  think fo r me as an individual I  am much more 
environmentally concerned and environmental stuff are o f  a very big priority fo r  me, so I  
would probably be more willing to pay than the average American." (respondent #10)
These examples illustrate how some respondents spontaneously interpret the purpose of 
the interview. A lack of correspondence with the intention of the question is clearly 
demonstrated. However, what is more alarming is that a misinterpretation of the purpose 
and rationale of the task continues after a thorough explanation regarding this has been 
provided. Overall, people are uncomfortable with answering the WTP question due to 
their uncertainty over what the procedure really implies, although the scenario in itself 
{i.e., the causes, consequences and suggested measures of preventing global warming) is 
(perfectly) clear to them. When presented follow-up questions on how they feel about 
the valuation task and whether they found this appropriate, these respondents tend to 
return to their original interpretation and divert from the notion of economic value.
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5.5.2. Appropriateness o f Economic Value
Although some people will respond regardless of what they think about the procedure, 
others express openly their concern for the appropriateness of putting ‘price-tags’ on the 
environment. Nearly half of the sample (12 respondents) clearly does not believe in this 
way of making environmental priorities, arguing that the environment is ‘not a 
monetary issue’. This opinion arises because they consider it to be un-related to private 
economic decision-making. Common arguments are that lay people do not have 
sufficient knowledge to make appropriate judgements and consequently ‘experts should 
decide’, that the procedure represents an ‘ultra-liberal standpoint’ overseeing core 
values, or that these kinds of environmental resources are global issues that rather 
should be solved through joint-efforts across nations. One respondent is particularly 
clear about this aspect;
"It depends, depends on so much, if, I  mean... What are you talking about, are you talking 
about paying to, hmm, whom, the government? It doesn't f i t  into my frame o f  mind actually, I  
mean, the question is virtually meaningless (laughter) fo r  my way o f  thinking, it's in a sense 
that, hmm, the whole notion o f  paying on a market fo r  these environmental objectives, is, 
huh, ought to be unsuccessful, because it doesn't f i t  into the way I  think, because the way I  
think, i f  I  would like to give to these matters, I  would not like it to be through this market 
[procedure]..." (respondent #20)
Nevertheless, the findings are somewhat mixed. Whereas a few respondents are 
undecided about what is right or wrong in this respect, some believe that CVM is a 
viable approach to making environmental priorities. They argue that it is a ‘sensible’ 
and feasible approach, that policy makers should take account of public opinion, and 
that economic benefits and costs matter. Yet, although public opinion is considered to 
be an important input to policy analysis, many are concerned whether it is possible to 
reduce such into a monetary figure that would adequately reflect what should be 
prevented and what should not, and that would capture important aspects of 
responsibility and availability of paying. Similarly, although there are limits to how 
much people can afford to pay and that costs thus have to be taken into consideration, 
this is a separate concept from economic preferences.
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Most importantly though is the fact that some respondents, despite their scepticism or 
lack of consent toward the CVM, still provide an answer to the valuation question. The 
responses from this group of respondents do not seem to be particularly unreasonable 
and they do not differ significantly from the average response. Thus, seemingly well- 
behaved responses to this CV study do not necessarily reveal people’s ‘true’ opinions or 
to what extent they are committed to their statements. Clearly this phenomenon poses a 
major problem for CV studies, which in the analysis commonly put emphasis on 
internal validity and overlooks to what extent responses are founded in an underlying 
value construct.
Interestingly, a difference regarding this aspect was found between focus groups and 
individual interviews. Whereas in the latter a possible disagreement toward the 
procedure was not disclosed until some follow-up questions were asked, respondents in 
the former mode seem more keen to initially protest against the procedure and to openly 
state their scepticism. Possibly this is due to the support they receive from other 
participants in the focus group, in which the exerted influence of the researcher 
according to what would be an ‘acceptable’ and expected answer may be significantly 
reduced. This outcome is supported by earlier findings by (Milgram, 1974), on the basis 
of which we may conclude that citizens are socialised to obey and trust authorities, but 
when someone sees someone else refusing to ‘follow orders’, protests from other people 
escalate.
5.5.3. Credibility o f the Hypothetical Market
A follow-up question was asked regarding how credible or realistic people thought the 
valuation scenario was. The purpose of this question was to illuminate to what extent 
CV results are consistent with the fundamental assumptions of traditional CBA. In order 
to be, as Blarney (1998) argues, it is required that responses are outcome related. There 
are two forces that may violate this assumption. Firstly and central to this thesis, 
economic values are indicated to also have a value-expressive function in these 
contexts, whereby the mere expression of an opinion is not only important but 
represents a significant part (e.g., Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992). Secondly, the 
implications of a wrong decision by the individual will have very small, if any,
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consequences as long as she does not consider her response to be influential on the 
project-outcome, possibly since she thinks of herself as one in a million ‘voters’.
In this study it is revealed that, for instance when asked if they believed if and to what 
extent their statement would be treated as a binding agreement, as many as 19 
respondents (66%) consider the setting more or less hypothetical in the sense that no 
such basis of policy making is likely to be introduced in the near future, and that they 
thus do not have to eventually pay the amount stated. Moreover, a few subjects express 
the thought that the hypothetical market is indeed very hypothetical, admitting that their 
stated WTP might not represent a ‘true’ value, nor that it is consistent through time;
"So, maybe on a yearly basis I  could afford to pay £50-60. However, my income will 
increase...but £50-60 definitely I  would devote. Having said that, at the same time, honestly, 
it's very theoretical and I  say that in theory, but in practice when I  really have to reach for  
the money and pay, I  wouldn't be as happy. So take that with a little bit o f  a reservation." 
(respondent #13)
Obviously, one may argue that a lack of credibility arises because the particular 
valuation scenario presented here is perceived as unrealistic. However, since there is no 
major conceptual difference between the design of this study and others that have 
assessed the value of equally complex amenities, I do not see any strong reason why the 
results of this study should be significantly different in this respect.
5.5.4. Strategies and Considerations o f Willingness to Pay
According to previous research, when people provide a WTP response, they tend to pay 
attention to factors not in accordance with economic theory and that should be irrelevant 
for economic value (e.g., Schkade and Payne, 1994; Vadnjal and O'Connor, 1994). The 
considerations and motivations of WTP are presented in Table 5.1. As explained in 
section 5.3., each respondent is given multiple codes when he or she is drawing on 
several different categories of these in order to establish an answer. The number of 
considerations assigned to each respondent is thus not restricted. As it turned out, 200
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codes were assigned across 29 respondents, and each respondent was assigned between 
2 and 13 different considerations.
Table 5.1. Considerations and Motivations of WTP
Considerations, Motivations and Strategies of WTP
Number of 
Respondents
Mean WTP in 
each Category
Reference to the particular resource under valuation:
Scope of problem (subjectively or objectively perceived) 7 514
Personal value of amenity {i.e., what it is worth to me) 3 1500
Costs of solving the problem 2 1400
Uncertain of what the improvement will imply 3 1183
Reference to economic situation and economic factors
What I can afford to pay 12 489
What is reasonable 3 517
How much do I otherwise spend in taxes 8 384
States percentage (of income or taxes) rather than absolute value 15 711
Reference to other spending 3 340
How much not to have a significant impact on other spending 4 1200
Reference to necessary but not "leisure" expenditures 3 1067
Difficulties of perceiving and calculating future income 4 587
Reference to more general issues
Environmental or public issues in general 10 425
Reference to (other) charitable contributions 3 690
Reference to political issues and issues of fairness
Do other people pay and how much? 11 581
Who is responsible, and therefore, who should pay? 19 656
Reference to payment vehicle or mode of administration 7 493
Attitudes or feelings toward taxation in general 4 837
Appropriateness of individual economic value 13 455
Trust in responsible authorities and parties 13 702
Discussion of institutional problems and possibilities 8 724
Other issues of fairness 2 550
Reference to other solutions
Will change behaviour rather than paying for the problem 4 148
Automatically considers fees related to specific use {e.g., car tolls) 8 588
Other references
Very difficult or impossible to answer 10 575
Guessed or made up an answer 3 800
Uncertain of own answer (seeks confirmation of what is correct) 3 750
Need more information 3 150
How much is needed ("I will pay what it takes") 8 969
Partly or completely misunderstand the question 4 275
Overall 6.9s 639
250b
8 average number of considerations per person 
b median
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As hypothesised, the table illustrates that those factors that ought to form a basis of 
WTP are rather infrequently considered. For instance, the scope of the problem and 
personal worth of the amenity is only mentioned by 7 and 3 respondents respectively. 
Instead, people make reference to the environment or public issues in general (10 
respondents) when calculating how much money to allocate. This is further highlighted 
by the fact that as many as 16 respondents claimed to have been thinking about the 
environment in general, and not global warming specifically, when explicitly asked 
after the ‘think-aloud* procedure. Thus, these findings are similar to those obtained in 
chapter 4 and provide support for the embedding hypothesis (Kahneman and Knetsch,
1992). At the same time it should be stressed that a number of people do base their WTP 
responses on factors assumed to be relevant according to economic theory. For instance, 
12 respondents considered how much they could afford to pay. Similarly, some 
respondents were unwilling to provide an answer simply because they did not have 
sufficient knowledge about what the improvement would imply, or otherwise felt that 
they needed more information in order to answer the question properly. For example;
"If I  was to contribute from my yearly income I  want to know the specific facts about the 
situation, you know, how desperate the situation is, how much is actually needed, ahh, but 
then I  expect that i f  I  was told that the situation dictates this amount o f  money, I  would most 
likely go ahead and pay it." (respondent #8)
"How much more? I  don't know you see, I  am not an expert... I  don't know how many billions 
are needed." (respondent #9)
Apart from motivations directly relevant to WTP, many respondents wanted to know 
who is responsible for the problem, and therefore, who should reasonably pay for this. 
In relation to this, people also seem keen on knowing if other citizens are paying and 
how much. Consider the following examples;
"First o f  all it depends, we say, this is definitely going to work, right?, which makes it really 
important to me and I  would happily pay the same amount as everyone else. But what comes 
to mind at the same time is actually that maybe the payment should be gradually increased 
with your income, and, ahh, maybe that companies should pay more than private persons, 
right?" (respondent #1)
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"I don't think a can put a figure to it, I  can just put a percentage o f  my income, hmm, looking 
at a very low income, ...but one has to look at it in two ways, firstly who, everyone should 
pay but in different gradings, i.e., people who are obviously less capable o f  paying, due to 
lower income or large families, and I ’m not going to be able to pay the same [amount] as 
people who are industrialists. The second thing that should be taken into account is the fact 
that industrialists, or people who are related to the industry, which is actually producing part 
o f  the problem, should probably be taxed, in quotation marks, more." . . .  "You need a figure? 
Ahhh, what, a £1,000, £1,500 every year? I  mean I  earn about, hmm, £16,000-17,000, so 
around 10% o f  that, knowing that everyone else is doing the same thing, because why should 
it be that people who believe in it and, it's very difficult to explain but, i f  you're paying you 
feel it has to be part o f  a joint effort with everyone else, it can't just be selectively done" 
(respondent #12)
"Hmm, so I'm not sure i f  I  completely understand it, I  wouldn't have to..., I  wouldn’t want to 
pay i f  I  did not think that everybody was going to p a y ...if it was something that effects 
everybody, a global thing, I  would be very very, I  would ju st be sacred i f  I  was paying £100, 
or something, and very few  other people were going to pay and it wasn't going to be enough 
to cover it. But you're saying it is enough?" (respondent #14)
Hence, the issue is not considered in isolation but rather as a collective effort whereby it 
is important that everyone is ‘doing their share*. In this sense, people perceive the good 
as (purely) public in its character, which should be provided not necessarily on the basis 
of what isolated individual citizens are willing to pay, but what has been collectively 
agreed upon, possibly through more common democratic procedures of decision­
making.
Another common strategy was to use a benchmark that formed the basis for how much 
money to allocate. Approximately half the respondents reflected on how much they 
spend in taxes for other public issues. The majority of these respondents also tended to 
state a percentage of their monthly or yearly income, rather than an absolute amount. 
This ‘taxation benchmark’ may also been seen as supportive of the previous argument 
that global environmental amenities, which rightly are seen as public issues, should not 
be provided on the basis of individual value. A further strategy was to make reference to 
various types of private spending, and to make sure that the amount stated would not 
have any significant impact on necessary or regular spending. Similar results are 
reported by Beattie et al. (1998) in a study of road safety, in which it was shown that
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respondents tend to state a WTP amount that would not have any impact on their regular 
expenditures and savings.63 Finally, some respondents considered how much they spend 
on other charities and based their amount accordingly. Some support for the mental 
account hypothesis pioneered by Thaler (1990) is provided here. The following 
transcripts illustrate this;
"Hmm, something that is a meaningful amount yet does not detract from my own ability to 
save money, to do the things and buy the things I  want to do. So kind o f  a painless amount I  
suppose." (respondent #10)
"If it's a yearly payment it will be different, because I  already subscribe to other charities and 
I've already a little budget fo r  donations to other causes, and I  could not strain that too 
much." (respondent #13)
Related to this is the view held by many respondents that environmental problems are 
either serious and therefore worthwhile to prevent, or they are not. Given this, people 
are willing to ‘pay what it takes’, while being reluctant to assess any specific value for 
the amenity on a continuous scale. Two respondents responded in the following way;
"...because i f  global warming threatens to destroy the whole planet, then you're going to say 
ok, I'll pay everything, hmm, but how to assess how much it is worth to you, i f  it is not going 
to threaten your life... You see it is not something you're used to put a value on, you're used 
to [have] value on something and then you get that thing" (respondent #14)
"I wouldn’t be a great supporter o f  that kind o f  approach. ...It's, hmm, by doing [this] you're 
mowing away from what, ...hmm, we would then do as much as people say we should do, we 
would spend as much money as people say we should spend, and this means that you, hmm, 
you can have almost like a collective conspiracy, ...and I  don't know about the effects o f  
global warming, unless from the media, which is controlled anyway. I  would never be able to 
tell that global warming was happening; raise the temperature by one or two degrees over a 
couple o f  years, [and] I'm not going to know the difference, ...and secondly with that kind o f
63 Several respondents consider necessary spending {i.e., rent, food, travels, etc.), but somehow fail to 
take into account leisure expenditures. It is thus indicated that whereas the former category constitute 
an accepted reason for not paying more to a good cause, this is not the case for the latter. This also 
illustrates that the impact o f such extra and ‘unnecessary’ expenditures are underrated in people’s 
budget-making.
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thing, you're dealing with such fundamental issues, so ultimately I  would pay anything to 
save, hmm, life, you know, even sacrificing my [own] life fo r  the world... With [respect to] 
global warming we are not going to get back to the 1992 level, or whatever, the question is; 
should we get it 1 degree above that, two degrees above that, three degrees above it, [and] 
would I  [like to] pay £20 to get it three degrees above, £100 to get it two degrees above, 
£1,000 to get it back to where it was?" (respondent #15)
5.5.5. Uncertainty o f Value Assessment
The misinterpretation of and difficulties with understanding the valuation task are 
obviously giving rise to an uncertainty regarding how to answer the questions. As 
indicated throughout this analysis, even when they have comprehended the task 
appropriately, since they have not been given the opportunity to think about whether it 
makes sense or not, whereby underlying purposes may become more transparent, people 
are unsure what would properly reflect their personal value of the amenity. The results 
indicate that respondents tend to look for information regarding how other people would 
perceive the task, what they are likely to do, whether they believe ‘everyone’ ought to 
take responsibility for the issue, etc. A number of respondents also seek confirmation 
from the interviewer, making utterances such as ‘is this enough?’, ‘is this good 
enough?’, or ‘would that be alright?’. In their search for an ‘adequate’ value, they are 
hoping to receive some sort of support from the researcher. Interestingly, in the 
beginning of the interview some people were reluctant about their participation in the 
study due to their alleged ignorance of the subject matter, but assumed that the 
interviewer must be an expert in making similar decisions and assessing WTP. Hence, 
rather than perceiving the task as an opinion poll, to which any answer should be valid, 
they start from the position that there is a ‘true’ value that the researcher knows about.
Some claimed that the question was very difficult or almost impossible to answer (10 
respondents), and although only representing a small portion of respondents, 3 guessed 
or simply made up an answer. Again this is in part reflecting the difficulty of assessing a 
WTP amount, but equally it illustrates people’s reluctance, or even inability, to protest 
against the procedure, no matter how ignorant they are regarding this, and no matter 
whether or not they consent to the very idea of assigning monetary values to
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environmental issues such as global warming. The degree of uncertainty is best 
reflected by the following subject;
"It's very difficult to, huh, to give you, you know, i f  you want some sort o f  a bold hard figure, 
how much is it worth to you, I  mean, you know, in a touching feely sense it's worth a lot to me 
i f  it succeeds 'cause it's gonna help my children and my grandchildren, and, huh, so forth, 
but asking me to put a figure on it, how much per year am I  willing to pay is extremely 
difficult, I  mean, hmm, I'm willing to pay as much as my council rate I  suppose, I  don't know, 
hmm, so what's that, hmm, 500 bucks, a 1,000 bucks Australian a year, I  don't know, but then 
I  might be willing to pay more... ” (respondet #28)
5.6. Conclusions
Findings from previous research related to how people respond to CV questions 
(Schkade and Payne, 1994; Vadnjal and O'Connor, 1994) are largely replicated in this 
study. The strategies used in order to assign an economic value to the environmental 
amenity are mostly not in accordance with the assumptions of standard economic 
theory. Factors that ought to be relevant seem to be subdued in favour of irrelevant 
factors. WTP is largely insensitive to the scope of the good, people make reference to 
environmental or public issues in general rather than focusing on the specific good 
described in the scenario, they are concerned to what extent they themselves, or other 
parties, are responsible for the problem, and they tend to automatically consider fees 
and regulations associated with a use of the specific resource in question, not economic 
value as defined in the CV literature. How much people can afford to pay is on the other 
hand an important determinant of WTP, but this is generally not stated in an absolute 
amount, but rather as a percentage of income. It is further conditioned by how much is 
spent on ‘other* taxes, and if related to overall spending, this benchmark is more or less 
confined to necessary or regular spending, whereas other ‘unnecessary’ (or leisure) 
expenditures do not figure in budget constraints. These findings provide a qualitative 
framework for understanding the anomalies demonstrated in the previous chapter.
More fundamentally, many respondents were concerned about the appropriateness of 
basing policy decision related to the amenity on individual economic value, at least as 
assessed in a study like this. Moreover, rather than thinking about their WTP, some
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people were inclined to discuss other, largely unrelated issues, such as general views of 
taxation, trust in responsible authorities and parties, or conducted other sorts of 
discussions related to institutional problems and difficulties. Others were concerned if 
and how much other citizens would pay instead of focusing on their own preferences. 
Hence it is indicated that an economic valuation of the environment does not come as 
straightforward as some CV researchers may be inclined to think, and it should not be 
taken for granted that respondents interpret the valuation task exactly as intended. There 
seems to be a lack of understanding between the researcher and interviewee in this 
sense; whereas the hypothetical market may make perfect sense for the former, it is not 
necessarily perceived in the same way by lay people, who may not comprehend 
underlying meanings, purposes and rationale of the inquiry, regardless of the provision 
of a thorough explanation.
What is particularly troublesome is that this lack of understanding is not always 
expressed, unless probed in relation to the elicitation question. People have a tendency 
to answer the question anyway, whatever meaning they attach to it, no matter if they 
adapt to the basic idea of a monetary valuation, and regardless of their consent to 
hypothetical markets as a basis of environmental priorities. These findings are in 
accordance with Schwarz' (1994) assumptions that those conversational norms that 
define the very meaning of a communicative process are absent in CV contexts. Put 
differently, there has to be a shared mental representation of procedures and purposes, 
and as long as the hypothetical market underlying CVM is not perceived equally by the 
researcher and respondents, answers provided may not represent genuine opinions.
Within a traditional quantitative framework, such responses may also be difficult to 
distinguish from those reported by people who have a well-developed opinion toward 
the issue. Previous research demonstrates that ‘non-attitudes’ show remarkable 
consistency over time, and seem relevantly linked with other public issues (e.g., 
Schuman and Presser, 1981). Therefore, the mere expression of a monetary value 
should not be taken as evidence that this is founded in an underlying value construct. A 
difference in this respect is found between individual interviews and focus groups, the 
latter which seem to encourage respondents to more freely express their attitudes toward 
and concern over whether the proposal of public policy-making makes sense in
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democratic context. Thus, apart from being more vulnerable to expectations and 
arguments presented by the researcher when people are less involved in a (public) issue 
(Bishop, 1990), this anomaly seems to vary with contextual factors of value assessment.
I believe that before any serious attempt is made to assess the individual economic value 
of natural resources, the procedure needs to be ‘institutionalised’ by being thoroughly 
discussed in a dialogue between politicians, citizens, businesses, researchers, and other 
involved parties over a significant period of time. A way of testing the possible 
influence of such communicative processes in the establishment of economic values of 
natural resources is to compare responses between individual and social contexts of 
valuation. This should facilitate an understanding of the value-concept and enhance the 
likelihood that suggested relationships between economics and preservation of natural 
resources are appreciated. If the valuation task is seen as feasible and realistic, 
respondents are also likely to consider their choices more consequential, and therefore, 
more tied to instrumental considerations and economic budget constraints. If people are 
given the opportunity to reflect upon what the policy proposal implies, and whether or 
not they consent to the foundations of this, they would presumably become more aware 
of their values and more able to provide well-founded estimates of WTP.
As a concluding remark, an important implication of this study is that there are a 
number of aspects surrounding the valuation task that will influence answers to CV 
studies and that are problematic for subsequent welfare analysis, at least when this 
concerns a global and more complex amenity. CV advocates generally believe that the 
impact of irrelevant factors of valuation, such as moral implications, issues of fairness, 
trust in responsible authorities, are possible to exclude by improved methodological 
procedures, for instance, by providing adequate and complete information of underlying 
purposes. However, mainly due to the hypothetical nature of the inquiry, the present 
research demonstrates the difficulties of positioning the respondents in a context 
wherein questions are interpreted as intended, and in which they are solely basing their 
responses on the personal (economic) benefits of the resource.
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6. Imprecise Economic Preferences: Response 
Formats and Giving Respondents Time to Think
So far in this thesis it is demonstrated that statements of Willingness To Pay (WTP) 
represent something different than monetary value. Rather than solely reflecting 
instrumental value, WTP encompasses a variety of dimensions, such as social norms, 
symbolic values, moral implications, political constraints, etc. Possibly due to these 
multiple aspects of valuation, people are unsure as how to answer the questions posed. 
In particular, they seem uncertain regarding exactly how much they are willing to pay 
for the amenities, or what would be a ‘reasonable* amount. This chapter takes notice of 
this phenomenon and examines specifically how uncertain people are of their 
Contingent Valuation (CV) responses. The ambivalence over trade-offs between money 
and environmental changes that respondents feel has been analysed by Dubourg et al. 
(1994), Gregory et al. (1995), Ready et al. (1995), Welsh and Poe (1998), and Ready et 
al., (1999). A general conclusion of these papers is that people only have a vague idea 
as to within which range their WTP is situated, which will result in imprecise and 
vaguely represented estimates.
In this chapter, a standard Open-Ended (OE) valuation question is compared with a 
Polychotomous Choice (PC) question that allows the respondents to express the degree 
of uncertainty of their stated WTP (Welsh and Poe, 1998). The latter is furthermore 
compared to a more inclusive response format, originally developed by Blarney et al. 
(1999), in which respondents express attitudes toward multiple dimensions of the public 
good, rather than solely stating their support through a single measure. Finally, in one 
setting respondents are given some time to think about the valuation task before a 
response is elicited. It is anticipated that this will facilitate social processes in the form 
of discussions with friends and relatives. On the basis of previous findings, the main 
hypothesis is that people’s supposedly strong feelings toward environmental resources 
are at best only vaguely represented in monetary terms, and the paper provides specific 
tests in order to understand how the above contexts and conditions of valuation 
contribute to the preciseness of stated WTP.
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6.1. Ambivalence and Imprecise Willingness to Pay Estimates
Ready et al. (1999) argue that there exist thresholds outside which respondents are 
certain of accepting (or not accepting) a monetary bid posed in a CV questionnaire. 
However, for bids situated between these thresholds the individual is ambivalent over 
whether to pay or not, and therefore, any such bid should not be interpreted as a point 
estimate. The ambivalence region is illustrated by figure 6.1.
Quantity
Money bidO
Figure 6.1. Ambivalence of WTP
Any combination of a monetary bid and a change in the quantity of the public good 
below and to the right of the line U (upper bound) will result in a rejection from the 
respondent, whereas any combination above and to the left of the line L (lower bound) 
will result in acceptance. The respondent will easily answer ‘yes’ to the combination Q\t 
and easily ‘no* to that of Q2. The region of ambivalence lies between these thresholds. 
For example, she will be ambivalent to a monetary bid and a quantity change at Qi. This 
does not imply that the individual is indifferent between a yes or no response, but rather 
that she is uncertain whether to support the project or not.64
64 The region of ambivalence may obviously be wider or narrower depending on the character of the 
amenity, and is likely to vary between respondents. Another example is the region between L' and U \  
In this case the respondent is experiencing a wider region of ambivalence, and there are fewer 
combinations that she is certain to reject or accept. We also expect her to be more or less ambivalent 
toward any combination between L' and U'. Thus, we may assume that the experienced ambivalence is 
a relative notion that may be expressed as ‘rather uncertain’, ‘very uncertain’, etc.
146
CHAPTER SIX
Although Ready et al. (1999) acknowledge that there are several reasons for 
respondents’ uncertainty in a CV study, they put emphasis on the lack of detail in the 
hypothetical scenario description. This is likely to be true in many cases, but the novelty 
of the task, arising from the complexity of the environmental amenity, or due to the 
novelty of the hypothetical market, is likely to pose more fundamental problems that 
cannot easily be overcome by an improved scenario description. Findings by Judd et al. 
(1981) and others indicate that attitude expressions contain more residual variance and 
are less precise when people are less involved with a political issue, and it calls into 
question to what extent people possess meaningful attitudes in such cases (Converse, 
1970). These findings are also in accordance with the hypothesised effects arising from 
various heuristics used in decision-making under uncertainty as postulated by 
Kahneman et al. (1982). Therefore, rather than routinely attributing people’s 
ambivalence over their preferences to flaws in the methodology, there is an incentive to 
investigate whether fairly precise economic estimates may be at all possible to assess on 
the spot, and in what way and through which procedures of valuation these may be 
crystallised into a more stable measure.
6.1.1. Response Format and Uncertainty o f Willingness to Pay
Ready et al. (1999) compared an OE with a Dichotomous Choice (DC) response format 
in a split sample CV study. For both formats, a payment card was used as a response 
aid. Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Schulze et al., 1996), the OE format 
generated lower estimates of WTP than did the DC format. On average, the standard DC 
question overstates WTP by a factor of 1.6. On the basis of some follow-up questions, 
Ready et al. (1999) concluded that DC respondents used a lower threshold of certainty 
compared to OE respondents. Accordingly, when facing an OE format, the respondents 
report a value that they are more certain of paying, although both formats seem to 
generate optimistic responses. In an attempt to more closely examine this effect, Welsh 
and Poe (1998) (and similarly Ready et a l, 1995) compared a traditional DC format 
with a PC format, in which the respondents choose between several response categories. 
By using more than two response alternatives, which traditionally only distinguish 
between a ‘yes’ and a ‘no’ response, the intensity of preferences may be measured, 
ranging from a definite yes (or strongly preferring), to a definite no (or strongly
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against). A respondent that feels ambivalent over her choice is thereby allowed to 
express this by choosing any of the middle response alternatives. The general finding 
was that the traditional DC format results in higher estimates than the PC format.
6.2. Multi-Dimensional Approaches and Avoidance of ‘Yes-Saying’
The most important finding of the study by Welsh and Poe (1998) is that people facing a 
DC format may be inclined to answer affirmatively in a situation when they are 
uncertain of their preferences. Blarney et al. (1999) have defined this tendency as ‘yea- 
saying’, which arises as a result of people’s inclination to agree with statements 
regardless of their content or implications. While the overarching research perspective 
among the majority of CV proponents is that this is primarily a statistical nuisance, 
others view this type of response acquiescence as an inherent characteristic of human 
decision making that is not unique for CV surveys (e.g., Bachman and O'Malley, 1984). 
Rather than being directly related to the content of questions, in many instances, 
responses reflect personality traits of the respondent. In research settings, this effect is 
even more likely to be present as argued by Schwarz (1994) and others. This 
presumption is empirically supported in chapter five, in which it is demonstrated that 
respondents tend to provide WTP amounts un-associated with their underlying 
preferences, and regardless of their eventual disapproval of a monetary valuation of the 
public good.
/
One particular reason for the occurrence of ‘yea-saying’ in CV contexts, and equally the 
lack of precision of WTP, may be that responses incorporate dimensions other than just 
instrumental value. Thus, the subordination of outcome-based considerations in favour 
of expressive motivations, particularly when these stand in conflict with each other, may 
lead respondents to experience uncertainty in their value statements. Similarly, when the 
latter motive adds to the former, overstatements of WTP are likely to occur. Hence, 
rather than confining ambivalence to indifference as suggested by Ready et al (1995), 
or that people do not have any meaningful opinions at all (Converse, 1970), the 
observation of vague and unstable attitudes may be a much more complex phenomenon 
that arises when the individual tries to resolve and express multiple and often 
conflicting opinions (Zaller and Feldman, 1992). In relation to this, Blarney et al. (1999)
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argue that the act of expressing support for a public good, captured only by WTP, is 
likely to have greater immediate emotional significance than losses in income. This is 
paralleled by the discounting of costs and accentuation of benefits accrued in the 
immediate as shown by (Slovic, 1969), which results in a tendency to agree with 
proposed WTP bids and, consequently, an overvaluation of the public good.65
As a remedy to this phenomenon, Blarney et a l (1999) suggest a different response 
format that originates from Multi-attribute Utility Theory (MUT). Instead of expressing 
their overall support on a single scale, people respond to more confined aspects of the 
public good that are anticipated to reflect multiple dimensions of value, some of which 
may be in conflict with each other. For example, people may support an environmental 
project of which they enjoy the benefits, but may on the other hand be reluctant to 
provide any monetary value because they do not think it is part of their responsibility to 
pay for this. Similarly, they may like the idea of proposed interventions, but at the same 
time be sceptical of whether these will achieve what they set out to achieve. By making 
the inquiry more specific and including more items, respondents are given the 
opportunity to refine their answers and provide more precise estimates of WTP. It is 
furthermore hypothesised that the procedure will make people more aware of affective 
and conflicting motives, thereby making it easier for them to assess economic values.
6.3. Social Processes and the Establishment of Economic Preferences
In CV studies respondents are asked to provide answers without being given much time 
to think about the issue. They are hence prevented from discussing the issue with 
friends and relatives, a process that is likely to influence opinions, particularly when
65 Interesting here is the finding that when subjects do not feel committed to the consequences of their 
actions, they similarly tend to maximise gains and discount potential losses (Slovic, 1969). On the 
contrary, when subjects know that they actually have to pay according to the choices made, they are 
acting more cautiously. Blarney (1998) conducted a study that partly built on these findings, in which 
he argued that overstatement and indecisiveness o f WTP occur since the respondent anticipates that her 
answer will not be decisive of outcomes. Thus, we may claim that, apart from an inherent difficulty of 
assessing WTP, estimates will be even less precise since there is little motive for the respondents to 
seriously consider their ‘true’ opinions in many CV studies.
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there is no previously formed judgement accessible in memory. Given that a core 
argument among CV critics is that rapid answers to complex questions are very 
unreliable {e.g., Gregory et al., 1993; Schkade and Payne, 1994), and rather should be 
interpreted as context dependent temporary constructions, it is somewhat surprising that 
very little attention has been paid to the role of social processes in the establishment of 
WTP. To my knowledge, there is only one study that has explicitly addressed this issue. 
Whittington et al. (1992) investigated whether WTP from respondents who were given 
time to evaluate a proposed water system in three Nigerian villages differed from those 
who were not. Their findings suggest that respondents in the former group were willing 
to pay significantly less than the latter. However, the discussion among the respondents 
may not have so much to do with social influence on attitude formation in a general 
sense, but rather was aimed toward reaching a common decision about a tangible issue 
that involved and affected everyone in the village.
A likely reason why the impact of social processes has not received much attention in 
the CV literature is that researchers interested in the field, both economists and 
psychologists, come mainly from an ‘individualistic* tradition of research, which 
Morgan and Schwalbe (1990) term ‘psychological social psychology*. This perspective 
generally pursues cognitive activities (and behaviour) in a ‘structural vacuum’ that 
ignores the influence of the social environment. Contrary to this, the European tradition 
of social psychology, pioneered by Moscovici (1984), stresses the importance of social 
interactions in the development and crystallisation of motivations, beliefs, attitudes, and 
behaviour. Rather than cognitive mental representations, this research tradition is 
concerned with the social origin of such schemata.
On the individual level, the local social environment creates expectations and imposes 
roles on the specific person, on which she reflects and acts upon (Morgan and 
Schwalbe, 1990). Taking this hypothesis a step further, we may as in chapter three 
argue that the development and crystallisation of beliefs and attitudes are similarly 
determined by the interaction with other people, since this process determines how we 
perceive the world, what values we have, which issues we are inclined to put emphasis 
on, what perspectives we hold, what interests we have, what should be considered as
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important aspects of an inquiry, etc.66 In this context I am interested in how people form 
and change attitudes toward specific issues as they interact with each other, and 
therefore, theories of social influence and social comparison (e.g., Kelman, 1958; Fazio, 
1979; Nowak et a l, 1990) are considered as most relevant for this research.
6.3.1. Social Interaction and Post-Influence
Social interaction and exposure to other sources of reference, such as media coverage 
and news stories, has two consequences. Firstly, they are vital, I would argue, in order 
to form an opinion of a matter that is novel to the individual. When little or no 
information exists about a particular issue, the consultation with other people may be 
useful in constructing a judgement (e.g., Fazio, 1979). In chapter five it was 
demonstrated that some respondents ask the interviewer for advice regarding what will 
be a reasonable fee. In answering the question, they uttered phrases such as ‘would that 
be alright’, ‘is this enough’, etc. They furthermore expressed concern over whether 
other citizens would pay and how much, which indicates that the issue demands a 
collective effort that may not be adequately decided by individuals in isolation. Support 
for this hypothesis is also provided by the results of conducted focus groups, in which 
respondents tended to express their concern and possible disagreement toward the
c-j
procedure more openly than in an individual context.
66 The research on risk perception provides an example that people’s valuations and choices cannot be 
fully understood by merely studying these in individual contexts. For example, Heimer (1988) proposes 
that various social influences shape how we perceive risky events. Drawing upon the works of Douglas 
and Wildavsky (1982) among others, she extends the experimental work on decision making under 
uncertainty, pioneered by Kahneman et a l  (1982), by making enquires into the origin of various 
heuristics and framing effects. Her hypotheses is that institutions and social situations provide people 
with a set of vivid experiences that lead to that some risks are overestimated and other risks 
underestimated, regardless o f involved objective probabilities and consequences.
67 There are two forms of social influence. Normative influence occurs when the individual conforms to 
the expectations of other people, whereas informational influence acts as providing evidence about 
reality. The former force normally requires some kind o f personal relation with the influencing parties, 
whereas the latter may occur among individuals that do not form a group, although it is reasonable to 
assume that homogeneity of the group enhances this influence (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955).
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Furthermore, other people’s judgements are important in order to develop and validate 
already but vaguely established opinions about issues that the individual is familiar 
with. The views of others reinforce in this sense the subjective validity of our own 
beliefs (e.g., Festinger, 1950; Fazio, 1979; Zimbardo and Leippe, 1991). For instance, 
by discussing an issue with others, people are likely to learn supportive (or non- 
supportive) reasons for a particular standpoint. In this process, participants are also 
likely to become more involved, thereby making them more aware of their feelings and 
viewpoints (Bligh, 2000). It is finally envisaged that the frequency of talk regarding a 
(political) issue contributes to the stability and consistency of opinions (Evans and 
Lalljee, 1997). People seek confirmation and support among social groups, and once 
this is given, they may be more assured of their own opinion. Moreover, Evans and 
Lalljee (1997) suggest that making a statement somehow commits the speaker to a point 
of view, and that she is likely to repeat this and make similar statements in the future. 
Similarly, the more frequently a particular statement is made, the less likely is it that 
this later will be radically changed.
6.3.2. Internalisation and Pre-Influence
Internalisation of values from previous social experiences generally acts as an aid to 
interpret forthcoming events. Kelman (1958) argues that when a particular value or 
value system has been internalised, people tend to state an attitude or perform a 
behavioural response without the direct surveillance of other people. Hence, whenever 
the individual is thinking of an issue, or when she is considering doing something that 
others may care about, she is contemplating what other people would think and how 
they would behave or react in a similar situation. The approval (disapproval) of an act 
occurs when this is congruent (incongruent) with the underlying value system 
(Dombusch, 1993). However, in the case of CVM, such internalisation hardly exists 
since the overwhelming majority of citizens have never been faced with a similar 
inquiry. There is no evaluative standard at hand, implying that the mental representation 
of the task is based primarily (or solely) on temporarily accessible information, and 
therefore more sensitive to context and framing effects (Schwarz, 1997).
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To conclude these arguments, providing a valid and consistent WTP response without 
being given the time to think through the valuation task is likely to be difficult for 
people. It is hypothesised that monetary estimates constructed during the course of the 
elicitation process are more diffuse and not equally well represented as those elicited 
after the respondents have thought through the issue, during which time important social 
processes underlying preference formation are facilitated. The validity of WTP 
responses is thus assumed to improve partly as a result of the monitoring, influence and 
support from the (immediate) social environment. A collective discussion may also 
facilitate certain motives among the respondents that would possibly result in different 
choices than in an individual context, the latter which to a larger extent are predicted to 
evoke self-oriented wants and interests (Vatn and Bromley, 1994).
6.4. Design of Experiment and Model
Data were collected at the London School of Economics (LSE) between September and 
November 2000. Subjects were targeted in two different ways. One group of 
respondents was asked during class teaching if they wanted to participate in the study. If 
they were, they were asked to sign-up on an attendance list and were later notified 
through e-mail. The other group of respondents was randomly selected from the 
school’s register and were told about the study through an e-mail. In order not to 
jeopardise the purpose of the study, they were only informed that this was about some 
environmental policy issues. Hence, no detailed information about the specific purpose 
of the study was provided prior to the interviews.
Those who were interested of participating were sent a second e-mail was sent that 
suggested various times for them to attend. Altogether 10 sessions with between 8-17 
respondents in each were run. Each session lasted for approximately 30 minutes, and for 
taking part respondents were paid £5. Since all subjects are students I do not expect 
their WTP responses to be representative for the general population. However and 
common throughout this thesis, I am interested in the effect of various conditions 
imposed on valuation scenarios, and therefore, it is the comparability of the sub-samples 
that is important. The participants came from a variety of fields in the social sciences 
and different course categories are fairly evenly represented across all sub-samples.
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6.4.1. Experimental Design
The questionnaire answered in the class-room experiment consisted of between 13 to 15 
questions depending on the particular response format. It included instructions for the 
valuation task, some questions related to socio-economic characteristics, knowledge 
questions about the amenity being valued, attitude questions addressing the 
appropriateness of an economic valuation of natural resources, and finally, a description 
of the proposed environmental project. The environmental project was specified as the 
saving of the African Elephant, a campaign currently run by the World Wildlife Fund 
(WWF). The scenario read;
The long-term survival of the African Elephant is a cause of great concern. The number of 
elephants has fallen drastically during the second half of last century. In 1979, there was an 
estimated 1.3 million elephants in Africa, but by 1995 this figure had shrunk to around 
400000. Part o f the decline is due to the availability o f new dry-land adapted crop strains, 
with the consequence that former elephant rangelands are now being cultivated. Furthermore, 
in forest areas the impact of major logging programmes is opening up and destroying 
elephant habitat. Apart from such widespread changes in the extent and pattern of land use, a 
major cause of the decline is poaching to satisfy demand for ivory and recreational illegal 
hunting.
As a consequence, approaches are needed to stop the decline in the number of elephants. 
Apart from traditional anti-poaching efforts and the elimination o f market demand for ivory 
products, it is essential to ensure the survival of the remaining species. The World Wildlife 
Fund (WWF) is the major actor in this field. It is currently running a campaign by setting up 
and managing reserves in order to protect wild elephants. Experience has shown that local 
involvement is important in these attempts, such as community based management, whereby 
landowners share both responsibility for and benefits accrued from elephants.
However successful these conservation approaches may be, they bear significant costs, and as 
the economic situation in many third world countries continues to decline, wildlife 
departments and local communities are suffering significant budget cuts. This makes 
international support for elephant conservation more important than ever. In this study we are 
interested to know how much the efforts to save the elephants are worth to you. More 
specifically, we would like to know how much you are willing to pay, as a yearly 
contribution, to support the WWF campaign.
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In order to compare the influence of various response formats, four variations were 
presented to independent groups. In one sub-sample, WTP was assessed through a 
standard OE valuation question. In the remaining three sub-samples the respondents 
were presented with a PC valuation format that presented an ordered sequence of WTP 
amounts. The difference compared to a standard PC question is that in the format used 
here they were told to indicate how certain they were of paying each of the amounts 
suggested in the valuation question. This allows respondents to express the degree of 
uncertainty associated with each bid threshold, from one bid that they are definitely sure 
of paying (lower bound), to one that they are definitely sure that they will not pay 
(upper bound). The instructions preceding this task are presented below, and table 6.1. 
presents the specific certainty thresholds and bid amounts used.
In the table below you are presented with 11 different amounts. We want you to state how 
sure you are of paying each of these as a contribution to the WWF campaign for saving the 
elephants. Please tick the appropriate box for each suggested amount. The willingness to pay 
is an annual payment. Take your time and try to consider the following before answering:
• your income and/or grants
• your current expenses
• your possible future use o f  your income
Table 6.1. Multiple-bounded response format
£2 £5 £7 £10 £15 £20 £30 £50 £100 £200 £400
I am definitely sure that I will pay
I am almost certain (90% sure) that I will pay
I am rather certain (75% sure) that I will pay
It is equally likely (50% sure) that I will pay
I am rather certain (75% sure) that I will not pay
I am almost certain (90% sure) that I will not pay
I am definitely sure that I will not pay
The respondents were in addition told that the amount should represent their maximum 
WTP associated with each threshold, or alternatively, an amount beyond which they are 
not willing to pay. Thus, rather than providing a single point estimate, the format will 
disclose a range of possible WTP amounts that the individual is more or less sure of
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paying, and apart from the size of mean and median WTP, the design of this study also 
reveals whether responses will be more precise through different approaches of 
estimating WTP. The particular range of amounts was chosen on the basis of the results 
of the OE format, which were assessed in a study prior to the PC formats.
Exactly the same design, range of bids and certainty thresholds were used in all three 
experimental conditions relying on the valuation format presented in table 6.1. In one of 
these, the questionnaire was formulated as above. In the scenario that allows the 
respondents to respond to several dimensions of the environmental project, rather than 
merely stating their WTP, the following questions preceded the valuation questions;
To save the African Elephant is worth something to me □ Agreeu Disagree
To save the African Elephant is an important issue □ Agreeu Disagree
I cannot afford to pay too much for this issue □ Agree
□ Disagree
I do not believe the particular campaign suggested □ Agree
will be efficient in saving the African Elephant u Disagree
I do not think this lies within my responsibility. □ Agree
Poachers and other responsible parties should pay u Disagree
There are other environmental issues that are □ Agree
more important and to which I rather contribute □ Disagree
Although being worth a lot to me, I do not think it □ Agree
is appropriate to base policies on the public’s WTP u Disagree
The format thus informs the respondents about various presumably important aspects of 
the valuation scenario and permits them to explicitly consider each of these, which, it is 
hypothesised, will result in different and possibly more informed responses to the 
subsequent WTP question, compared to the standard PC question. The format is 
principally similar to the one used by Blarney et al. (1999), who argued that this would
68 The median WTP of the OE format was £25, with a mean WTP of £41.80.
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facilitate more conservative WTP responses since the individual, for example, may 
express that they find the environmental issue important, but for other reasons are 
reluctant to pay for it, at least in this manner.
In the final sub-sample, the respondents were given some time to think about the 
environmental project and the valuation task before a WTP was elicited. The following 
information preceded the valuation question for this group of respondents;
We want you to consider the question below. However, we do not want you to answer it now. 
Instead, you will be given a week or more to think about a monetary contribution to the 
WWF campaign. During this time we encourage you to discuss the environmental problem, 
as well as an economic valuation of this, with friends, spouse, relatives, etc. We also want 
you to think of your opinion when similar (environmental or public) issues are brought up in 
the media. Although receiving valuable comments from other sources, keep in mind that it is 
your own opinion that we are interested in.
The questionnaire was separated into two parts and the experiment was conducted in 
two sessions. In the first of these, the respondents answered the first part, which 
presented the whole scenario and some knowledge questions related to elephants and 
the WWF campaign. They were also presented with the valuation question and the 
range of WTP amounts illustrated in table 6.1., but were told to only use this as a guide 
for their subsequent responses, and were urged not to answer the question since I did not 
want them to commit themselves to any response at this stage. After reading through 
and completing this part of the questionnaire, they were asked to bring with them the 
first part of the questionnaire to the next occasion we met, at which time they provided 
their WTP. Three experimental groups were run, in which the respondents were given 
between 7 to 10 days to think about the issue. The subjects were paid £5 for each 
occasion they turned up.
In all PC formats the respondents were asked to state more precisely how much they 
were 90% sure of paying in a follow-up question. By comparing these responses to the 
results of the OE format it is possible to indirectly judge what level of certainty the 
latter respondents are basing their WTP amounts on. The WTP was elicited as a 
standard OE question and asked after to the PC question with certainty thresholds;
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Please state exactly the amount you are almost certain (90% sure) of paying. The amount 
should be equal to or more than what you are definitely willing to pay, but less than or equal 
to what you are rather certain (75% sine) of paying.
I am almost certain (90% sure) I would pay £ .............  to the WWF campaign
To summarise the design of the study, four different valuation scenarios or formats were 
applied; a standard OE response format (in the following denoted open-ended, or OE), a 
PC question with certainty thresholds (PC standard), a PC question with certainty 
thresholds that in addition presented several questions relating to various dimensions of 
the environmental project (PC multi-attribute), and finally, a PC question with certainty 
thresholds in which the respondents were given time to think before they provided their 
WTP and answered some follow-up questions (PC time to think).
6.4.2. The Model
Responses to the OE format are analysed with an OLS regression model. The analysis 
of WTP data elicited through the PC format with certainty thresholds is based on a 
standard logit-model, however, with some modifications in the application of this. The 
model applied here postulates that, for each consumption alternative, the individual 
derives a certain utility that is defined by the various characteristics of this alternative. 
Apart from the systematic part of the utility function, V, that consists of the various 
goods available for consumption, there is a random term, e, implying that the utility 
derived for individual i from choosing, in this case the environmental project, is;
ut =Vt +e t (1)
The assumption of this model is furthermore that, between a ‘yes’ and ‘no’ response, the 
individual chooses the alternative with the highest utility.69 The probability of choosing 
to contribute to the Environmental Project (EP) thus equals the probability that the
69 If the utility from the environmental project exceeds that of an alternative use of the money represented 
by WTP, a ‘yes’ response will be provided, otherwise not. For further explanation of the random-utility 
framework and model estimation in economics, see for instance Long (1997).
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utility from this is greater than the utility of an Alternative (A) use of the amount of 
money equal to the WTP bid. Therefore we have;
P r (^ i =  1) =  P r (^iEP f iEP ^  ^iA £ \A  )  =  ^ (^ iE P  _  CiA '> ^ iA — ^iEP )  (^ )
The variability in utility is accommodated by Socio-Economic Characteristics (SEC) 
among the individuals, and, as hypothesised, the different Response Formats (RF) 
applied. The probability of providing a ‘yes’ response furthermore depends on the WTP 
Bid (BID). Given that the systematic part of the utility function, Vit is assumed to be 
linear in these attributes, it takes the following form;
Vl —  cc + Px^ £C + + p x5/D = Zl —  Li (3)
The probability that the individual chooses to contribute with the WTP bid proposed for 
the environmental project is thus defined by;
Pr(r( = o =  (4)
l + exp(Z,)
The model above can be applied to each of the certainty thresholds. It will thus define 
the probability that the individual respond with ‘definitely sure’, ‘90% sure’, ‘75% 
sure’, etc., to each WTP bid proposed.
6.5. Results
Altogether 146 people participated in the study. These respondents were further 
allocated to each sub-sample according to the following; open-ended (n = 35), PC 
standard (n = 37), PC multi-attribute (n = 37), and PC time to think (n = 37).
6.5.1. Ambivalence Bounds o f PC Formats
Table 6.2. presents the parameter estimates of the logit regressions associated with 
various certainty levels. The PC standard format is in these set as the benchmark 
scenario. In addition to two dummy variables reflecting the intercept effect of the PC 
multi-attribute and PC time to think formats respectively, the regressions include two
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socio-economic variables, gender and income. According to the table and as expected, 
the higher the WTP bid presented, the less likely is it that the individual will respond 
with a ‘yes’ response, a result that is highly significant across all four certainty levels. 
Furthermore, income is positively related to WTP, and finally, females are more likely 
to support the WWF campaign. Interesting in this respect is that the coefficient 
representing the impact of gender shows a particularly strong effect for the highest
7 0certainty level, indicating that women provide slightly more precise estimates of WTP.
71Table 6.2. Parameter estimates for various certainty thresholds
Variable
WTP 100% sure
Coefficient
WTP 75% sure
Coefficient
WTP 50% sure
Coefficient
WTP 25% sure
Coefficient
Constant 0.831*** 1.406*** 1.659*** 1.789
(3.24) (6.18) (7.61) (8.66)
WTP bid -0.175*** -0.111*** -0.073**’
.  _ _  -*•* 
-0.036
(-10.73) (-12.32) (-12.30) (-12.88)
PC multi-attribute 0.087 0.036 -0.204 0.187
(0.39) (0.19) (-1.07) (0.96)
PC time to think -0.254 -0.336* -0.621 -0.680
(-1.15) (-1.72) (-3.29) (-3.70)
Gender (1 if male) -0.485*** -0.337** -0.273* -0.337**
(-2.65) (-2.10) (-1.77) (-2.21)
Income 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0004** 0.0003*
(2.29) (2.33) (2.07) (1.76)
Log-likelihood -371.622 -467.431 -507.510 -528.134
n 111 111 111 111
Note: t-values presented in brackets
*, ” , and *** denotes significance at the 0.1,0.05, and 0.01 level respectively
70 The unrestricted models included two more variables (whether the respondents was a graduate or 
undergraduate student, and whether he or she was a member of an environmental organisation), but 
were on the basis of performed chi-square tests excluded in the restricted models presented in table 6.2.
71 The parameter estimates of the remaining three thresholds presented in table 6.1. are as expected and 
according to the results here, but are for illustrative reasons not included in the table.
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If we take a look at the difference between the three PC formats used, across all 
regressions, the respondents presented the PC time to think format are less likely to 
respond with a ‘yes’ response than respondents presented the PC standard format. 
However, as indicated by the significance level of the coefficients across the four 
regression models, the effect is more pronounced the lower the certainty threshold, 
resulting in wider ambivalence regions of the standard PC format compared to the PC 
time to think format.72 Thus, the results demonstrate firstly that the respondents who 
were given time to think about the issue prior to the valuation question on average 
provided a lower WTP. Secondly, it is indicated that this process encourages 
respondents to revise their responses particularly for lower certainty thresholds (i.e., 
their upper bound of WTP, that is, what they are rather or definitely sure of not paying), 
resulting in more precise estimates.
What is interesting to note is that, except for the 50% sure threshold, the likelihood of a 
‘yes’ response among respondents presented the PC multi-attribute format is actually 
higher than among those presented the PC standard format. Although the parameter 
estimates are not statistically significant between these two formats, this result is 
somewhat unexpected since, according to the reasoning before and findings provided by 
Blarney et a l (1999), we would expect the opposite to occur. One possible reason for 
this effect is the slightly different design of this particular study; whereas the 
respondents in the study by Blarney et al (1999) stated their WTP in association with 
their response to each aspect of the issue or procedure, here they were only 
subsequently asked about their WTP. Hence, no direct or explicit link is established 
between opinions toward various aspects of the environmental project and statements of 
WTP in the study presented here.
From the estimated logit regressions, ambivalence regions were constructed for each 
response format. Similar to Ready et a l (1995), the lower ambivalence bound is defined
72 To clarify this finding, it is indicated that for lower certainty levels (i.e., 50% and 25% sure), 
respondents who are given time to think are significantly less likely to provide a ‘yes’ response for each 
bid presented (implying a lower WTP among these group of respondents), whereas no significant 
difference is found between the formats for higher certainty levels (i.e., 100% and 75% sure).
161
IMPRECISE ECONOMIC PREFERENCES
as the amount to which 50% of the respondent would respond with a ‘definitely yes’, 
whereas the upper bound is defined as an amount to which 50% would respond with a 
‘definitely no’. The bounds according to these probabilities are calculated on the basis 
o f other variables in the model set equal to their mean values o f  the sampled population. 
The ambivalence regions may hence be viewed as representing a typical or average 
respondent to the study. In order to take account o f the possible sensitivity o f  the results 
o f these categorisations to what is considered a ‘yes’ response and what is considered as 
a ‘no’ response, two alternative definitions o f lower and upper bounds were used, 
defined as the amounts to which 60% and 70% o f the respondents would respond with a 
‘definitely yes’ and a ‘definitely no’ respectively.
250 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
200
150
100
50
0
In Figure 6.2., the difference between lower bounds o f WTP are not as pronounced as 
between the upper bounds, a result that is consistent across all three definitions o f
n'y
ambivalence regions (i.e., for 50, 60 and 70%). Whereas the PC time to think format
73 However, due to the scale of the value axis, the difference between the lower bounds across formats is 
somewhat concealed in the figure. The exact ambivalence regions were as follows, presented in the 
order PC standard, PC multi-attribute, and PC time to think-, 50% (5.4 - 199.5, 5.8 - 209.2, 3.9 - 102.7); 
60% (3 - 162.3, 3.5 -  172, 1.5 -65.5); 70% (0.5 -  121.9, 0.9 -  131.4, 0.1 -  24.9).
H Standard 
□  Multi-attrib 
□  Time to think1 1 |11 |11 |
50% 60% 70%
Figure 6.2. Ambivalence bounds of WTP (measured in £)
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results in much narrower ambivalence regions, these are approximately the same for the 
other two formats, however that of the PC multi-attribute format being slightly wider. 
To conclude, the region of ambivalence among the respondents who were given time to 
think about the issue and the valuation task is, according to the above definitions, half or 
less than half than that of the remaining two sub-samples, which leads us to conclude 
that the respondents in this sub-group provide more precise estimates of WTP. The 
parameter estimates of the logit-model in table 6.2. support this interpretation.
6.5.2. Qualitative Analysis
In a follow-up section of the questionnaire, the respondents in the PC standard format 
were asked to comment on how valuable it would be if given the opportunity to state 
their opinion on the basis of several aspects of the environmental issue, and how 
valuable it would be to have time to think about and discuss this with other people. The 
respondents in the remaining two sub-samples were asked how valuable each of these 
response formats or processes actually was. Overall and across all categories of 
respondents, both a more inclusive format that allows the respondents to express their 
WTP on the basis of several aspects of the issue, and one that gives them some time to 
think about this before stating their WTP, seems to be a helpful guide in the valuation 
process. However, the analysis does not provide any support for the idea that PC time to 
think format should be more valuable than the PC multi-attribute format.
If we examine specific comments made in relation to the question on the value of time 
to think, the majority perceived that, for various reasons, this would be more or less 
valuable or helpful. Responses ranged from those who consider the time as useful in 
order to reconcile some new aspects of the problem, such as comparison with other 
environmental issues, reflection of personal responsibility, trust in interventions, and to 
scrutinise budget constraints, to those who stated that it would be useful for whatever 
reason. What is particularly interesting and supportive of the findings in chapter five is 
some respondents’ claim that it made them realise that their ‘on the spot’ WTP would 
be more based on political correctness and an aim to please the interviewer, rather than, 
perhaps, personal worth. Despite the fact that only a few respondents explicitly made 
this comment, this raises the question of whether the time-lapse from the presentation of
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the valuation question to the elicitation of WTP may accentuate instrumental 
considerations involved, and subdue expressive motivations not directly linked to the 
environmental issue being valued.
Respondents were finally asked if they had discussed the issue or valuation task with 
someone else, and here only five out of 37 said that they had not. Yet, the influence of 
this discussion is not clear-cut. Whereas some respondents stated that it was very useful, 
the majority said that their opinion was pretty much established before knowing about 
other people’s views. What the analysis does suggest, however, is that among some 
respondents this feed-back was valuable as a validation of their prior opinion, thereby 
supporting the arguments by Fazio (1979) and Zimbardo and Leippe (1991) who 
hypothesise that a discussion with other people is useful in order to become more sure 
of vaguely established attitudes and opinions. To conclude, we do not have any 
unambiguous indication of the extent to which social processes, the media and other 
sources of reference influence people’s responses, but it seems likely that the former has 
some kind of validating role in the establishment of opinions in this study. It is also 
possible that people are unwilling or unable to recognise this type of influence, so the 
results here may not properly reflect the impact of this factor.
6.5.3. Open-Ended versus PC Responses with Certainty Thresholds
Figures 6.3. and 6.4. present the estimated logit distributions of the PC standard and PC 
time to think format. It also depicts the distributions of OE responses, the latter being 
defined according to the particular bid used in the PC format that the respondent would 
accept given her OE response of WTP.74 Likewise the calculations of upper and lower 
ambivalence bounds in the previous section, the probabilities below are estimated when 
all other variables are set equal to their mean values of the sampled population.
74 For example, if stating a WTP of £40, the individual is considered as providing a ‘yes’ response to the 
bid £30, but a ‘no’ response to the bid £50.
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Figure 6.3. Logit distributions -  PC time to think valuation format
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Figure 6.4. Logit distributions -  PC standard valuation format
As the figures illustrate, the disparity between a ‘definitely yes’ and a ‘probably not4 
response (i.e., between what the respondent is ‘100% sure o f  paying’ and what she is 
‘75% sure o f  not paying’) is considerable, particularly for responses to the PC standard 
format, thereby supporting the previous finding that the ambivalence bounds are quite 
large. Furthermore, the distribution o f OE responses is similar to the distribution o f  
‘probably not’ responses o f  the PC standard format, and lies to the right o f those o f the
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PC time to think format. It is thus shown that the standard OE response represents a 
rather low certainty level regarding the likelihood that this amount will later be paid by 
the individual, resulting in substantially larger estimates of WTP compared to the PC 
format as utilised here. These results are similar to but more pronounced than the 
findings by Welsh and Poe (1998), who found that the distribution of OE responses lies 
just to the right of the ‘probably yes’ distribution, rather than just below the ‘probably 
not’ distribution as is the case here.75 Thus, respondents answering the OE question in 
Welsh and Poe's (1998) study seem to be more certain about their WTP statements than 
people are in this study. Similarly, Ready et al. (1999) found that only 33.5% of OE 
respondents stated an amount that they were less than 95% sure of paying.
There are, however, a number of possible reasons for the apparent difference across 
these studies. Firstly, Welsh and Poe (1998) used an OE valuation that was framed as a 
voting situation, rather than an inquiry of maximum WTP. Secondly, it is possible that 
the interpretation of the certainty levels ‘probably yes*, ‘not sure’, etc. used by Welsh 
and Poe (1998), is different from the definitions used in this study (e.g., ‘75% sure’, 
’50% sure’, etc.). I am therefore inclined to argue that such seemingly subtle differences 
in question wording may have a significant impact on outcomes (e.g, Schuman and 
Presser, 1981), and a direct comparison of the different studies may therefore not be 
adequate. Thirdly, Ready et al. (1999) assessed OE estimates with the use of a payment 
card, which may not yield the same results as a standard OE question.76 Finally, all three 
studies rely on different statistical procedures in estimating the distribution of OE 
responses, assigning different weights to outliers or extreme responses, different 
specification for defining upper and lower bounds, etc.
75 The relevant comparison between OE and PC responses would be within the standard format since this 
is conceptually similar to the designed used in other studies, which do not add any conditions such as 
those in the multi-attribute and time to think format o f this study.
76 In fact, the distribution o f their OE estimates with payment card is very similar to the distribution of 
responses o f a payment card estimated by Welsh and Poe (1998).
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Table 6.3. presents the mean and median WTP that the respondents were 90% sure of 
paying. As mentioned previously, this estimate was elicited through a standard OE 
question that was asked subsequent to the main valuation question. Figure 6.5. further 
presents the distribution of OE responses for all four response formats.
Table 6.3. Mean and median WTP
Response format Open-ended PC standard PC Multi-attribute PC Time to think
Mean WTP £41.80 £10.57 £ 12.30 £8.30
F  = 38.26***
Median WTP £25 £ 7 £ 6 £ 5
Note: *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level
Since the respondents answering the valuation question through any of the three PC 
formats were explicitly told that their open-ended WTP should be in the region between 
the amount they were 100% sure of paying and what they were 75% sure of paying, the 
estimates are not directly comparable as such. Nevertheless, the OE format results in an 
estimate that is roughly four times larger than the latter three taken separately, 
suggesting that the OE response represents a much lower level of certainty. The 
histograms presented in figure 6.5. below also illustrate that the frequency of zero, or 
low responses of WTP, is higher in the PC format than in the OE format. Thus, WTP 
assessed through a standard OE format generates a more optimistic estimate regarding 
how much the issue is worth to people and what they actually want or can afford to pay. 
Moreover, allowing respondents to explicitly express the likelihood of actually paying 
the stated amount seems to distinguish what may be protest bids, or ‘true* zero-WTP, 
that otherwise would be concealed since people tend to state an amount that they are 
unlikely to pay anyway.
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PC Multi-attributePC Baseline
Open-endedPC Time to think
WTP WTP
Figure 6.5. Frequency distributions of WTP 
6.6. Conclusions
The fact that people provide answers in surveys and interviews, despite their lack o f  
knowledge regarding the inquiry (Converse, 1970), and regardless o f an uncertainty 
about their opinions (Nadeau and Niemi, 1995), has been demonstrated in other areas o f  
social research. In chapter five it was shown that people have a tendency to state WTP 
amounts for an environmental project or issue, but these responses do not necessarily 
reflect whether they consent to the procedure presented, and there seems to be a large 
degree o f  uncertainty involved regarding what would properly reflect individual 
economic value. This study examines this type o f  uncertainty, or ambivalence, 
expressed as the difference between various thresholds o f  certainty regarding the 
likelihood that the individual will actually pay the WTP bid presented. Three variants o f  
a Polychotomous Choice (PC) format were applied, one which posed various questions 
aimed at capturing various multidimensional aspects o f economic value and their impact 
on estimated WTP, one that allowed the respondents some time to think about the issue 
before responding, and a more simple format employed in previous research {e.g., 
Ready et al., 1995; Welsh and Poe, 1998). These formats were finally compared to a 
standard Open-Ended (OE) valuation question.
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The results indicate that people’s decisions will be different when they are given time to 
think about the valuation issue. Particularly, it is indicated that WTP estimates are 
significantly more precise among this group of respondents; the ambivalence regions, 
measured as the difference between a bid that the individual is sure of paying and one 
that she is sure not to pay, is less than half as wide among the respondents given some 
time to think about the issue, compared to the other PC response formats. No definite 
reasons are provided for why these results occur, but it is assumed that this process 
enables respondents to put the issue in a broader context, whereby competing public 
issues, personal responsibility, and budget constraints are realised. Between the other 
two sub-samples, no statistically significant difference in WTP was found, although the 
respondents who were reminded of and responded to various other aspects of the 
valuation scenario seemed slightly more likely to respond with a ‘yes’ response, 
although the difference in the results is not statistically significant.
One hypothesis of this study is that the consultation with friends and relatives will 
reduce people’s ambivalence over their WTP, particularly when the environmental issue 
is unfamiliar and the valuation task novel. According to the analysis of responses to 
some follow-up questions related to this idea, discussions with friends and relatives 
were conducted by the majority of respondents given the opportunity to do so, and this 
interaction further seems valuable in order to establish or validate opinions. Some of 
these respondents also claimed that this would be helpful in determining if and how 
much the environmental issue should be valued in monetary terms. However, this result 
is by no means unambiguous, and the study does not reveal exactly how frequent or 
extensive this interaction was, nor the nature of it. It hence does not explicitly provide 
an answer to whether the respondents rely on the same decision rules as in an individual 
context, or if a group discussion generates altogether different decision strategies as 
demonstrated by Kocher and Sutter (2000). It is also un-answered whether a collective 
discussion evokes different motives than in an individual context, which may be 
expected according to the theorising by Sen (1977) and Vatn and Bromley (1994).
Another important result of the study is that WTP assessed through a standard OE 
valuation question is substantially larger than WTP assessed through the PC format with 
certainty thresholds, thereby supporting the findings by Ready et al. (1995) and Welsh
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and Poe (1998). Both the mean and median estimates of the former are 4-5 times larger 
than the estimates of the latter. In addition, the nature of the distribution of responses is 
different between these formats, and it was demonstrated that the frequency of zero and 
low WTP responses is higher in the PC format. Thus, when posed an OE elicitation 
question, respondents seem to implicitly adapt to a (much) lower level of certainty, and 
consequently, they are likely to report a figure that they are rather unsure of actually 
paying. Apart from the fact that the estimated welfare effect will be higher when 
assessed through the OE format, it may also give an overly optimistic picture of the 
general support among the public for the project being evaluated.
The policy-relevant implications of the above findings are that statements of WTP for a 
public good, such as the one valued here, are only vaguely represented in people’s 
minds. Therefore, these should not be treated as point estimates, but rather as a measure 
that falls within a wider region of ambivalence that may (or may not) capture what 
would be a ‘true’ value. One way of dealing with this problem is to apply an elicitation 
format that reveals the width of this ambivalence, and on the basis of this information, 
approximate upper and lower bounds of involved welfare estimates could be calculated. 
On the basis of such formats, it is possible to study for which particular environmental 
policy issues people seem to possess more crystallised attitudes and values, and how 
these vary across individuals. Apart from the possibility of distinguishing well-founded 
values from non-attitudes in this sense, this procedure in itself is also likely to remind 
the respondents of how certain they actually are of paying the amount suggested, which 
is indicated to have consequences for their statements of WTP.
The next step is to develop methodologies that reduce the uncertainty that the 
respondents feel when answering a CV question. Encouragement and inducement to 
take more time in answering the valuation question seems like a fruitful approach in 
order to fulfil this aim, which is indicated to result in more precise statements of WTP. 
This study also provides some support for the idea that statements of WTP should not 
be considered as individual preferences only, but should be assessed in a context 
wherein social processes are present. Apart from the validating function these serve for 
the establishment of opinions, reactions to environmental problems commonly demand 
collective efforts that may not be adequately decided by individuals in isolation. CV
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researchers are therefore recommended to be more attentive to underlying social 
processes of value assessments, and judgements need to be made regarding if and to 
what extent communicative processes are relevant for and should precede 
environmental benefit estimation.
Another approach to remedy the ambivalence involved is to apply a response format 
that more properly reflects the multidimensional character of the valuation task, albeit 
utilised in a different way than here. This recommendation is based on the hypothesis 
proposed by Zaller and Feldman (1992) that the individual is ambivalent as how to 
answer the questions because he or she possesses multiple and conflicting opinions 
toward the public issue. This prediction further appears plausible considering the 
various types of motivations and considerations behind economic value that respondents 
seem to have in CV contexts, some of which may lead to high statements of WTP, 
others to low statements of WTP, and for this reason it may be difficult for people to 
reduce their opinion(s) into a summary judgement.
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7. Choice Experiments and Self Image:
Hypothetical and Actual Willingness to Pay
As a result of the various problems that have been demonstrated in many Contingent 
Valuation (CV) studies (e.g., Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992; Desvousges et al., 1993; 
Blarney et al., 1999; Kahneman et al., 1999), Choice Experiments (CEs) have received 
prominent attention in recent years as an alternative approach to benefit estimation. In 
choice experiments, people are asked to choose one alternative from a choice set of two 
or several options, each of which is described by the attributes attached to it. Hence, it is 
hypothesised that the individual makes her choice on the basis of these attributes, which 
determine the benefits accrued. Hanley et al. (1998) discuss several potential 
advantages of CEs compared to the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM), including 
closer resemblance to real markets, easiness of valuing attributes rather than whole 
commodities, avoidance of yea-saying, and a built-in test of sensitivity to scope. It is 
thereby argued that CEs are more promising approaches to assessing economic values 
of environmental resources.
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the external validity of Stated Preferences (SP) 
in CEs. It will thus provide a test of how well hypothetical statements of economic 
value in hypothetical market scenarios predict behaviour, the latter represented by the 
actual or real payments people make in an experimental context. The rationale for 
testing this aspect on CEs is that those few tests of external validity that have been 
performed have mainly assessed benefits using the CVM, and a relevant question is if 
CEs perform better regarding this aspect. This study follows the design by Carlsson and 
Martinsson (2001), with some important exceptions. In particular, it examines whether 
respondents try to act in an internally consistent way when expressing both hypothetical 
and real WTP in subsequent order. Thus, by using a split-sample design, one in which 
subjects are asked to make actual payments after stating a hypothetical value, and 
another in which subjects are directly faced with a ‘real’ scenario, and hence not 
preceded by hypothetical statements, a tool is provided to test the impact of self-image 
and cognitive dissonance in these contexts. A further aim of the study is to assess the 
impact of the financial incentives introduced in the experiment.
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The extent to which hypothetical statements of maximum Willingness To Pay (WTP) 
for an environmental amenity correspond to real or actual payments is often considered 
to be an ultimate validity test of Stated Preference Methods (SPMs). However, since the 
basic objective of these methods is to provide economic values when no market exists, 
such external validity tests are rare, and those tests that have been carried out are often 
conducted on various private goods. Due to the lack of empirical bases, researchers 
disagree if and to what extent the CVM and CEs are reliable tools of benefit estimation. 
For example, Mitchell and Carson (1989) are favourable to the potential of CVM to 
capture unbiased WTP estimates, whereas Neill et a l (1994) acknowledge that no solid 
empirical basis exists that supports the external validity of stated economic values.
The chapter is organised as follows. The section below presents previous research on 
the external validity of WTP estimates assessed through the CVM and CEs. After this 
follows a discussion related to self-image and the theory of Cognitive Dissonance (CD), 
and the implications for within-subject tests of SPMs. On the basis of this exposition, a 
theoretical model of choice behaviour, which incorporates self-image and CD in the 
utility function, is proposed. Before the empirical findings and conclusions are 
presented, the hypothesis to be tested, how the experiments were conducted, and the 
econometric models to be estimated are described.
7.1. External Validity of Stated Preferences
Seip and Strand (1992) asked respondents whether or not they were interested in 
becoming members of an environmental organisation in Norway and, if they were, how 
much they would be willing to pay for an annual membership. Those who stated an 
amount above the actual membership fee (200 NOK) were soon after mailed a letter 
from the organisation, requesting them to join. It turned out that 6 out of 64 respondents 
actually decided to pay the membership fee, indicating that hypothetical WTP may be a 
poor indicator of real WTP. In another study about biological diversity, people were 
urged to respond to a newspaper advertisement in order to support the preservation of 
endangered animals (Navrud, 1992). Less than a week later, those responding to the ad 
were sent an offer to become a member of World Wide Fund for Nature (WWFN), and
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• m31 % of these respondents actually chose to pay the official membership fee. 
Cummings et al. (1997) compared hypothetical statements with real payments in a CV 
study using a referendum elicitation format. The study was directed toward people who 
lived close to a contaminated area, and the respondents were told that if everybody 
taking part in the study paid 10 USD, the amount of money aggregated across all 
individuals would be sufficient to cover the costs to produce and distribute a ‘citizens’ 
guide’ that provides valuable information regarding safe groundwater. In the 
hypothetical referendum 45% voted yes and 55% voted no, whereas when real-money 
was introduced, 27% voted yes and 73% voted no.
These studies then provide mixed results regarding the convergence of hypothetical and 
real WTP. However, there is a tendency for hypothetical WTP to overstate real WTP in 
CV studies, or at least for the number of respondents who agree to pay a certain amount 
to be more in a hypothetical compared with a real context. Similar results are found in 
studies that have examined hypothetical and real WTP for other than environmental 
goods, predominantly characterised as private goods (e.g., McClelland et al., 1993; 
Loomis et al., 1996). Across these studies, hypothetical WTP overstates real WTP by a 
factor between 1.5 to 3.7. The problem, however, by assessing the value of private 
goods is that these do not possess the same characteristics as public goods, and hence 
the estimation of benefits is conceptually different.78
Carlsson and Martinsson (2001) is the only study I am aware of that tests the external 
validity of CEs applied to environmental amenities that are characterised as public 
goods. In this study, respondents first made 16 hypothetical pair-wise choices. In each 
choice set, the amount of money given to the respondent and the donation to three
77 However, the advertisement did not mention anything about monetary payment, nor was any actual 
amount specified. A response to the ad should therefore be interpreted as a general expression of 
support rather than an indicator of economic value. The targeted group may further be self-selected 
since it is likely that only environmentally concerned people responded, or read the advertisement in the 
first place.
78 Apart from the fact that private goods lack some important characteristics of public goods, when 
valuing private goods that are marketed, people may also make educated guesses about the actual 
market price, which is likely to influence their statements of WTP.
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different environmental projects varied, and each attribute had three different levels. 
Typically, if the amount of money given to the respondent was larger in one alternative, 
the donation was larger in the other alternative within the same choice set. In a second 
round of the experiment respondents repeated 16 similar pair-wise choices, but this time 
they were informed that one of these would be randomly drawn as the actual choice set. 
They would accordingly be paid the amount of money that corresponded to the choice 
made in this particular choice set, whereas the donation would be made anonymously by 
the research team to the project chosen. The results showed no significant difference 
between hypothetical and actual marginal WTP, although the former was slightly higher 
than the latter.
7.2. Within-Subject versus Between-Subject Test of External Validity
The results discussed above are problematic because of the fact that a significant 
number of the experiments have used within- rather than between-subject designs. All 
the above studies assessed real WTP subsequent to hypothetical WTP was provided by 
the same individuals. The major issue at stake is to what extent these real WTP 
estimates are in fact real. Many economists consider within-subject tests to be sufficient 
for investigating the correspondence between stated and real economic commitments, 
and Carson (1997) argues that “having consistently observed internal tests of the scope 
of insensitivity hypothesis being rejected in samples of any size, one might reasonably 
expect to see this hypothesis rejected in external tests” (p. 27). Even though this 
argument relates to embedding effects, it reveals a common opinion regarding what 
constitutes a sufficient criterion of external validity.
This paper takes a different view by suggesting that within-subject tests may not be 
fully appropriate to investigate the invariance of responses across contexts. It 
hypothesises that respondents strive to act in an internally consistent way in such 
experiments, and that pre-reported hypothetical bids therefore will influence subsequent 
actual WTP. In other areas where between-subject tests have been performed, these 
generally reveal a greater discrepancy between hypothetical WTP and real WTP. Slovic 
(1969) investigated the difference between hypothetical and real choices of gambles in a 
split-sample. The study does not report the difference of choices being made, but in
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hypothetical contexts people tend to maximise gains and discount the impact of losses, 
whereas in real contexts the risk of losing money receives much greater attention. Due 
to this shift in focus, the implication for SPMs is that the approach may result in 
overestimation of WTP since the consequences of subsequent payments are not fully 
realised, whereas the benefits of environmental preservation are likely to be over-rated.
Irwin et al.'s (1992) study of preferences for insurance demonstrates that hypothetical 
WTP is greater than real WTP, although the difference is not statistically significant. 
They also report a greater variance of hypothetical WTP, with more very high bids and 
significantly more zero responses. The former result supports the hypothesis that people 
in these contexts are not as concerned about the actual payments involved, which results 
in more extreme bids. An experiment conducted by Neill et al. (1994) evaluated the 
WTP for both a painting and a map. They compared three contexts of valuation; generic 
CVM, a hypothetical Vickrey auction, and a Vickrey auction with real payments.79 
Hypothetical WTP is similar across the former two contexts, but each of these 
overstates real WTP by a factor of 27 and 25 respectively. Frykblom (1997) found that 
hypothetical WTP exceeds real WTP only moderately, thereby suggesting that 
respondents are responding ‘truthfully’ in within-subject tests. Thus, although on the 
whole indicating that the divergence of hypothetical WTP and real WTP may be greater 
in between-subject tests than in within-subject tests, the findings of previous empirical 
research are not unambiguous. Some of these results also relate to private goods that, for 
reasons discussed above, are not comparable with public goods.
7.2.1. Cognitive Dissonance and Self-Image
The attitudes that people report do not always reflect their ‘true’ convictions. Social 
norms, the requirements inherent in social roles, and self-presentational concerns 
sometimes lead people to claim things they do not genuinely believe (Eagly and 
Chaiken, 1993). Here I will focus on the latter of these constraints, whereby theories of 
cognitive dissonance and counter-attitudinal advocacy are relevant. Research on these
79 In a Vickrey auction, the respondents make repeated rounds bids, and it is assumed that through a 
learning effect they will eventually make choices that converge to economic theoretical assumptions.
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phenomena was pioneered by Leon Festinger during the fifties. In his original 
statement, Festinger (1957) argued that people would not readily take inconsistent 
attitudinal positions, or positions that are in conflict with previous behaviour. The 
essence of the theory is that individuals strive to achieve harmony between their mental 
representations of beliefs, attitudes, intentions and behaviours. Disharmony between any 
of these elements tends to result in either changed behaviours, or cognitive 
manipulations in response to already performed behaviours. In other words, CD arises 
when two (or more) elements stand in conflict with each other, either by implying 
opposite positions, or simply by not matching each other.
Festinger (1957) assumed that dissonance varies in magnitude according to the 
importance of the elements. Importance is here determined by how much value is 
placed on the issue, and to what extent it is central to the perceiver’s self-concept. Since 
Festinger’s original proposal CD has been replicated in a number of studies (Aronson 
and Carlsmith, 1963; Zimbardo et al., 1965; Scheier and Carver, 1980). More modem 
accounts of the theory assume that some auxiliary conditions must be fulfilled, thereby 
predicting attitude change in a narrower range of situations. The following important 
conditions have been proposed; freedom o f choice, aversive consequences, and 
commitment (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993).
In order to result in any change of the cognitive elements, people must to some extent
SOhave performed the task, or vindicated a particular position, by ‘free will*. The second 
condition suggests that there must be some kind of consequence of the behaviour 
performed, or an attitude position, either related to physical outcomes or psychological 
affect {e.g. involvement). Finally, attitude change is more likely to occur when people
80 When subjects are forced to carry out a certain task there is less incentive to change attitudes, because, 
after all they more or less have to comply with whatever instructions are given. Similarly, if people are 
not free to choose which behaviours to engage in, they would not feel personally responsible toward 
these. Festinger and Carlsmith's (1959) experiment demonstrates this; the less subjects are paid to 
perform a boring task, the greater the dissonance, since when monetary incentives for participating in 
the study are large, they are better able to motivate a contradictory behaviour, or state something 
publicly that is contrary to their private opinion. Hence, whenever given an opportunity to misattribute 
any conflict between various elements to external factors, dissonance is less likely to arise.
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feel committed to their position, and commitment would be lower when subjects could 
not be identified with their counter-attitudinal statements. Therefore, public advocacy is 
likely to produce more attitude change (Scheier and Carver, 1980), although in many of 
experiments reviewed by Eagly and Chaiken (1993), subjects were indeed anonymous 
to the researchers. We may argue that the basic conditions for dissonance arousal are 
fulfilled in within-subject tests of stated preferences; respondents are free to make then- 
own choices, they are committed to their hypothetical responses in the sense that these 
statements cannot be altered within the context of the experiment, and actual choices 
involving money are consequential. Therefore, it appears reasonable to expect that real 
WTP in CEs will be influenced by previously made hypothetical assessments.
The question is then, in what particular situations will a conflict arise between 
hypothetical and real assessments? In other words, when would choices be different had 
the individual not been influenced by her previous statements? On the basis of Katz’ 
(1960) theorising related to the functional value of attitudes, I predict that there exists a 
difference in cases whereby people are largely motivated by value-expressive 
considerations, based on the idea that people would like to reassert a positive self- 
image. The self-image is assumed to improve when the respondent is doing what she 
considers to be ‘good* and worthy actions (Andreoni, 1989), when answering 
hypothetical surveys in a way that implies that she would undertake such actions in real 
life, and when acting consistently with previously made statements (Greenwald and 
Ronis, 1978). The argument may for the purposes of this study be extended to claim 
also that people have a positive WTP to preserve or improve this image.
Support for this proposition is provided by impression-management theory (Tedeshi et 
al., 1971), which emerged as a result of the controversy surrounding the motivational 
basis of CD. According to this interpretation, attitudes change because people want to 
manage an impression that others have of them. One aspect of this is to behave in a 
consistent manner and avoid attitudes that conflict with their behaviour and vice versa. 
Hence, impression-management theory assumes that the attitude change is not genuine 
and that participants in CD experiments only appear to change their behaviour in order 
to be viewed favorably by the experimenter. However, revisions of CD theory similarly 
stress the importance of self-consistency and self-affirmation as driving forces of
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dissonance (e.g., Aronson, 1992; Steele et al., 1993). Given that most people have a 
positive self-concept, dissonance is likely to result when they act in a way that may be 
viewed as incompetent, immoral or irrational, for instance telling a lie to another person, 
which would be the implication if behaving inconsistently toward (previously) stated 
attitudes. Put shortly, people would like to see themselves as ‘nice and smart’ (Akerlof 
and Dickens, 1982). Although commonly being informed that their responses will be 
treated anonymously and that no matching will be made between statements of WTP, 
respondents would, according to the latter theoretical account, still have an incentive to 
act consistently across different contexts of valuation.
According to the above insights, I hypothesise, and later test, that hypothetical WTP 
exceeds actual WTP particularly for issues that have an important ethical dimension. An 
ethical dimension is further assumed to be present for choices that involve other 
people’s well-being, or those that involve non-human welfare, for example global 
environmental resources that are not of immediate concern to the individual. It thus 
builds on the hypothesis by Kahneman and Knetsch (1992), who argue that responses in 
CV studies commonly represent symbolic statements. However, in a context that is 
viewed as more consequential by the individual, for instance by involving real monetary 
trade-offs, and in which he or she is more committed to her actions and statements, 
these considerations will play a less influential role, and therefore, lead to different 
choices. To conclude, certain goals and motives, in this case value-expressive and 
instrumental considerations, become more or less salient between different contexts of 
valuation, and if the individual is asked to repeat the same task in various contexts in 
subsequent order, she is in addition influenced by an aim to act consistently between
Q1
these, thereby making choices less different than they otherwise would have been.
81 Another test of validity is to compare the results of SP methods with estimates derived from Revealed 
Preference (RP) methods. Carson (1996) found in a comprehensive meta-study that the estimated WTP 
in RP studies were of the same magnitude as those obtained from dichotomous-choice CV studies, and 
that they were actually somewhat larger on average. Wardman (1988) surveyed British value-of-time 
studies and found similar results when comparing SP and RP studies. However, RP methods are only 
applicable on well-defined goods that primarily accrue use values, such as access to recreation areas or 
hunting rights, and such comparison are according to the hypothesis provided here therefore not 
adequate as a general test whether hypothetical WTP corresponds to real WTP.
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Apart from a general scepticism toward experimental results since these are derived in a 
context that fails to replicate everyday reality (e.g., Rosenthal, 1966; Gaskell et al., 
1997; Loewenstein, 1999), we may also argue that the trade-offs from earned money in 
the experiment are not comparable to the trade-offs from current (or anticipated) income 
and wealth. In this sense, losses loom larger than foregone gains (Kahneman et al., 
1990). Moreover, the amount of money involved is rather small, implying that choices 
may not be sufficiently consequential, and therefore, not possible to generalise in a 
broader sense. I will therefore explicitly take into account the scale of the experiment in 
terms of the amount of money involved, both in the theoretical model and in the 
empirical tests. The prediction is that people still have an incentive to reassert a positive 
self-image in real-money choices as long as monetary trade-offs are reasonably small 
and therefore less consequential.
7.3. The Model82
In most SP experiments (including CVM) of environmental change, or a change in some 
other public good, respondents are (explicitly or implicitly) assumed to maximize a 
strictly quasi-concave utility function as follows:
u = u(x,G) (1)
, du . du . where — >0, —  >0 
dx dG
where x is private consumption, and G is quantity of a public good, such as an index of 
environmental quality. The Marginal Willingness To Pay (MWTP) for an increase in G
is then given by the marginal rate of substitution between G and x, i.e., MWTP = •
For a sufficiently small change in G, as normally assumed in CEs, the average WTP for 
an improvement will be approximately equal to the marginal WTP. The maximum 
WTP for a certain change in G, AG, is thus given by AG*MWTP (or AG* AWTP). 
Hereafter this model will be referred to as the conventional reference model.
82 This section is rather technical and presents a mathematical formalisation of the choice problem. 
However, this part is not vital in any respect to understand the hypotheses and results o f this study.
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7.3.1. The Extended Model with Self-Image
Andreoni's (1989; 1990) model to explain charity and voluntary contributions to public 
goods is based on the utility function u ‘ = u(xl ,G ,g l) , where g1 is individual f s  own 
voluntary contribution to the public good. Apart from the utility arising from the 
provision of the public good, the individual derives utility from the mere act of giving 
(i.e., the ‘warm glow* of giving). Thus, the utility depends on the particular 
circumstances of the contribution, and a private donation would be worth more than an 
equally large anonymously made donation due to the positive effect it has on the 
individual’s self-image.83 Introducing self-image in the model we have then instead;
u = u(x,G ,s) (2)
i du _ du A du - where — > 0,—  > 0,— > 0
dx dG ds
where s is self-image. The self-image is assumed to depend on the degree to which (i) 
the individual acts in accordance with her ethical beliefs, (ii) the honesty to herself, and 
(iii) in accordance with earlier made commitments or statements. Given the choice 
design in this experiment, people do not actually pay any money for increasing the 
donation; instead the associated income transfer to them is affected. The change in G is 
neither constant, but changes between the choice sets. Therefore, I assume that self- 
image is a function of the implicit marginal WTP, or the trade-off the respondent is 
willing to make between money to herself and a contribution to the WWF campaigns. In 
other words, how much money is needed to the campaigns in order to compensate for 
one dollar not given to the individual? This can be formalised as;
s = f\M W T P  * -  MWTP moral |, |MWTP * -  M W TPtrue |, |MWTP * -  MWTP*_X |)= f ( d x , d 2,d 3) (3)
83 For the model this implies that an individual’s utility is not equally affected by a donation from some 
other (unknown) person to an environmental organisation, as if the same donation were made 
personally. If this were not the case, so that, say, an individual derives the same utility for 0.2 USD 
given (by anyone) to an environmental organisation as one dollar to himself. This would imply that the 
individual would derive more utility from reading in the paper that the organisation has received 10000 
USD in a donation (from some other unknown person) as she would derive from receiving 2000 USD 
himself. This is hard to believe.
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where < 0,-^—< 0,-^— < 0. In this model, MWTP* is the stated MWTP for a certain
ddx dd2 dd3
change in G, MWTPmoral is the ethically superior value (i.e., the value which would 
give the respondent the best self image if there were no conflicts with other 
determinants of the self-image), MWTP1™6 is the true MWTP that keeps individual 
utility constant, ignoring welfare effects related to the survey response per se, and 
MWTP*_X is a previously stated WTP. Thus, both self-image and CD are now included 
in the utility function.
7.3.2. Hypothetical Willingness to Pay
In the conventional reference model it is implicitly assumed that respondents will reveal 
their true preferences, although the model itself gives no explanation of why the 
individuals in a hypothetical context would do so, and assumes that issues such as self- 
image have no important role to play. In the extended model, however, I assume that if 
respondents know or have reason to believe that the survey is hypothetical, they will 
maximize (3), implying that x and G will be treated as if they are unaffected by their 
responses, and the utility maximization is reduced to the maximization of s.
In a hypothetical choice where the ethical dimension is less important (assuming that
0/» fid
others are not affected by the question), we have —--------— = 0. If no earlier
J n '  ddx dMWTP
fif* fidcommitment or statement is made we also have —------- -— = 0, implying that s is
dd3 dMWTP v s *
maximized when MWTP* = MWTPtrue, i.e., the optimal response is to answer 
‘truthfully’. For example, for issues such as recreational parks and hunting rights, the 
ethical dimension is very limited, and empirical results do not indicate any clear
discrepancy between stated-preference and revealed-preference studies, which is
consistent with the proposed theory (e.g., Carson, 1996).
In environmental valuation studies, on the other hand, the perceived ethical dimension is
often important, so we have -f— < 0. Assuming again that no earlier commitment or
ddx
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statement is made, s is maximized for the WTP* when —  = . Thus, the optimal
ddl dd2 *
response implies a trade-off between the ethically superior value (i.e., the associated 
‘warm-glow’ feelings) and honesty.84 From the mean value theorem we then have that 
MWTP1™6 <MWTP'hyp < MWTPmoral.
7.3.3. Real Willingness to Pay
In a question involving real money, and a real change in G, the respondent maximizes 
the following utility function
u = u(x, G, s(MWTP)) = u (x°+ L x ,G °+  AG, s(MWTP)) (4a)
where x° and G° are initial individual income (or wealth) and (overall) revenues for the 
WWF project, respectively, and Ax and AG are the corresponding increases due to the 
choice experiment. The higher AG that is chosen, the lower Ax is obtained, and vice 
versa. Although the choices are of course discrete in the CEs, I will for analytical 
simplicity model the amount of money foregone by the individual as / (A G ), so that 
Ax - T  -  f  (AG) where T is the maximum possible money transfer to the respondent. 
The marginal (or average) WTP in the interval is then given by / (AG) / A G , and the 
CEs are designed so that a higher AG also implies higher Marginal WTP (MWTP), or 
Average WTP (AWTP). We can then re-write the utility function to be maximised as;
u = u(x° + T - f ( A G ) ,G °  + AG, s ( f  (AG)/AG)) (4b)
The problem, as formulated, is to choose AG, i.e., how much money that should be 
given to the WWF project. The more is given, the less money does the respondent
84 The importance of the latter motive is recognised in the following example: Assume that you won 
100,000 USD on a lottery, how much of this would you give away to charity? Even if we believe that 
the ethically superior value would be all of it, i.e. 100,000 USD, few of us would give away everything, 
and hence we would feel dishonest to ourselves if we gave that answer.
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receive herself, and the higher self-image is achieved. We have the following first order 
condition:85
du du du ds
dx dG ds dMWTP dG  AG 2 )
=  0
or
du du
+ W AG + S u _ d s   (5)
f ' - J — ^  dMWTP
AG
f
By the design of f  we have that / '—— > 0. Equation (5) reflects a tradeoff between self-
AG
image effects of a higher MWTP, given that we have an ethically important good so 
that MWTPmoral > MWTP1™6, and real changes in G and x. Since the second term is 
positive, we have that the first term is negative. Since u is monotonic in s, and s 
monotonic in MWTP in the relevant interval, we can conclude from the mean-value 
theorem that hypothetical MWTP will exceed real-money MWTP.
In the second term of the equation, reflecting effects on self-image, there is no direct 
influence from scale, so that just doubling all monetary values in the experiment would 
not affect self-image provided that the respondent made the same choices as with the 
original scale. In the first term, however, the factor AG will reflect scale. Consider the 
limit case where AG goes to zero, implying that the first term vanishes relative to the 
second term, and the results converge to the hypothetical case.
dsAs in the hypothetical case, the factor can be separated into different elements.
r  dMWTP r
If respondents have not undertaken a previous hypothetical experiment we have;
du „ du
IH4&-4G + -p  f _  ds
dG
( J L .+ J L
ddx dd2
= 0 (6a)
but if they have, we have instead;
85 Remember that the changes are considered sufficiently small so that the MWTP is constant in the
interval and hence equal to the AWTP.
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du du
 /  + ------ ^  f  ^& S G J a  + du
f ,  f _  ds
AG
iL+JL+JL.
K ddx dd2 dd3
= 0 (6b)
Since < 0 we have, again by the mean-value theorem, that MWTP is expected to be
dd3
higher if respondent has participated in an earlier conducted hypothetical experiment.
7.4. Empirical Hypotheses
As implied before, the individual’s self-image is assumed to depend on the degree to 
which (i) the individual acts in accordance with her ethical beliefs, (ii) the honesty to 
herself, and (Hi) in accordance with earlier made commitments or statements. From 
these assumptions, the following hypotheses were derived:
Hi: Hypothetical MWTP is predicted to exceed real-money MWTP.
Hi: The MWTP from the real-money experiment that follows the 
hypothetical experiment is predicted to be below the hypothetical 
MWTP, but above the real-money MWTP provided by respondents who 
have not undertaken a hypothetical experiment before.
Hy. When comparing different real-money experiments it is predicted that the 
MWTP would decrease with the actual amount of money involved.
These hypotheses can be contrasted with the conventional reference model that neglects 
the influence self-image and CD, in which instead MWTP would be predicted not to 
vary with respect to the above circumstances. In the following section I will describe the 
experimental design in order to test hypotheses H\ - H^.
7.5. Experimental Design and Method
The experiment was conducted at the London School of Economics (LSE) in February 
2000. It was first announced in association with class-teaching, and students interested 
in participating were later contacted by e-mail in order to arrange a date and time for the 
experiment. The subjects were divided into two sample groups. Respondents in one of
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these firstly made hypothetical choices (hypothetical), followed by choices that 
involved real payments (real after hypothetical), whereas in the other sub-sample 
respondents made real choices that were not preceded by hypothetical choices (real 
directly). In each of these experimental settings, subjects were faced with 16 choice sets
o/z
that were identical across all settings. Thus, a design is applied that allows us not only 
to test the correspondence between hypothetical and real choices, but also to investigate 
the influence of the former on the latter, that is, to what extent individuals try to act in 
an internally consistent way in these contexts. The diagram below illustrates how the 
two samples were constructed.
Sample group 1:
Sample group 2:
Hypothetical Choices
Real choices
Real Choices
Altogether 43 students from various courses were recruited, mainly graduate students 
but also a few undergraduates. Of these, 23 subjects first made hypothetical choices, 
followed by choices involving real money, whereas the remaining 20 subjects made real 
choices not preceded by hypothetical choices. The experiment was conducted in 4 
sessions with 10-15 subjects in each. All sessions were run within the same week, and 
those sessions including respondents who made both hypothetical and real choices were 
run on the first day in order to avoid rumours about the purpose of the experiment. 
Although on the whole being very similar in terms of some possible key characteristics, 
various categories of subjects (i.e., in terms of gender, age, etc.) are evenly distributed 
across the three sub-groups. It would obviously have been preferable to have a larger 
sample, but since the experiments involved real money, budgetary considerations 
imposed restrictions.
Each session started by asking some questions about socio-economic characteristics. 
Then the subjects received verbal and written instructions regarding the choice 
experiment. The instructions included some brief information about the general purpose
86 The character of these choice sets will be explained further in the text.
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of these types of procedures {i.e., estimation of economic values to inform policy 
analysis), the nature and purpose of the environmental projects, and finally how the 
choice experiment works. The particular environmental projects chosen were two 
campaigns currently run by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF). In the hypothetical setting 
the instructions additionally read;
The choices are hypothetical but it is still very important that you answer them truthfully and 
as i f  they involved real money.
There are altogether 16 choices fo r  you to make. Try to consider each o f  these in isolation as 
i f  that was the only choice you have to make. I f  you want you may go back and change your 
earlier answers after second thought.
The latter information was given in order to minimise order and learning effects. In the 
real conditions that were introduced subsequently to these choices, the subjects were 
given the following information:87
In the following you will be presented similar choice situations as before, although now your 
choices will in fact determine how much money you earn in this experiment, as well as how 
much money is contributed to the campaigns. It thus involves real money. The procedure is 
the following:
• you will again make 16 pair-wise choices
• afterwards one o f  these will be drawn randomly as the actual choice set
• you will be paid the amount o f  money according to the alternative chosen in this 
particular choice set, whereas the corresponding contribution is paid anonymously by us 
to the WWF
Thus, your choices will determine how much money you earn in this experiment, as well as 
how much money is contributed to the campaigns. I f  you want you may go back and change 
earlier answers after second thought.
In each choice-set in all experimental conditions, subjects were asked to choose 
between two alternatives. Each alternative was characterised by three attributes; the
87 Essentially the same information was presented to the other sub-sample that were faced with real 
choices directly. By essentially I mean except from words such as ‘again’, ‘as before’, etc., since in this 
case the subjects had not made any hypothetical choices previously.
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amount of money that they themselves would receive (income), the size of the donation 
paid to the particular campaign run by the WWF (donation), and the type of campaign. 
The amount of money paid to the respondents had four levels, the donation four levels, 
and there were two different campaigns to choose from. Both campaigns are currently 
run by the WWF in order to protect endangered wild animals. This was also explained 
to the respondents. Thus, we may argue that the scenario is perceived as fairly relevant 
and realistic by the respondents. The issues may further be considered as public goods, 
since they are not associated with a membership in the WWF, and there are no 
particular side-benefits associated with the donations. Still, in order to minimise the 
impact of any possible private-good characteristics, it was also stressed that the 
donations would be paid to the WWF anonymously by the research team. The 
respondents would receive evidence through copies of the receipt of the whole donation 
(across all respondents), but not any evidence or receipt of their own contribution. After 
the experiments were finished, all respondents left the class-room and were called back 
in one by one, whereby the draw was made that decided how much this individual 
should be paid, the size of her donation, and to which campaign. The draw was made 
under the supervision of the respondent due to be paid, but no one else. Table 7.1. below 
summarises the levels of attributes applied in the experiment.
Table 7.1. Level of attributes
Income Donation WWF campaign
£0 £0 The African Elephant
£5 £7 The Green Sea Turtle
£10 £14
£15 £21
Given these levels, a full factorial design has 32 combinations of attribute levels. In 
order to create an efficient design using 15 unique choice sets I largely relied on the 
search algorithm developed by Zwerina et al. (1996). They identify four criteria of an 
efficient design; orthogonality, level balance, utility balance, and minimal overlap,
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among which I put emphasis on the former three.88 In addition to these criteria, the 
levels of attributes were tested in two rounds prior to the experiment, involving 14 
respondents altogether. Apart from the 15 choice sets used for estimating marginal 
WTP, I added one choice set in order to test for transitivity. This was done by repeating 
one of the original choice sets in which the alternatives were presented in the reverse 
order {i.e., alternative A becomes alternative B and vice versa). An example of a choice 
set is presented below.
Table 7.2. Example of a choice set
Choice number 3 Alternative A Alternative B
Money given to you £5
£14
Elephant
£10 
£7  
Sea Turtle
Contribution to campaign
Campaign
In previous studies that have performed within-subject tests of external validity, it is not 
always clear how the choice sets in the real conditions have been designed. Preferably, a 
different order of the choice sets should be presented across the conditions in order to 
reduce the direct influence of previously made choices, which is accordingly done in 
this study; real choices that follow the hypothetical ones are presented in a different 
order than hypothetical choices. For half of the respondents, the order of the choice sets 
was reversed in order to cancel (and test for) any possible ordering effects.
In order to examine the influence of scale, four subjects89 from the sample who made 
real choices (not preceded by hypothetical ones) were contacted a few weeks later. 
These respondents repeated the same task, only this time they were informed that each
88 Orthogonality implies that the levels of each attribute vary independently, level balance that the levels 
appear with equal frequency, utility balance that the utility of each alternative within a choice set is the 
same, and minimal overlap is satisfied when the alternatives within each choice sets have non- 
overlapping attribute levels. When these criteria are jointly fulfilled, the design will be optimal 
according to Zwerina et al. (1996).
89 Again for financial reasons, since the amount of money is here considerable larger.
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choice set would determine the donation and income earned, rather than one randomly 
drawn. Hence, the total donation possibly made, and the money possibly earned by each 
subject is now substantially higher than in the original setting. In the original 
experiment, the respondent could earn a maximum of £15, or make a donation up to 
£21, whereas in the follow-up experiment they could earn a maximum of £100, or chose 
to make a donation of £122.50.90 Given that the sample group consists of students, these 
amounts are likely to have a significant impact on their monetary budgets, and may 
therefore result in a different behaviour than recorded in the original setting. In order to 
minimise the possible direct influence of previously made choices, the choice sets in the 
follow-up experiment were also presented in a different order.
7.5.1. The Empirical Model
In the empirical analysis I use a standard random-utility model (McFadden, 1974). The 
model is based on the assumption that, among 2 alternatives 4^ = 0,1, the individual 
chooses the alternative with highest utility. Apart from a systematic part of the utility 
function, Vf there is a random term, £, so that the utility derived for individual i from 
choosing alternative 1 becomes;
»«=*»+*« (7>
The probability of choosing alternative 1 in each choice set equals the probability that 
the utility from this alternative is greater than the utility of alternative 2. Hence we have;
Pr(4  = 1) = Pr(Fn + > Vi2 + si2) = Pr(*a - *i2 > Vi2 - Vn) (8)
The systematic part of the utility function (or the reduced form of the utility function) is 
assumed to be linear in the attributes, in the interval considered;
V{l=a + Pxx + PEDE +pTDT +P2zADe +Dt ) (9)
90 Due to financial reasons, the level of income and donation were halved across all choice sets. However, 
the trade-off between the attributes is still the same as in the original setting.
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where D E and D T are the donations given to the elephant and turtle projects 
respectively, and z  is a vector of dummy variables. The marginal, or average, WTP for a 
change in one of the donations, say to the elephant campaign, is then equal to;
p F du.-/dDE dVi/dD E B E + B zZ: /m \
MWTP: = AWTP: =—lLi  = - lL-i  = - ------------------------------------------ (10)
dut /  dXf d V{ /  dXj fi  x
Given such a utility function, and that the error terms of (7) follow a Gumbel (or type 1 
extreme-value) distribution, implying that the differences between the error terms in (8) 
are logistically distributed, the probability of choosing alternative 1 becomes;
l + Exp(-px(Xi - x 0)J ^
Exp ( - / ? * ( * , ) - ( P E + f i !z j )(D]E - P l ) - ( p T + 1 * 2 ,X A 7,~ AT))
1 + E x p + P ‘z ,) ( D ? - D % ) - ( P t + / ) 2z,)(D lr - D l ) )
As is common, I ordered the choice sets in the econometric analysis so that the 
alternative which included a donation to the elephant campaign is always modelled as A 
= 1, and vice versa, implying;
Pr(A = n  = Exp(~-fiX(x \ ~ xo)~ (0 * + P Zzi)D\ + (PT + P Zzi)DZ )
* 1 + Exp(-/! '(* , - x ^ ) - ( P E +f}‘zt)D* +(f iT + f i ’z,)D0')
Exp(- f i x(xl - x 0) - ( p E + f i ‘zlXP lE - D l ) - ( P E ~ P T) P l ) 
l + E x p ( - ^ ( x , - x 0) - ( P E + P ’z M D ? - D l ) - ( P E - P t )D%)
(12)
However, since the utility function (9) is invariant to any monotonic transformation, we 
can without loss of generality multiply all parameters with any positive constant. For the 
interpretation of the results it is convenient to normalise the marginal utility of income 
to unity, so that fix =1. Using (11) we can then re-write (12) to obtain:
p Exp(-(*| -x„ )-M W T P ,E(D f -D l) - (M W T P ,E -M W T P J)d I )
‘ l + Exp(-(x, - x ^ - M W T P f i D f  -D l) - (M W T P ,E -M W T P j)D Ta j
Exp(-(x, - x Q)~M W TPf^o(D f -D l) - tM W T P t (D f  - D l ) z , -(M W TP ? -M W T P j)D l)
1 + Exp(- (x, -  x„ ) -  MWTPf.o (D f  - D l ) -  AMWTP, (D { - D l  ) z ,  -  (M W TPf -  MWTP? )£>0r )
In this expression, MWTP2E=0 is the MWTP for the elephant campaign, given that the 
dummy variables reflecting the experimental context and gender are zero; AMWTPt is 
the increase in MWTP associated with an increase in dummy variable z,- from zero to
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one; and MWTP.E -  MWTP* is the MWTP difference between the elephant and the 
turtle campaign. The parameters associated with the variables jcj-jc0, Df -  Dq , 
(D f -  Dq )z i and Dq in (13) can be estimated by a logit model. Thus, this formulation 
enables us to directly estimate the MWTPs for the elephant campaign, the MWTP- 
difference between the campaigns (assumed to be independent of the dummy variables), 
as well as the difference in MWTP due to the dummy variables reflecting gender and 
the experimental context (implicitly assumed to be the same for the campaigns).91
7.6. Results
Altogether 8 subjects had lexicographic preferences in the intervals presented in the 
experiment and in at least one of the contexts. Among these, 5 subjects always went for 
the alternative with highest donation, whereas 3 subjects always chose the alternative 
with the highest income given to them. Thus, responses on the whole seem to be 
balanced with respect to income and donation. There is a lack of consensus in the 
literature as to whether one should exclude such observations from the analysis or not. 
On the one hand, one may argue that these respondents have made no serious attempt to 
trade, and instead were chosen a cognitively easier (lexicographic) strategy. On the 
other hand, this unwillingness to trade may for some individuals reflect genuine 
preferences in the intervals considered, or at least that there may be some useful 
information in these observations. I am inclined to favour the latter argument, and hence 
have included these observations (e.g., following Carlsson and Martinsson, 2001). 
Nevertheless, models excluding the lexicographic observations were also run, with no 
effect on the main results. Regarding the test of transitivity, it turns out that only 4 
subjects have intransitive preferences within the same context, indicating that responses 
appear rather stable within each individual and context.92
91 Normally in a logit-model, the parameter estimates need to be transformed into probabilities before 
they can be meaningfully interpreted. However, in the formalisation here, since all variables are 
representing the same underlying unit (i.e., income), the logit-estimates may be interpreted directly in 
terms of marginal WTP.
92 Transitivity is a fundamental axiom of standard economic theory, and it hypothesises that a particular 
choice (e.g., A > B) would be repeated across all choice sets, everything else equal.
192
CHOICE EXPERIMENTS AND SELF IMAGE
7.6.1. Hypothetical versus Real Willingness to Pay
Table 7.3. below presents the estimated parameters associated with the three 
experiments based on (1) Hypothetical choices, (2) Real-money choices after the 
experiment hypothetical choices, and (3) Real-money choices not preceded by 
hypothetical choices. The estimates are obtained through standard logit models in which 
one parameter (i.e., reflecting income) is normalised to unity.
Table 7.3. Parameters of utility functions associated with different samples
Pooled sample
Variable Coefficient
Hypothetical
Coefficient
Real after hypothetical
Coefficient
Real directly
Coefficient
P  Income 1.00** 1.00** 1.00** 1.00”
(9.54) (5.64) (5.89) (5.09)
MWTPElephant 0.89** 1.40** 1.11** 0.81**
(8.01) (7.55) (7.12) (5.14)
MWTPElephant -MWTPTurtle -0.03 -0.06 0.03 -0.05
(-0.59) (-0.82) (0.36) (-0.58)
Dummy Hypothetical 0.41**
(3.52)
DummyEeaj aj}er hypothetical 0.25*
(2.19)
Dummy Gender=male -0.55*’ -0.82** -0.48** -0.38*
(-5.75) (-4.72) (-3.06) (-2.21)
Log-likelihood -582.0313 -188.4628 -202.2818 -188.5554
n 990 345 345 300
Marginal WTP 0.89 1.40 1.11 0.81
Note: f-statistics are presented in brackets
*’ denotes significance on the 0.01 level; * denotes significance on the 0.05 level
93 Ideally, a panel-data model may have been run, wherein the effect at the individual level is fixed. This 
was also performed, but yielded no significant difference o f the parameter estimates in table 7.3.
193
CHAPTER SEVEN
The first model in the table presents the pooled estimates of the three separate 
experiments. As expected, the parameter estimates for marginal utility of consumption 
(or income = Plncome) and donation (to the elephant campaign = MWTPEiephant) are both
positive and significant at the 1% level across all models, indicating that a higher 
donation and a higher income transfer enhance the likelihood of choosing that 
alternative. Furthermore, we see that the MWTP for the sea turtles program is slightly 
(but insignificantly) larger compared to the elephant program (since the parameter 
estimates of (MWTPElephant -MWTPTurtle) is negative). To test for possible order effects, a
dummy variable was introduced for one of two different orders, but the corresponding 
parameter was never significant at the 0.10 level.94
I also tested for the influence of various socio-economic characteristics, including 
gender, age and income, but only gender had a significant explanatory effect.95 Women 
turned out to provide a much higher marginal WTP across all contexts, supporting the 
experimental results by Eckel and Grossman (1998), who found that women in general 
tend to contribute more to public goods. Indeed, women’s MWTP is larger then 1 in 
both the hypothetical and the real after hypothetical cases. This means that women tend 
to prefer that one additional dollar be given to the campaign instead of to themselves. 
However, the gender differences here are lower, both in absolute and relative terms, in 
the real-money experiment compared to the hypothetical experiment. This actually goes 
in the opposite direction compared to Brown and Taylor (2000), who in a CV 
framework found that men on average had a much higher ‘hypothetical bias’.
As predicted by H\f marginal WTP is higher in the hypothetical context compared to the 
real context not preceded by hypothetical choices. Whereas in a real situation the 
individual is indifferent between receiving £ 0.89 herself and donating £ 1 to the WWF 
campaign for elephants, in the hypothetical scenario she is indifferent between receiving
94 Since it has been suggested that individual error terms are likely to be larger within a hypothetical than 
a real context, a heteroscedastic pooled model was run, where the variance in each sample is allowed to 
differ. However, the difference in the distribution of the error terms is not statistically significant, and 
the parameter estimates are almost identical to the pooled model presented here.
95 Since the sample consisted of students the variations in income and age were, naturally, limited.
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£ 1.3 (i.e., 0.89 + 0.41) herself and donating £ l.96 We can also see that marginal WTP 
is higher in the real-money experiment that follows after the hypothetical experiment 
(i.e., 0.89 + 0.25 = 1.14), compared to real-money choices not preceded by hypothetical 
choices. These findings are statistically significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 level 
respectively (first column), and are reflected by the parameter estimates for MWTP in 
each of the restrictive models. However and contrary to what is predicted by Hi, 
marginal WTP in the hypothetical context is lower for men than in real-money 
experiment that follows after the hypothetical experiment, although the difference is 
small.97 For women Hi is quite clearly supported.
In addition to this test, I performed likelihood-ratio tests of pooled (across contexts) and
QQ
restricted models, and test statistics are presented in table 7.4. Given these, we can at 
the 0.01 level reject the hypothesis that the parameter estimates of the hypothetical and 
real contexts come from the same population. The main hypothesis that marginal WTP 
differs between a hypothetical context and a real context not preceded by hypothetical 
choices is thus supported. Moreover, replicating the results by Carlsson and Martinsson 
(2001), we cannot reject the hypothesis that marginal WTP differs between hypothetical 
choices, and real-money choices made after hypothetical choices, suggesting that the 
latter may be a poor indicator of external validity.
Table 7.4. Likelihood-ratio tests of pooled and restricted models
Model comparison Test statistics
Hypothetical vs Real after hypothetical x l  =4.9488
Hypothetical vs Real directly x \  =16.9608 p<0.01
Real after hypothetical vs Real directly X l =5.7654
96 Thus, in the former situation the individual requires more income in order to make the same donation. 
The coefficient should be interpreted such as that a larger value o f this reflects a higher MWTP.
97 The MWTP for men are (1.40-0.82) = 0.58 in the hypothetical scenario, and (1.11-0.48) = 0.63 in the 
real scenario that follows after the hypothetical experiment.
98 Likelihood ratio test: X = -2[ln Lpooled -  (In Lrestrictedl + In Lrestricted2)] ~ %2
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7.6.2. Testing for the Influence o f Scale
The same regression as in the main model was run for those 4 respondents who were 
followed-up with real-money choices involving much larger monetary incentives. These 
respondents were chosen on the basis of previously made choices; one respondent with 
a MWTP close to the average MWTP in the original sample group, two with a MWTP 
slightly higher than the average, and one who had almost lexicographic preferences in 
favour of donations. These four respondents were contacted a couple of weeks after the 
original experiment and asked to perform a similar task. Since the degree of anonymity 
would naturally be lower in an experiment involving only four subjects, I performed this 
follow-up experiment on the internet through attached documents in an e-mail. In this 
way, I believe, the potential bias arising if respondents do not feel that their answers 
will be treated anonymously is largely reduced. In the model below, each choice set in 
the original as well as in follow-up setting is accounted for independently, which leaves 
us with 120 observations altogether. Two respondents became much less altruistic, 
while the remaining 2 respondents did not behave very differently compared to the case 
with smaller amounts of money.
Table 7.5. Influence of large-scale monetary incentives.
Variable Pooled sample Original scale Large scale
A 1.00* 1.00 1.00*
(2.47) (1.24) (2.24)
MWTPElephant 0.62 1.83** 0.68*
(1.90) (2.65) (2.18)
MWTPElephant - ■MWTPTurtle 0.03 0.003 0.06*
(1.71) (0.12) (2.21)
^O rig in a l scale 0.99*
(2.56)
Log-likelihood -73.048 -35.237 -36.454
n 120 60 60
Note: /-statistics are presented in brackets
** denotes significance on the 0.01 level; * denotes significance on the 0.05 level
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As illustrated by the table, estimated MWTP is substantially lower in the large-scale 
setting (0.68), compared to the average MWTP among the same respondents in the 
original setting (1.83). The dummy variable introduced in the pooled model to control 
for the overall difference between sample groups is furthermore statistically significant 
at the 0.05 level. Although being based on only 4 respondents here, the results still 
indicate that scale may be important, and it supports Hy
7.7. Conclusions
A frequently raised critique against the CVM, CEs, and other SPMs is that such 
approaches are likely to result in overestimation of the (environmental) benefits. The 
empirical results regarding this differ, however, and it appears incorrect to conclude that 
using a hypothetical survey-method would always overstate benefits. Furthermore, with 
the exception of Carlsson and Martinsson (2001), the overwhelming majority of efforts 
in order to test for this have been employed in applications of the CVM (e.g., Navrud, 
1992; Neill et al., 1994), and studies supporting the convergence of hypothetical and 
real WTP have mostly been conducted as within-subject tests (e.g., McClelland et al., 
1993; Carlsson and Martinsson, 2001)." This study is an application of CEs and follows 
the design developed by Carlsson and Martinsson (2001), with some important 
differences. In particular, I use a split-sample design that enables me to examine 
whether stated marginal WTP for the environmental project will influence subsequent 
real Marginal WTP (MWTP).
A choice model is developed in which people derive utility from their self-image, which 
depends on the degree to which the individual acts in accordance with her ethical 
beliefs, the honesty to herself, and in accordance with hypothetical statements made 
earlier. According to this model, people have an incentive to overstate their MWTP if a 
high value corresponds to the respondents’ ethical views, but not otherwise. It thus 
captures the hypothesis developed by Katz (1960) and Herek (1986) that attitudes serve 
multiple functions; rather than being solely outcome-related, these are also, among other
99 This is directly related to the validity of within-subject, as opposed to between-subject tests of 
embedding in CVM (e.g., Boyle eta l., 1994; Carson, 1997).
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factors, determined by value-expressive motives. The model further predicts that, due to 
the desire to behave consistently with respect to previously expressed responses and 
reduce conflicting behaviour, people’s MWTP in real-money experiments are affected 
upwards by previously stated high MWTP in a hypothetical experiment. Finally, the 
model predicts that the scale of monetary incentives will alter the results of real-money 
experiments, because the opportunity cost of maintaining a generous self-image is 
negligible when the amount of money involved is small, but presumably not so when 
these are substantially increased.
The results support these hypotheses, and are compatible with the proposed theoretical 
model, but incompatible with the conventional model typically used in the 
environmental valuation literature. It seems plausible to suggest that, depending on the 
context of valuation and how consequential responses are considered to be, certain goals 
and interests become more or less salient to the individual. In a hypothetical valuation 
scenario, the respondent is likely to be largely influenced by value-expressive motives 
(Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992), and in order to attain a self-image as a ‘good’ citizen 
contributing to a ‘good’ cause, this may lead them to provide high statements of WTP. 
This outcome is also likely to prevail in a context that involves real money if the 
individual has ‘committed’ herself to a certain response. The model suggested here 
appears reasonable on the basis of findings in social psychology, notably research on 
cognitive dissonance (e.g., Festinger, 1957), which hypothesises that people would not 
readily take inconsistent attitude positions, or positions that conflict with accomplished 
behaviour, particularly when this imperils the individual’s self concept as a moral and 
honest person (e.g., Aronson, 1992). Given the influence of previous statements of 
WTP, an implication is that within-subject tests of SPMs may not be appropriate 
procedures for examining external validity.
Perhaps more importantly, experiments with real money trade-offs, no matter if 
preceded by earlier hypothetical questions or not, serve as no guarantee that people’s 
utility (as a measure of well-being) will be adequately revealed when the good being 
valued has a strong ethical dimension, and the experimental scale differs from a real- 
world situation. In these situations, people still have an incentive to ‘buy’ a better self- 
image by providing responses compatible with a relatively larger MWTP. Thus, other
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motives than profit maximisation operate also when monetary incentives are introduced, 
and people may be reluctant not to contribute to the public good since they are not 
losing any money anyway. However, when these incentives are increased to a level that, 
I anticipate, will have a significant impact on respondents’ budgets, marginal WTP is 
significantly reduced. To conclude, when the opportunity cost of maintaining a high 
self-image is substantial, MWTP is likely to be lower, and therefore, the generalisation 
of small-scale experiments may be limited.
As a generalisation of the results, this study does not support the argument by Hanley et 
al. (1998) that CE’s would provide more accurate and valid welfare estimates than the 
CVM. Although not testing for commonly observed anomalies such as embedding, 
strategic behaviour and divergences between WTP and Willingness To Accept (WTA) 
measures, the lack of correspondence between hypothetical and real MWTP in between- 
subject tests suggests that the former are poor indicators of real economic commitments. 
No matter if CE’s do better on internal validity, the ability to generalise findings from 
the experimental laboratory to the contexts these are intended to approximate seems 
limited. However, such findings are not confined to stated preferences of environmental 
amenities, but have been the basis of a more general critique of experimental research 
(e.g., Gaskell, 1990; Lowenstein, 1999). Further research is warranted regarding to what 
extent alternative methodologies to the CVM, such as CE’s, are externally valid, and 
whether the unreasonably low internal validity found in many CV studies, compared to 
the majority of assessments in social research, may be improved through these 
approaches.
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8. Discussion and Conclusions
The Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) is applied in attempts to estimate the 
economic benefits of public goods in order to inform policy-decisions. Unlike 
conventional economic methodologies that extrapolate economic value from actual 
choices or behaviour, it is based on hypothetical market scenarios in which respondents 
are posed Willingness To Pay (WTP) questions about non-marketed goods and services, 
such as natural resources. Apart from circumventing the absence of markets, it has the 
advantage of also including ‘non-use’ values in responses, and is hence considered a 
‘catch-all’ approach that is assumed to capture all possible benefits involved, not only 
those that arise from a use of the resource. It further enables the valuation of anticipated 
but not yet realised changes in the good. Due to its potential merits, the methodology 
has become increasingly popular over the last decades and is by many economists seen 
as a powerful and viable tool of economic benefit estimation.
However, the validity of the CVM has been widely debated throughout the years (e.g., 
Mead, 1993; Diamond and Hausman, 1994; Hanemann, 1994; Carson et al., 1996a; 
Blarney, 1998; Kahneman et a l, 1999), and, as a result of the variety of anomalies that 
have been demonstrated in empirical research, there remains large scepticism regarding 
the possibility of assigning economic values to natural resources. Many of these 
anomalies and shortcomings were realised in early research, which was attentive to 
problems such as strategic behaviour, anchoring effects, sponsor bias, hypothetical bias, 
etc. The main concern among Contingent Valuation (CV) practitioners was therefore 
how these could be overcome by methodological refinements, argued on the basis of the 
assumption that people possess monetary values for all sorts of marketed and non­
marketed goods. However, a large body of research has challenged the assertion that the 
failure to assess valid and consistent welfare estimates is mainly due to flawed 
methodological procedures. The central theme of this objection is that CV responses 
may not be anchored in economic preferences, and as such represent something 
different than economic value. Thus, the latter perspective entails a shift in focus from 
methodological concerns to the basic nature of hypothetical economic value.
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The aim of this thesis has been to examine the content validity of economic estimates 
derived from the CVM and other Stated Preference Methods (SPMs). It thus had as its 
objective to investigate the extent to which assessed economic values for environmental 
amenities are ‘intuitively plausible*, and whether people’s interpretations of valuation 
scenarios correspond to the intended meaning by the researcher. These aspects have 
been largely ignored within the mainstream research on the CVM, which has been 
overly concerned with specific outcomes and how well data fit with theoretical 
assumptions in economics. Given that the economic model of human decision-making 
fails to explain why certain types of stated behaviour are observed, this thesis adopted a 
broader perspective on people’s responses in CV studies and similar contexts. In 
particular, it incorporated theoretical insights and notions in social psychology in order 
to illuminate the foundations of empirical anomalies, and that, it is envisaged, will help 
to improve our understanding of how and why people value the environment.
8.1. Summary of Main Findings
In order to fulfill the objectives of this research, four separate but theoretically and 
conceptually linked empirical studies were conducted. They centre on various key 
themes relevant to CV research, such as embedding, precision of economic value and 
correspondence between hypothetical and real WTP. The aim is to examine these 
aspects in contexts and in a manner that facilitate a discussion beyond (isolated) 
methodological issues, and which are not limited to how well data fit with economic 
theory. Methodologies and analysis are further different across the four case studies, 
which rely on mail-surveys, face-to-face interviews or experimental data, and 
combinations of these approaches. Both quantitative and qualitative analysis was 
performed. Finally, a number of different environmental resources that vary in 
complexity and familiarity were evaluated throughout the thesis.
8.1.1. Embedding Effects and Methodological Procedures
According to standard economic theory, economic value should be based solely on 
instrumental (or outcome-related) considerations among respondents. For instance, it
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should be related to the magnitude or extent of the resource being valued, how 
important and urgent the problem is in terms of environmental damage, how effective 
suggested environmental measures are, etc. However, empirical research has
demonstrated that CV respondents are often unresponsive to the scope of the
environmental resource being valued {e.g., Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992; Desvousges 
et al., 1993). These studies have shown that people are not willing to pay more for a 
larger provision of a particular good, and as a result, very similar WTP estimates have 
been assessed for amenities that vary greatly in scope. Another finding is that the same 
resource is assigned a higher value when it is valued on its own compared to a situation 
when it is valued within a larger package of (natural) goods (e.g., Strand and Taraldset, 
1991; Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992). These phenomena have by Kahneman and Ritov 
(1994) been termed perfect and regular embedding respectively. They indicate a non­
increasing utility function among respondents, and further that economic value is not 
independent of the inclusion of other alternatives in the valuation scenario.
A long-standing controversy in the CV literature has been what causes these anomalies. 
A central claim among opponents of the CV methodology is that respondents are 
‘inherently’ unresponsive to the characteristics of the amenity, and that value statements 
have a basis in other, largely irrelevant, factors (Diamond and Hausman, 1994; 
Kahneman et a l, 1999). However, the majority of studies providing evidence of perfect 
and regular embedding are rather different from a typical CV study. In particular, they 
use a design that does not follow the guidelines and recommendations set out by the
NOAA panel (Arrow et a l, 1993). As a consequence, CV proponents have been
inclined to believe that embedding, along with a number of other anomalies, are due to 
flawed methodological approaches, with the implicit message that these could be 
overcome with improved survey design and administration. Thus, no unequivocal 
answer has been provided in the literature regarding the validity of the CV methodology 
in this respect.
This study applies a more ‘rigorous’ design than what is normally the case among 
studies demonstrating embedding. Most importantly, the nature and characteristics of 
four different amenities (rain forests, endangered wild animals, urban air pollution, and 
global warming), including the causes and consequences of their deterioration, are
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clearly described in the valuation scenario. Moreover, credible interventions in order to 
prevent or improve each of these resources are presented. Hence, the study adopts an 
approach that is more similar to a typical CV study. It further employs between-subject 
tests of these anomalies, and is therefore different from studies that have rejected the 
embedding hypothesis, which mainly have relied on within-subject tests. The majority 
of respondents answered WTP questions associated with either one or simultaneously 
four environmental issues. In order to compare the responsiveness to scope of WTP 
with an alternative measure of environmental priorities, some respondents reported their 
attitudes toward the same four issues on the basis of a Categorical Rating (CR) format. 
Both these measures were derived using two different administration modes, either in 
the form of face-to-face interviews or through self-completed questionnaires.
The main findings are that neither an instrument of economic value nor a concept of 
attitude, as utilised here, are capable of making the respondents responsive to scope. 
No significant difference in WTP was found between minor and major scope for any of 
the issues. The results also indicate that embedding is independent of how the 
magnitudes are specified (i.e., whether absolute magnitudes, percentage, number of 
events, or verbal cues are used). The weak relation between expressed economic value 
and the character of the amenity was also supported by small variations in mean WTP 
across the four issues. The presumption that a measure of economic value should be 
psychometrically inferior to a more traditional notion of attitude, as proposed by 
Kahneman and Ritov (1994), is however challenged as neither instrument showed 
responsiveness to scope. Finally, a considerable part-whole effect was demonstrated for 
one of the environmental issues being valued (i.e., global warming), which was 
assigned a twofold value when evaluated on its own, compared to when evaluated as 
part of four issues.
Perfect and regular embedding may thus not be easily corrected for by improved 
methodologies. Their occurrence further appears reasonable according to theoretical 
predictions in (social) psychology. For instance, it has been argued that answers to CV 
studies should be understood as attitude expressions rather than economic preferences 
(Kahneman et al., 1999). Since these types of constructs may not be based exclusively 
on the physical characteristics of the particular amenity, insensitivity to scope is likely
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to occur. Furthermore and apart from the failure to take into account budget constraints 
and other consumption alternatives when only being presented one amenity, results are 
partly consistent with Thaler's (1990) hypothesis that people have ‘mental accounts’ for 
various categories of goods that are not easily separated into specific events. The 
particular amenity being valued will in this case represent a more inclusive good, such 
as all environmental problems, or public goods in general. Nevertheless, the above 
notions cannot completely account for the results, since the total value of several 
resources was significantly larger than the value obtained for just one of these, which 
would not be the case if responses were influenced solely by value-expressive motives.
8.1.2. People’s Representations o f Contingent Valuation Scenarios
The repeated demonstration of empirical anomalies, including embedding, has resulted 
in a divide regarding what WTP responses in CV studies actually measure. The basic 
presumption among CV proponents is that there exists a set of coherent and well- 
defined preferences for ‘all’ kinds of private and public goods, including natural 
resources. Hence, the task for the CV researcher is to design methodologies and pose 
questions that properly and completely reveal these preferences. This paradigm of 
thought has also lead to a particular perspective in explaining results. By and large, 
explanations have been rather ‘reductionistic’ in their character, pinpointing in detail 
isolated (economic) phenomena, such as income and substitution effects, whereas the 
broader issues of how people interpret and make sense of CV questions have been 
widely ignored. CV advocates have in this sense been more interested in the product, 
rather than the process, of economic thought.
This thesis argues that, apart from people’s limited ability to provide valid and reliable 
answers when questions are adequately interpreted (Harris et al., 1989), there may be 
more fundamental problems involved by showing that respondents in CV studies 
sometimes put the valuation question in a different context than that which is intended 
by the researcher. In order to evaluate this notion, a think-aloud study using concurrent 
protocols was conducted, where respondents were urged to express what they were 
thinking while considering and answering a valuation question relating to global 
warming. In addition, two focus-groups, each consisting of four subjects, were run.
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Two main findings emerged from this analysis. The first was that people, albeit 
interpreting the task ‘properly’, tend to discuss largely unrelated issues, such as their 
opinion regarding their own responsibility for the problem, their view on the link 
between economics and the natural environment, their belief or (mis)trust in the 
environmental intervention, etc. The other more problematic result was that some 
people appear to base their answers directly on such apects, without paying attention to 
the environmental resource per se. Sometimes they even respond with a WTP response, 
despite partly or completely misunderstanding the question, and regardless of their lack 
of consent toward the rationale of an economic valuation. Finally and as a result of the 
above, people expressed a large degree of uncertainty about reported economic value.
These effects may explain many of the anomalies discussed in the CV literature. For 
instance, perfect embedding may be explained by the fact that respondents’ mental 
representations of the scope of the good are different from that described in the 
valuation scenario (Schwarz, 1997). It further provides a basis for the fact that WTP 
estimated for a wide variety of amenities are rather similar in magnitude (Kahneman 
and Ritov, 1994). The study discussed here, however, draws attention to a more 
fundamental problem by indicating that people’s basic representation of the valuation 
question may deviate from that intended by the CV researcher. They tend to interpret 
this as reflecting what their view on how much everyone through the tax system ought 
to pay for environmental preservation, or how effective environmental measures in 
general are, which are clearly different inquires from how much each specific resource, 
according to the magnitudes as specified, is personally worth to them.
What also emerges from the analysis is that the respondents do not perceive the 
valuation scenario as particularly realistic; they do not readily believe in the usefulness 
or feasibility of the suggested programme and have difficulties in perceiving the link 
between stated hypothetical value, actual payments and policy implementation. This is a 
different issue from their eventual scepticism toward the success of the proposed 
environmental intervention, since the latter is a specific aspect of the valuation scenario 
that may persist despite a complete understanding of the procedure. Another insight is 
that people in focus groups tend to more openly express their scepticism toward the 
valuation task, compared to when interviewed on their own. It seems that people in this
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context are not as vulnerable to the researcher’s interpretation of what would be a 
sensible approach toward solving the problem at stake, since they may find support for 
their criticism from other participants.
8.1.3. Precision o f Economic Value
That people provide answers in surveys and interviews, despite their lack of knowledge 
regarding the issue (Converse, 1970), and regardless of uncertainty about their ‘sincere’ 
opinion (Nadeau and Niemi, 1995), has been demonstrated in other areas of social 
research. In the previous study it was indicated that people will state economic values 
for an environmental project or issue, but there seems to be a large degree of uncertainty 
regarding what would exactly reflect their WTP. The third empirical chapter examined 
this type of uncertainty or ambivalence, operationalised as the difference between 
various thresholds of certainty regarding the likelihood that the individual will actually 
pay the WTP bid presented. Hence, rather than being expressed as a point estimate, 
WTP is measured as falling within a bounded range that is hypothesised to include an 
unknown ‘true’ estimate of economic value. ,
Furthermore, having illuminated people’s misrepresentation of the valuation scenario 
when this relates to a rather complex and unfamiliar amenity, an interesting question is 
to what extent citizens can provide precise estimates for more tangible issues, for which 
the valuation task should be perceived as less novel. Specifically, in this study the 
valuation scenario was presented as a voluntary contribution for saving the African 
Elephant through a campaign run by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF). The study 
further made use of different elicitation formats. Three variants of a Polychotomous 
Choice (PC) format were applied; one which posed various questions aimed to measure 
the influence of multidimensional attributes that define economic value; one that 
allowed respondents some time to think about the issue before responding; and a more 
simple format similar to the ones used in previous research (Welsh and Poe, 1998). 
Thus, contextual factors of valuation that have been discussed in the literature (Vatn and 
Bromley, 1994; Blarney et al., 1999) were more carefully examined here. These formats 
were finally compared to a standard Open-Ended (OE) valuation question. The study 
was performed as a class-room experiment.
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The results indicate that people’s decisions will be different when they are given time to 
think about the valuation task. More specifically, WTP estimates are significantly more 
precise among this group of respondents. The ambivalence regions, measured as the 
difference between a bid that the individual is sure of paying and one that she is sure not 
to pay, is less than half as wide among respondents given some time to think about the 
issue, compared to the other response formats with certainty thresholds. No definite 
reasons were provided for why these results occur, but it is envisaged that this process 
enables respondents to put the valuation task in a broader context, whereby competing 
public issues, personal responsibility, and budget constraints are more fully realised. 
Between the other two sub-samples, no statistically significant difference in WTP was 
found, although the respondents who were responding to multidimensional aspects of 
the environmental issue seemed slightly more likely to provide a ‘yes’ response.
On the basis of speculation in the CV literature (Vatn and Bromley, 1994), a main 
hypothesis of this thesis is that a consultation with friends and relatives will reduce 
people’s ambivalence over their WTP. According to a qualitative analysis conducted in 
this study, a discussion with friends and relatives was conducted among the majority of 
respondents given the opportunity to do so. This interaction further seemed helpful in 
establishing an opinion and in deciding how much the environmental issue should be 
valued in monetary terms. However, this result is by no means unambiguous, and the 
study does not reveal exactly how frequent or extensive this discussion was, nor the 
nature of it. Thus, it does not explicitly provide an answer as to whether a group 
discussion generates altogether different decision strategies than in an individual 
context (Kocher and Sutter, 2000), or if it evokes different motives and values as 
hypothesised by Vatn and Bromley (1994). Nevertheless, it has previously been shown 
in this thesis that opinions seem to be less influenced by respondents’ anticipation 
regarding what would be an adequate answer in the face of the researcher when this is 
evaluated in a social context. This indicates that respondents to some extent rely on 
fellow respondents in their decision-making.
Another important result from this chapter is that WTP assessed through a standard OE 
valuation question was substantially larger than WTP assessed through the PC format 
with certainty thresholds. Both the mean and median estimates of the former are 4-5
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times larger than the estimates of the latter. In addition, the nature of the distribution of 
responses was different between these formats, and the frequency of zero and low 
responses of WTP was higher in the PC format. Thus, when posed an OE elicitation 
question, respondents seem to implicitly adopt a much lower level of certainty, and 
consequently they are likely to report a figure that they are rather unsure of actually 
paying. The estimated welfare effect will therefore be higher when assessed through the 
OE format, and it may give an overly optimistic picture of the general level of support 
among the public for the environmental resource being valued.
8.1.4. Hypothetical and Real Willingness To Pay
Due to the number of problems and empirical anomalies that have been demonstrated 
with the CV methodology, Choice Experiments (CEs) have received prominent 
attention in recent years as an alternative approach to economic benefit estimation. In 
CEs, people are presented with a number of choice sets, each which include two or 
more alternative scenarios that the individual is asked to choose between. The scenarios 
are characterised by some attributes attached to the resource(s) being valued, such as 
how much of it that will be preserved, in what way it will be provided, and how much 
the suggested intervention will cost. Hence, it is hypothesised that the individual makes 
her choice on the basis of these attributes, which determine the benefits accrued. Hanley 
et al (1998) discuss several potential advantages of CEs compared to the CVM, 
including closer resemblance of real markets, easiness of valuing attributes rather than 
whole commodities, avoidance of yea-saying, and a built-in test of sensitivity to scope.
Chapter seven conducted CEs in order to estimate the WTP of two endangered wild 
animals. The overarching aim was to investigate if CEs suffer the same shortcomings as 
CVM. In particular, the study examines the correspondence between hypothetical and 
real WTP, the latter evaluated according to the actual payments people make for the 
amenities presented. A theoretical model is developed where people derive utility from 
their self-image, which depends on the degree to which the individual acts in 
accordance with her ethical beliefs, honesty to herself, and in accordance with earlier 
made statements. According to this model, people have an incentive to overstate their 
marginal WTP if a high value corresponds to the respondents’ ethical views, but not
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otherwise. The model also predicts that, arising from the desire to behave consistently 
with respect to previously expressed responses and reduce conflicting behaviour, 
people’s marginal WTP in real-money experiments is affected upwards by previously 
stated high marginal WTP in a hypothetical experiment. A split-sample design is 
employed in order to test this hypothesis. Finally, the model predicts that the scale of 
monetary incentives will alter the results of real-money experiments, since the 
opportunity cost of maintaining a generous self-image is negligible when the amount of 
money involved is small, but presumably not so when monetary trade-offs are 
substantially increased.
The results were compatible with these predictions. Although not claiming that the 
model here is necessarily ‘true’, since people’s behavior is undoubtedly influenced by 
other motives, it was nevertheless shown that the results are incompatible with the 
conventional models typically used in the environmental valuation literature. 
Theoretical notions in social psychology, particularly relating to cognitive dissonance 
and people’s reluctance to behave inconsistently across contexts (Festinger, 1957), and 
their desire to reassert a positive self-image (Katz, 1960), also support this model. The 
implications of the study are firstly that within-subject tests of SPMs may not be 
appropriate for examining external validity. Furthermore, and more importantly, not 
even real-money experiments, without earlier hypothetical statements, seem to properly 
reflect people’s utility (as a measure of well-being) when the good to be valued has a 
strong ethical dimension, together with an experimental scale that differs from a real- 
world situation. In such situations, people still have a strong incentive to ‘buy’ an 
improved self-image by providing a larger marginal WTP.
When explaining survey-responses for non-use values in the environmental valuation 
literature the most common addition to the standard model is based on either pure 
(solely utility-based) or paternalistic (e.g., environment-focused) altruism (Hanemann, 
1994; McConnell, 1997). However, such models cannot explain the results obtained 
here since there is nothing in these assumptions that would explain either the 
discrepancy between real and hypothetical WTPs, or the influence of previously 
expressed preferences. The same applies to (social) commitments (Sen, 1977) and 
genuine altruism (Edwards, 1992; Johansson-Stenman, 1998), where it is assumed that
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people do not solely maximize their own utility, but also consider other elements, such 
as others’ well-being, as intrinsic determinants of their actions. There is now a rapidly 
growing literature in experimental economics on social preferences that can explain the 
often large observed departures from pure self-interest in terms of monetary payoffs. 
For example, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) argue in 
favour of various forms of difference or inequality aversion to explain observed 
behaviour in game-theoretical experiments. Rabin (1993), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) 
and Chamess and Rabin (2000) hypothesise, based on the same and similar 
experiments, that fairness and reciprocity are also important factors.
Given that self-image is an argument in the utility function, these explanations appear 
reasonable. Presumably, most people would like to see themselves as defenders, or at 
least supporters, of fairness, and many people probably find it more pleasant being in 
favour of equality rather inequality. However, an implication of the model here is that 
the influence of such social preferences (fairness, equality, etc.) in these experiments 
may be exaggerated compared to real-world behaviour. The money involved is typically 
not only small, but the experimental situation per se may induce people to think in terms 
of ‘what kind of person am I?’ to a larger extent than they would do otherwise. In other 
words, depending on the particular context of valuation (i.e., a hypothetical versus a real 
scenario), certain values and motives become more salient. I therefore believe that it is 
important to additionally consider various kinds of unselfish behaviour, like the above 
authors who assume that people are not as selfish and greedy as the standard models 
predict. However, at the same time, they may not be as unselfish, or concerned with 
principles of fairness and equality, as some recent experimental results seem to suggest.
8.2. Caveats and Limitations
Although on the whole being designed to remedy some of the shortcomings of previous 
research, either arising from their specific methodological approaches, or due to 
somewhat narrow interests among researchers, a piece of research like this naturally has 
limitations of its own. The most important of these is that the thesis examines only a 
few aspects of validity, for which reason it should by no means be considered a 
‘complete’ account of relevant problems of CVM and other SPMs. For obvious reasons,
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a number of research enquires had to be left out. Notwithstanding its limited scope, I 
still believe that the thesis captures some of the most conceptually important issues 
surrounding the CV controversy, some of which have been extensively discussed in the 
previous literature, some of which have not. The issues surveyed and the way in which 
anomalies are investigated also facilitate an investigation into what lies behind people’s 
answers in hypothetical valuation scenarios, allowing us to put the results in a broader 
theoretical framework where perspectives outside economics may be considered.
Secondly, in mail-surveys, interviews, and experiments, students are primarily used as 
the targeted group of respondents. Due to their specific socio-economic characteristics, 
they may not be representative of the broader population. While acknowledging the lack 
of generality that this implies, the purpose of this thesis was not to generalise dollar 
estimates of specific environmental amenities, but to examine how various experimental 
conditions affect the character, stability and size of WTP. Hence, likewise other 
research with similar objectives, it is the comparability between various sub-groups of 
respondents that is the crucial element. I am inclined to argue that this fundamental 
criterion for validating the results is even better satisfied than it would be in a case that 
involved subjects with different backgrounds and characteristics. Given that I am 
interested in the cognitive limitations, strategies and motivations among people, and 
how these vary across different contexts, a problem would only arise if we have reason 
to believe that the targeted group of respondents are more vulnerable to such factors 
than the remaining population. Taking into account the fact that more knowledgeable 
individuals are generally less reactive to persuasive communication and experimental 
manipulations by the researcher (Wood et al., 1985; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986), and 
assuming that students are more knowledgeable than the general population, we would 
on the contrary expect that the anomalies demonstrated here would be less pronounced 
for this group of respondents.
Thirdly, as discussed previously, a major problem of validating results and their causes 
is that different CV studies tend to use different study-designs and methodological 
approaches. This is particularly obvious between studies conducted by proponents and 
opponents of the methodology. Although the NOAA panel has established various 
guidelines and recommendations for conducting reliable CV studies (Arrow et al.,
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1993), these are not indisputable, and they are further focused on how to estimate actual 
WTP estimates, not how to validate these. As a result, there is no uniform benchmark to 
which the methodological approach in this thesis can be judged. The aim of this thesis 
was to apply designs that closely follow those proposed by the NOAA panel and the 
majority of CV practitioners, thereby avoiding some of the criticism that has been 
frequently raised against studies demonstrating various problems of the CVM. At the 
same time, established procedures of psychological research that are used in order to 
validate theoretical predictions are adopted. Thus, I have strived to pay attention to 
methodological recommendations from various fields and interests of research, with the 
underlying aim of making results comparable.
Finally, the amenities valued in this thesis have in common that they are global 
resources that involve large non-use values. The issues evaluated in the early chapters 
are also quite complex and unfamiliar. An anticipated criticism would therefore be that 
findings are not valid for environmental resources or public goods in general. Admitting 
that this may be so, the amenities covered still vary in their character and complexity, 
although on the whole they may not be considered as the most tangible. However, this is 
neither the case for the majority of CV studies, which have as their aim to estimate non­
use values of broad issues, and the objective here is to critically examine the validity of 
such studies. What the thesis argues is that the endeavour to assign economic values to 
natural resources for which environmental qualities and functions are difficult to 
foresee, involves a number of problems and is rarely a straightforward task. No overall 
attempts are made to generalise findings to more well-defined amenities, or to cases 
when the valuation task is less novel and more easily comprehended.
8.3. Implications and Directions for Future Research
In the following sections I will discuss the implications of this research. These take the 
form of either recommendations for the estimation of real economic benefits by CV 
practitioners and how these should or could be accounted for by policy makers, or as 
procedures for validating results and existent methodologies. Emphasis will be put on 
insights and perspectives that have been largely ignored in the literature, but which may 
hopefully enlighten the CV research.
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8.3.1. Affective Processes o f Valuation
The results of this thesis replicate the findings of Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) and 
others by indicating that statements of WTP seem to represent attitudes rather than 
economic preferences. As attitude expressions, WTP comprises other factors than those 
that are the target of Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA). Apart from reflecting a desire to 
gain approval from the interviewer, they also serve a value expressive (or symbolic) 
function that mediates the need for self-approval and self-realisation. Kahneman and 
Knetsch (1992), and similarly Andreoni (1989), hypothesise that people provide 
estimates of WTP in order to acquire a sense of moral satisfaction, or ‘warm glow’, 
from contributing to a good cause. Thus, CV scenarios are likely to evoke an emotional 
response toward preserving the environment (Kahneman et al., 1999). Support for this 
hypothesis is provided by theoretical notions developed by Katz (1960) and Herek 
(1986), which acknowledge that attitudes serve many distinct functions apart from 
being instrumentally oriented.
The problem with value expressive functions (or affective processes of valuation) is that 
attitude reports are independent of and insensitive to rational arguments in the valuation 
scenario, such as the scope and extent of the amenity being valued. As argued in the 
theoretical chapter of this thesis, the major problem here is that the fundamental 
objective of CBA is to reflect the choices people would make on the basis of exactly 
such characteristics, not the affective value of objects considered one at the time. If 
economic values captured in hypothetical valuation scenarios are only loosely related to 
the particular amenity being valued, they should not be interpreted as a measure 
reflecting its relative importance. Moreover, the affective response may not be confined 
to the amenity described in the valuation scenario, but may incorporate and represent a 
more inclusive class of goods, or a prototype of this class, such as the environment in 
general.100 Thus, what is essentially reflected in responses is something different than 
what the policy intervention encompasses.
100 The latter exemplifies the representative heuristic developed by Kahneman et al. (1982), implying that 
people tend to base their judgement on an event that is familiar to them (i.e., ‘the environment reminds 
me of the depletion of the rain forest in South America I heard on the news the other day’).
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Value-expressive functions are likely to be most prominent on occasions when the 
valuation is not perceived as consequential by the respondents. If they do not see the 
forthcoming policy intervention as particularly feasible, affective processes are more 
likely to be pronounced since their answers are not anticipated to have any (major) 
impact on policy decisions anyway, and the question is if we can expect respondents to 
be responsive to relevant factors if they do not take the task seriously enough. 
Furthermore, people need to realise the environmental functions of the natural resource. 
Given that the benefits of amenities most commonly evaluated in CV studies are quite 
unforeseeable, they are unlikely to make an informed judgement regarding these. Apart 
from imposing important restrictions on CBA, value-expressive motives also explain 
many of the observed anomalies in CV research. Focusing on the results of this thesis, 
we may firstly argue that insensitivity to scope and part-whole effects arises due to 
respondents’ failure to confine their answers to instrumental considerations. 
Furthermore, direct evidence is provided from conducted CEs; in a hypothetical context, 
in which choices and statements may be perceived as less consequential, value- 
expressive motives become more salient than in a context involving real payments. 
Responses are also likely to be less precise if the benefits and features upon which 
responses should be based are unknown or obscured. Overall, such statements are likely 
to be less predictive of future behaviour (Krosnick, 1986), and therefore, less relevant 
for economic policy analysis.
8.3.2. Comprehension o f the Valuation Task
Before people can express their preferences, they must understand the structure, content 
and purpose of the valuation task. Furthermore, they need to figure our what their 
options are. In a CV study, people are asked to report an economic value of something 
that they have presumably never thought of before in monetary terms. This is not to say 
that they do not realise that the benefits of public goods somehow must be balanced 
against their costs, but they are unfamiliar with the particular question raised, and they 
may as a result not perceive the suggested basis of policy decisions as particularly 
sensible or realistic. Fischhoff (1991) suggests that people have well-defined 
preferences over only a very limited set of goods, and when posed a WTP question on 
an unfamiliar issue, they are forced to construct a value on the spot. Schkade and Payne
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(1994) and Vadnjal and O'Connor (1994) show that this construct suffers from a number 
of problems, from being based on irrelevant factors, to just being made up by 
respondents in a guessing game, thereby resulting in the registration of ‘non-attitudes’.
The construal processes involved in interpreting survey questions, interviews and 
experimental inquiries have been extensively studied in decision sciences {e.g., Gregory 
et al., 1993; Schkade and Payne, 1994; Fischhoff et al., 1999). The major discovery is 
that people interpret tasks in simpler, more complicated, or just different ways than 
investigators assume, but rarely in exactly the way they are required to by the 
researcher. Furthermore, although interpreting the task correctly, a number of aspects 
surrounding the valuation task will influence the answer elicited, some of which are not 
directly relevant (Fischhoff et al., 1999). For instance, in a CV study, respondents are 
likely to reflect on the basic purpose of the inquiry, who is sponsoring this, who will be 
responsible for its implementation, their (mis)trust in involved parties, the nature of the 
transaction, what the notion ‘household opinion’ entails, etc. At the same time, relevant 
factors are sometimes ignored or forgotten.101 People also often rely on a pre-defined 
mental representation of the valuation task in their struggle to find out what the 
investigator is aiming for (Schwarz, 1997).
Such construal processes of preference assessment are rarely paid adequate attention to 
in CV research. They are merely considered as a means to an end, and the general idea 
is that people will interpret the CV question exactly as presented, and any 
misunderstanding of this is attributed to a lack of specification in the valuation scenario. 
Thus, some true value is presupposed. However, as the above accounts and the findings 
of this thesis imply, deviations from intended purposes are not easily corrected for. 
Normally in survey research we choose to live with the various anomalies arising from 
respondents (mis)interpretation of the questions asked, being aware of that the latter do 
not necessarily reflect exactly what they are intended to measure. In CV studies this 
problem is likely to be more pronounced, since they present an issue of which people
101 For instance, Fischhoff et al. (1999) found that on average less than half of the respondents in their 
study remembered details of the valuation scenario, such as how much of the resource will be restored, 
how effective the restoration will be, how the programme will be paid far and who will pay for it.
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may only have a vague idea of its causes and consequences, and that further posit a 
procedure of dealing with this that is not yet ‘institutionalised’, that is, which does not 
comply with established (democratic) principles of public policy-making.
In order to make the valuation task real enough to answer, respondents are, intentionally 
or unintentionally, trying to put this in a context that makes sense to them and which 
complies with what a survey or opinion poll would normally ask for, such as their 
opinion as to how much effort society in general should spend on solving environmental 
problems, who should take responsibility for these, how they should be paid for and so 
on. Similarly, they are searching their experiences of how public issues are normally 
decided upon in society, which guides them in their interpretation of the questions 
posed. The respondents are thus asking questions about the questions posed by the 
researchers. Unfortunately, rather than being perfectly clear toward the researcher about 
their uncertainty, they are sometimes inventing their own answers to these questions, 
because, after all, the questions are in fact asked by an ‘eminent’ researcher and they 
must therefore, in one way or the other, be meaningful and warranted (Schwarz, 1994). 
As a result, people may evaluate a proposal differently from the one being the target of 
the inquiry, or may misinterpret its purposes, which leads us to conclude that CV 
responses should not always be taken at face value.
8.3.3. Contextual and Social Factors
It is envisaged that a discussion with friends and relatives may help respondents to 
develop and stabilise opinions toward the research inquiry. The general conclusion of 
previous research that has looked into the role of social processes on decision-making is 
that people who communicate regularly think similarly (Zimbardo and Leippe, 1991). 
People further rely on ‘significant others’ in order to establish new opinions or validate 
previously established views. Apart from friends and relatives, people are influenced by 
the media and other sources of reference in their decision-making. These sources divert 
the attention of people, they suggest what would be a reasonable answer, and they make 
people more confident of their opinions by transferring their confidence in authorities 
into their own judgements. Theories of social impact, social influence and social 
comparison (e.g., Kelman, 1958; Fazio, 1979; Latane, 1981; Nowak et al., 1990) all
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acknowledge the role of social interaction in the establishment of opinions and 
preferences. In economics, the impact of other individuals has been explored in theories 
of herd behaviour and information cascades (Bikhchandani et a l, 1992), which entail 
that people’s buying behaviour is largely determined by how other people act in the 
market place. In an individual CV interview, respondents thereby lack guidance that 
they would otherwise have and find useful in their everyday decision-making.
It is somehow odd that the dynamics of social processes and the role of dialogue in 
formulating opinions regarding what in the end would be a proper action to take in 
relation to environmental issues have been virtually ignored in the CV literature. On the 
basis of research conducted by Sen (1987) and others, who emphasise the difference 
between decisions in the market place and moral commitments in a social world, and 
who subscribe to the basic argument that people do not respond to CV surveys as self- 
oriented consumers, but rather as citizens concerned with fairness and equality, we 
ought to ask why preferences are typically assessed in individual contexts and not 
through collective discussions. Assuming that social norms, conventions and shared 
values are necessary components in helping the individual to provide reasonable 
answers to surveys about public issues, these should be conducted in an environment 
that facilitates such factors, and that frame the valuation task in an appropriate way.
Similar to Vatn and Bromley (1994), this thesis argues that communicative processes 
are vital to developing an understanding of the valuation task, to decide what is worth 
valuing, and why that is so. It posits that there is a functional meaning of the 
relationship between society and the natural environment that is unlikely to be 
completely or properly explored in an individual context. This may also explain why 
respondents, in their efforts to understand the valuation task, tend to discuss more 
general issues of the link and conflicts between environmental preservation and social 
progression, rather than reflecting upon its individual worth. It is not the main objective 
of this research to decide in what particular contexts WTP is most appropriately 
assessed, and whether other than utilitarian considerations should be (completely) 
excluded from responses, but it nevertheless demonstrates that results are sensitive to 
various contextual factors in a more general sense, such as whether WTP is elicited on 
the spot or assessed after the respondents have been given the opportunity to reflect
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upon their opinions, or whether statements are hypothetical or involve real payments. 
Future attempts at assessing economic values of public goods should be more attentive 
to such contextual factors and investigate how and to what extent these influence 
estimated welfare effects.
8.3.4. Rational Decision-Making and Philosophical Concerns
Assuming that CV studies and other SPMs could be designed in ways that entice 
respondents to behave in a satisfactory way and that would fulfil the requirements of 
economic impact analysis, we are still left with two problems. Firstly, the use of CV 
studies to make judgements of public goods implies that the more well-off would have 
considerably more to say, because they could afford to state (and later pay) a higher 
value than other citizens, and thereby their opinions would be assigned greater weight. 
However, such criterion of policy making is likely to result in resentment from people, 
not only from the less well-off because they may feel that their decision power is 
hampered, but also from the public generally. This is due to the fact that most people, in 
addition to purely selfish motives, are concerned also about morale, loyalty and a sense 
of fairness. Thus, there are competing claims between utilities, rights, social contracts, 
core values, etc., whereas WTP is only indirectly, and sometimes quite weakly, related 
to the first of these. Sen (1977) illustrates this aspect with an amusing example. The 
following tells the story of two boys who find two apples, one large and one small;
Boy A tells boy B, “You choose.” B immediately picks the larger apple. A is upset and 
permits himself to remark that this was grossly unfair. “Why?” asks B. “Which one would 
you have chosen, if you were to choose rather than me?” “The smaller one, o f course,” A 
replies. B is now triumphant: “Then what are you complaining about? That’s the one you’ve 
got!” (Sen, 1977; p. 328)
Thus, there is often a contrast between commitments and (purely) selfish motives 
concerning issues that involve fellow citizens, and market-based decision-making is 
therefore not easily transferable to non-market domains. Apart from large difficulties of 
adequately capturing the latter, embodied in economic value, the question is whether 
such a criterion of natural preservation is appropriate. I believe that the CV research has 
progressed without paying full attention to this aspect. A more sensible approach would
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be to firstly discuss the meaningfulness of economic value in public policy analysis, and 
whether welfare effects should be estimated on the basis of survey results. In this 
process it is important to involve the public, which arguably should be given an 
opportunity to express their opinions toward how and on what basis environmental 
policies should be shaped. As is otherwise common in a democratic society, a political 
discussion should precede implementation of specific approaches to public policy­
making in order to make these ‘democratically legitimate’, and to provide collective 
frames of meanings for environmental values and policy. Although citizens may 
consent to the inclusion of economic welfare effects, they are then better equipped to 
put forthcoming CV studies in an adequate context, which would lead them to interpret 
questions as intended.
Secondly, whereas real world decisions and behaviour are clouded by emotions and a 
lack of clearly defined objectives, surveys and experiments often state or hint what the 
respondents should pay attention to and what they should disregard, thus suggesting 
what would be a reasonable response. For example, let us assume that it is possible to 
design a ‘perfect’ CV scenario that would direct the respondents into only considering 
the resource being valued, thereby minimising the impact of symbolic value 
expressions. However, if people in a real-world situation do find the broader context 
important (i.e., the environment in general), possibly due to the moral implications of 
the policy intervention, would it be correct to disregard such motivations and 
considerations among the public?
As demonstrated in this thesis, we may equally end up in an opposite situation, that is, 
that people in the survey and experimental context exaggerate or distort statements in 
order to appear as ‘good’ and fair citizens in the eyes of the researcher, but when acting 
in a real world context, they are indeed rather selfish and less concerned with ethical 
and moral principles. The problem of generalising results is common for all kinds of 
experimental research, but whereas this normally is focused on cognitive effects and the 
impact of experimental conditions in order to learn about the nature of human behaviour 
and decision-making, the purpose of SPMs is actually to estimate ‘true’ and real world 
opinions. Therefore, my recommendation to CV practitioners is that they should be 
more aware of the caveats and limitations discussed in mainstream survey research.
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8.3.5. Methodological Limitations and Recommendations
The elicitation of affective value processes and misunderstanding of valuation scenarios 
should preferably be avoided, or at least minimised, in CV studies. One way of 
achieving this goal is to confine the measurement of economic values to tangible and 
familiar issues, which is likely to result in less novel valuation tasks. I agree with 
Bjomstad and Kahn (1996) that before attempts at estimating non-use values are 
pursued, we ought to investigate how well people respond to hypothetical valuation 
scenarios that mostly or exclusively capture use values. Implicit in this argument is the 
idea that focus should be placed on amenities that respondents have a moderate 
experience or knowledge of, and that somehow have an established link with ordinary 
economic decision-making. Not only should people’s attitudes toward such goods be 
more developed, thereby making it easier for them to provide unbiased value estimates. 
It is also more likely that respondents will genuinely believe in the suggested 
environmental program and comprehend the link between hypothetical statements of 
WTP, subsequent actual payments (either through taxes, fees or voluntary 
contributions), and policy implementation. If the valuation scenario is perceived as 
realistic in this sense, respondents should be more aware of and motivated by 
instrumental consideration in their responses, whereby various anomalies and the 
influence of contextual factors are reduced.
The problem of assessing valid WTP estimates for more complex amenities that involve 
large non-use values, which are un-avoidable if the CVM is to fulfil its objectives, does 
not imply despair about the possibility of using economic value as an aid in policy 
making. Certainly it is useful, and even if people are motivated by emotional processes 
in their responses to CV studies, such motivations may still provide some valuable 
information regarding what the targeted amenity is worth to them, which in the long-run 
have implications for what is worth preserving and what is not. However, it should not 
be the only input to policy-making as some committed CV practitioners seem to 
suggest. Rather, it should be considered as one of several criteria, weighted along with 
professional advice, expert judgements and the outcome of other democratic decision 
processes. Considering that decisions in other areas of public policy-making, such as 
health care and education, are not (or at least rarely) made according to principles of
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consumer sovereignty, one may wonder why it should be the only basis as far as 
environmental resources are concerned. Policy makers need also be aware that, rather 
than representing point estimates or ‘true attitudes’ that exclusively reflect all 
dimensions involved, assessed economic vales reveal a balance of considerations among 
people who strive to resolve multiple and often conflicting opinions in making a 
summary judgement (Zaller and Feldman, 1992).
An approach toward remedying, or at least make these limitations explicit, is to 
introduce methodological approaches that capture the motivations behind WTP, which 
enables an analysis of whether WTP statements pass as economic value as defined by 
utilitarian principles. The disentanglement of value processes will also reveal to what 
extent respondents understand the valuation task, if they agree to the suggested 
proposal, and whether they perceive this to be realistic and feasible. Apart from the 
design of specific items in questionnaires that are asked subsequent to the valuation 
question, respondents should be encouraged to ‘think aloud’ while being confronted 
with this. Concurrent verbal protocols are used extensively in psychological research 
when investigating perspectives and decision-making among lay people, and there 
should be a lot to gain from importing these tools to the techniques of environmental 
valuation. On the basis of the results from verbal reports, more informed judgements 
regarding the validity of WTP statements can be made, which either could be 
disqualified if there is a lack of a fundamental understanding of underlying purposes, or 
adjusted when ‘merely’ specific attributes of valuation scenarios are misrepresented.
Such approaches are finally valuable in order to judge what type of issues are well 
suited for economic analysis, and in what particular contexts economic values may be 
estimated. It should also be helpful in order to distinguish between various (categories 
of) respondents, because it may well be that whereas many individuals do not have any 
meaningful attitudes at all in these contexts as suggested by Converse (1970), others, 
particularly those who are more involved in the public issue being valued, may possess 
(fairly) well-represented and stable values toward this. Researchers are for similar 
purposes encouraged to perform adequate manipulation checks, such as controlling for 
respondents’ interpretation of the amenity, including the extent and effectiveness of 
proposed interventions. Between-subject tests of anomalies should be employed in these
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efforts since it has been indicated that within-subject tests are not sufficient, nor always 
appropriate, to validate results. Generally speaking, CV practitioners are urged to be 
more attentive to the fact that some outcomes in CV studies are behavioural regularities 
that cannot be attributed to insufficient or improper valuation techniques, and a future 
avenue of research is to investigate exactly what these are, for which amenities, and for 
which individuals they are likely to be present.102
8.4. Concluding Remarks
Over a decade ago, Peterson et al. (1988) pulled together a number of scholars from 
various domains of the behavioral sciences in an attempt to broaden the perspective 
among researchers in the CV community. Harris et al. (1989) similarly called for more 
multidisciplinary studies and attention to social psychological issues relevant to CVM, 
such as limitations of information-processing and judgement-making abilities among 
humans. At approximately the same time, Mitchell and Carson (1989) provided a state- 
of-the-art account of the current CV research, adopting the basic view that the 
assessment of hypothetical economic values was indeed meaningful, fundamentally 
possible, and without any major problems. By and large, the role of factors traditionally 
viewed as outside the field of economics were downplayed, and the feeling was that it 
was now more of a matter of fine-tuning the methodology to correct for problems such 
as strategic behaviour, measurement bias, sampling and aggregation issues, etc. Judging 
on the basis of the character and objectives of mainstream research conducted up to the 
present date, it appears that the latter perspective has won significantly more ground.
The present research stresses the importance of establishing a research agenda that 
focuses on people’s understanding and interpretation of CV scenarios. Attempts at 
valuing environmental resources should first be subject to content validity before
102 Yet another issue that needs to be addressed in CV research is how well assessed values are 
representative for the general public. Given the low response rates in CV studies, a problem arises if 
only environmentally concerned or interested people are taking part in these. CV practitioners are 
therefore recommended to be more attentive to concepts and procedures in other fields o f political 
science that place emphasis on such aspects.
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moving onto other aspects of validity. The problem should in this respect dictate the 
methodology rather than the other way around. Many CV researchers would probably 
argue that the correspondence between revealed and stated preferences, in addition to 
how well hypothetical WTP predicts real economic commitments, are the most 
fundamental criteria of whether the CVM measures economic value with accuracy. 
Without denying the importance of these aspects, revealed preferences only reflect use 
values and are therefore not readily comparable with stated preferences, the latter which 
are also assumed to capture passive use values and non-use values. Moreover, real WTP 
as measured in experimental contexts may not always properly reflect how people 
would act in a real-world context, partly because certain motives become more salient in 
these, partly because monetary trade-offs generally are small.
The most fundamental requirement in order to move beyond technical inquires of 
measurement bias, statistical analysis, elicitation formats, calibration of estimated 
values, aggregation issues, etc., is to integrate economics with other disciplines, most 
notably psychology, sociology and decision-sciences. The extent to which this has 
happened is not great, but I believe there is a clear value in broadening the participation 
to include more diverse methods, backgrounds, and objectives of research. Although 
there are examples that endorse other than purely economic interests and procedures 
(e.g., Bjomstad and Kahn, 1996), these attempts are destined to be insufficient since, 
again, they arise from an eagerness to explain more specific anomalies and outcomes. In 
this sense there is a lack of interest in theory-testing among CV practitioners, in 
deference to the practical aim of estimating the value of particular environmental 
amenities. The rarity of genuine interdisciplinary approaches to understanding the 
fundamentals of economic value-expressions in hypothetical market scenarios is best 
reflected by Boulding and Lundstedt (1988);
... economics and psychology ... are continents o f the mind separated by a very wide ocean, 
no doubt produced by academic continental drift. Furthermore, they seem to be continents 
without any good harbors. ... It is a fundamental principle o f economics that specialization 
without trade is worthless. Unfortunately, in the continents of the mind, specialization seems 
to feed on itself, and there are large, invisible tariff barriers against the interchange of ideas 
(p.21).
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One suspects that CV practitioners are not particularly congenial to adapting to 
psychological insights because these may be seen as suggesting, due to all the involved 
problems of human-decision making, that there would be not much of an idea to 
continue with the endeavour of assessing monetary values of environmental resources. 
However, much psychological research shows that there are patterns of decision-making 
and behaviour that are not the result of human ignorance, but of human intelligence, 
reflecting its limitations as well as its strength. Rather than dismissing alternative 
explanations, I believe there is a lot to learn from these in order to develop an 
understanding of the limits and possibilities of environmental valuation. Instead of 
spending too much time in quantifying environmental values suitable for mechanical 
aggregation, more attention should be diverted towards the fundamental problems of the 
underlying value construct. Methodological approaches in social psychology, which by 
tradition are much more concerned with how well methodologies measure the 
theoretical construct they are aimed to measure, would also prove vital in attempts to 
improve specific environmental valuation techniques. A constructive dialogue between 
researchers from different disciplines should, I believe, result in a more enlightened 
debate that extends beyond the narrow dogmatism that has too frequently characterised 
CV research over the last decade.
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SURVEY OF ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES
My name is Henrik Svedsater and I am a research student at the London School of Economics. In this 
survey I am going to ask some questions about your opinions on various environmental issues which our 
society is facing today.
Please note that I am interested in your opinions; other people may think differently about the questions I 
am going to ask, but there are no right or wrong answers in this respect. Your answers will be treated in 
confidence and not shown to anyone outside the research team The questionnaire consists o f 17 questions 
and takes no more than 10 minutes to complete.
As thanks for your participation, there will be a lottery of £ 30 among all who hand in the survey. In case 
you want to take part in this lottery, please write down your place of residence and room number on the 
top of this page. The winner will be notified on Wednesday 26/11.
Thank you beforehand for your cooperation!
And good luck in the lottery!
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INTRODUCTION
Environmental pollution and the exploitation of natural resources are indeed important problems that our 
society is facing today, and most people would probably argue that these should be put high on the 
political agenda. However, solving all environmental problems at once is neither possible, nor perhaps 
desirable. Rather, we need to make priorities and allocate our public and private budgets to those 
environmental issues we find most important.
SECTION A: WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS103
One way of deciding on what are environmental priorities is to ask people for their willingness to pay for 
solving various environmental problems, either through higher taxes, voluntary donations or higher prices 
for various products. I am interested in how much the environmental improvements in the list below 
are worth to you. I want you to consider your maximum willingness to pay for each of these, given that 
the proposed interventions will be carried through successfully.
The willingness to pay involves an annual voluntary contribution. Before answering any question in 
this section, please read through the whole list of issues. Try also to consider your current household 
income, expenses and possible future use of your income when making an assessment.
Think carefully about each issue and try to give your best answer!
1. Preservation of the rain forest in Bolivia. Rain forests contain the largest number of habitats and 
are therefore a source of much irreplaceable material for medicine, industry and agriculture. The 
main causes of deforestation are timber exploitation and conversion of forests into grazing land 
and agriculture. In order to stop this, international initiatives have been taken to establish national 
reserves throughout the country, implying a sustainable use of the rain forest. The results will be 
that the current deforestation rate of 50,000 ha annually is prevented.
My willingness to pay fo r  this environmental improvement is £ .....................
103 Variations of scope between sub-samples are presented in a later section.
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2. Saving of the endangered African elephant. This animal is threatened by extinction due to 
illegal ivory hunting and the exploitation of important habitats and breeding grounds. The 
foundation of an international wildlife fund, the establishment o f game parks and stricter hunting 
laws will entail its survival.
My willingness to pay fo r  this environmental improvement is £ .....................
3. An improvement of the air-quality in the London area, by imposing stricter emission controls 
and subsidising more environmentally friendly fuels. High concentration of substances such as 
carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, sulphur dioxide, lead and black smoke, reduce plant growth, 
cause visible damage to sensible crops and add to acid deposition (acid rain). Moreover, they are 
toxic for humans, and high concentrations or acute exposure might cause breathing problems.
My willingness to pay fo r  this environmental improvement is..... £ ....................
4. A reduction of 20% in the gases that give rise to global warming. The emission of greenhouse 
gases give rise to global warming, and to stop this we need to be more efficient in the way we use 
energy for heating, transport and industry. The effects of global warming is somewhat uncertain, 
but it is believed that some areas will get too hot, leading to that some types o f agriculture will no 
longer be possible. There are also considerable risks of rising sea-level and the frequency of 
droughts, tropical storms and other unexpected changes to the climate.
My willingness to pay fo r  this environmental improvement is £ .....................
SECTION B: FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS
In this section I would like to ask you about the questions you have answered in the above. Specifically, I 
am interested in how difficult it was for you to make these assessments, how confident you are with your 
answers and what kind of considerations you paid attention to.
5. Overall, how difficult did you find it to make the □  Very difficult
assessments in section A? □  Rather difficult
□  Rather easy 
I I No problems really
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6. Regardless of how difficult or easy the task in 
section A might be, people can be more or less 
confident about their ability to make these 
assessments. Overall, how confident are you 
of your answers in section A?
□  Very confident 
I I Rather confident
I I Rather uncertain
I I Very uncertain
I I I  basically just guessed
Please comment i f  you care to
7. Among the issues, for which one are you least confident with your answer, and for which one are 
you most confident? (please indicate by question number)
The one I  am least confident about is question number..........................
The one I  am most confident about is question number ..........
8. What considerations) did you pay attention to when making your assessments? Please think for a 
moment and tick the three most important reasons for your assessments. Could you also briefly 
describe below how you come up with your answers in section A?
How much I  personally care about the issues I I
The seriousness and extent o f  each problem I I
What I  can afford to pay I I
What other people would pay (a fair share) I I
Consideration o f  how many other environmental issues that need support Q
I  want to fee l that I  contribute something to the environment □
My belief that the improvement actually will be carried through successfully [I]
What the likely costs fo r  the intervention will be □
To what extent Ifee l responsible fo r solving the problem I I
Consideration o f  how many people might contribute to the issue Q]
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9. What motivated your answers? Please think carefully and tick the appropriate box(es).
Self interest, including own family
In the interest o f  society □
In the interest o f  future generations □
Non human interests (i.e. concern fo r  plants and animals) □
10. Could you please add up (in rough figures) the total amount you have agreed to support all 
environmental issues in this survey with, and then indicate below from which of your “private 
accounts” you would take this amount, keeping in mind that the WTP involves an annual fee.
Rent /  living expenses □
Travel expenses □
Clothes □
Entertainment (cinema, theatre, sports etc.) □
Specific hobby that I  am spending money on □
Savings □
Other type o f  spending □
11. When you have considered from where you should get the money, are you still willing to make the 
same total contribution for the environmental issues involved in this survey?
No, la m  willing to reduce my contribution substantially □
No, I  am willing to reduce my contribution slightly □
Yes, I  am willing to keep it the same □
SECTION C: QUESTIONS ABOUT YOURSELF
As a last section I would like to ask you a few questions about yourself. These are raised in order to 
classify people into different groups according to some key characteristics.
12. Are you Q  Male
□  Female
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13. How old are you? (please state age, not birthdate) ..............  years
14. Which country do you come from? ....................................................
15. For how long time have you been living in England? ..............  years
16. What is your main subject at the university? .....................................
17. What is your total income per year before taxes? £ ........................
number of dependants of this income ................  persons
Thank you very much for your cooperation! 
It will be very valuable for me.
per year
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VARIATIONS OF SCOPE: ALTERNATIVE 1
1. Preservation of the rain forest in South America. Rain forests contain the largest number of 
habitats and are therefore a source of much irreplaceable material for medicine, industry and 
agriculture. The main causes of deforestation are timber exploitation and conversion of forests into 
grazing land and agriculture. In order to stop this, international initiatives have been taken to 
establish national reserves throughout the continent, implying a sustainable use of the rain forest. 
The results will be that the current deforestation rate of 2 million ha annually is prevented.
My willingness to pay fo r this environmental improvement is £ .....................
2. Saving of the most endangered mammals in the world, including the Sumatran rhino, the 
pygmy chimpanzee, the African elephant, the koala and the Siberian tiger. All these animals are 
currently on the verge of extinction due to illegal hunting and the exploitation of important habitats 
and breeding grounds. The foundation of an international wildlife fund, the establishment of game 
parks and stricter hunting laws will entail their survival.
My willingness to pay fo r  this environmental improvement is £ ....................
3. An improvement of the air-quality in the London area, by imposing stricter emission controls 
and subsidising more environmentally friendly fuels. High concentration of substances such as 
carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, sulphur dioxide, lead and black smoke, reduce plant growth, 
cause visible damage to sensible crops and add to acid deposition (acid rain). Moreover, they are 
toxic for humans, and high concentrations or acute exposure might cause breathing problems.
My willingness to pay fo r  this environmental improvement is £ .....................
4. A reduction of 20% in the gases that give rise to global warming. The emission of greenhouse 
gases give rise to global warming, and to stop this we need to be more efficient in the way we use 
energy for heating, transport and industry. The effects of global warming is somewhat uncertain, 
but it is believed that some areas will get too hot, leading to that some types of agriculture will no 
longer be possible. There are also considerable risks of rising sea-level and the frequency of 
droughts, tropical storms and other unexpected changes to the climate.
My willingness to pay fo r  this environmental improvement is £ ....................
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VARIATIONS OF SCOPE: ALTERNATIVE 2
1. Preservation of the rain forest in Bolivia. Rain forests contain the largest number of habitats and 
are therefore a source of much irreplaceable material for medicine, industry and agriculture. The 
main causes o f deforestation are timber exploitation and conversion of forests into grazing land 
and agriculture. In order to stop this, international initiatives have been taken to establish national 
reserves throughout the country, implying a sustainable use of the rain forest. The results will be 
that the current deforestation rate of 50,000 ha annually is prevented.
My willingness to pay fo r  this environmental improvement is £ .....................
2. Saving of the endangered African elephant. This animal is threatened by extinction due to 
illegal ivory hunting and the exploitation of important habitats and breeding grounds. The 
foundation o f an international wildlife fund, the establishment o f game parks and stricter hunting 
laws will entail its survival.
My willingness to pay fo r  this environmental improvement is £ .....................
3. A major improvement of the air-quality in the London area, by imposing stricter emission 
controls and subsidising more environmentally friendly fuels. High concentration of substances 
such as carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, sulphur dioxide, lead and black smoke, reduce plant 
growth, cause visible damage to sensible crops and add to acid deposition (acid rain). Moreover, 
they are toxic for humans, and high concentrations or acute exposure might cause breathing 
problems.
My willingness to pay fo r this environmental improvement is £ .....................
4. A reduction of 60% in the gases that give rise to global warming. The emission of greenhouse 
gases give rise to global warming, and to stop this we need to be more efficient in the way we use 
energy for heating, transport and industry. The effects of global warming is somewhat uncertain, 
but it is believed that some areas will get too hot, leading to that some types of agriculture will no 
longer be possible. There are also considerable risks of rising sea-level and the frequency of 
droughts, tropical storms and other unexpected changes to the climate.
My willingness to pay fo r this environmental improvement is £ .....................
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Appendix B. Design of Interviews and Focus-Groups Chapter 5
‘Think-Aloud’ Interviews 
INTRODUCTION
In this interview I am going to ask you some questions that relate to the natural environment. Specifically 
we are going to discuss one particular environmental issue that our society is facing today. However, 
before we come to this I will ask you some general questions about the environment and also present 
some background information for the forthcoming task.
It is important for me to hear what you think. Try not to hit on what other people would say, or what 
might be an "acceptable" answer. There are no "right" or "wrong" answers in this respect. Your answers 
will be treated in confidence and will not be shown to anyone outside the research team
Do you have any questions?
1. The natural environment is a rather broad issue which encompasses many different topics and 
areas. Could you please describe what first comes to mind when thinking about environmental 
degradation? Are these major problems?
VALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES
Environmental pollution and the degradation of natural resources are indeed important problems that our 
society is facing today, and there is a widespread concern that these issues should be put high on the 
political agenda. However, solving all environmental problems at once is neither possible, nor perhaps 
desirable. Rather, we need to make priorities and allocate our public and private budgets to those issues 
we find most important.
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One way of deciding on what are environmental priorities, is to ask people for their willingness to pay for 
solving various environmental problems. This could be put in the contexts of higher taxes, voluntary 
donations or higher prices for various products. Sometimes the underlying economic value is derived by 
establishing a hypothetical market associated with a particular environmental project, whereby people are 
asked to value the actual resource in monetary terms. The main rationale of these approaches is that the 
efforts and costs of solving various environmental problems ought to be compared with their benefits. 
Only when the latter (that is, the aggregated money people are willing to pay) exceed the costs will it be 
worthwile to carry out proposed preservation activities.
SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE - GLOBAL WARMING
Over the last decade there has been a concern that human activities have impact on the earth's 
atmosphere. Debates about global warming have been conveyed frequently in the media and probably few 
people are completely unaware of the issue.
2. Before proceeding I  would like to ask what you know about global warming, and could you please 
mention some effects or consequences that you believe would result?
SCENARIO DESCRIPTION
Global warming results from the emission of greenhouse gases, primarily carbon dioxides, which are bi- 
products of manufacturing, heating and transportation. The effects o f global wanning is somewhat 
uncertain, and there prevail some disagreement among involved researchers what and exactly how large 
the effects would be. However, it is believed that some areas will get too hot, leading to that some types 
of agriculture will no longer be efficient nor possible in the future. Whereas some places will get warmer, 
other will become colder, leading to changes in the liveability at different places. Due to alterations in 
global and regional temperatures, there are considerable risks of rising sea-level and the frequency of 
droughts, tropical storms and other unexpected changes to the climate. Conservation biologists are further
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concerned with the effects on biodiversity, from extinction of single populations o f highly habitat-specific 
endangered plants to the extirpation of entire species and communities. On a more broader level, these 
changes might cause yet unknown but possibly serious effects on the global eco-system.
In order to stop this we need to be more efficient in the way we use energy for heating, transport and 
industry. As a first step toward solving the problem, a treaty was signed by 38 countries in Kyoto Japan, 
agreeing to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases 7 percent below 1990 levels by the year 2012. Yet, 
there are a significant number of people, including environmental groups, climate scientists and 
governmental officials, who argue that these efforts are not sufficient and who therefore urge for much 
tougher restrictions. However, by imposing higher charges on the emission of greenhouse gases, along 
with making more use of biological fuels, various fuels and other forms o f energy will become more 
expensive. Apart from the direct effect on taxes, such measures will eventually have an impact on the 
prices of various consumer products.
Suppose now that a policy is implemented that will ensure that the emission o f greenhouse gases are 
reduced to the extent that the above problems are prevented. There has been some approximation of how 
much such a policy will cost for the average citizen in terms of higher prices and taxes, and the core 
question is if  people are prepared to pay this. I would therefore like to know how much such initiatives 
are worth to you.
THINK-ALOUD
Before coming to the next question, I want to inform you that one important purpose of this research is to 
find out what people are thinking when answering questions about environmental values. Therefore I am 
asking you to think-aloud while you are working on the question given below. By think-aloud I am 
simply interested in everything that you are thinking, from the moment you have read or heard the 
question until you give me an answer you are satisfied with. In this process it is important that you do not 
plan what to say, nor do you have to explain what you are saying unless probed to do so. Just speak out 
loud what comes to mind. If you are silent for some time I will remind you to continue talking.
An example is the following mathematical problem: What is the result o f  11 times 14?
Do you understand this procedure?
The willingness to pay involves an annual payment. It is conditioned by the fact that the proposed 
intervention is carried through successfully. Try to consider your current household income, expenses and 
possible future use of your income before making an assessment. Think carefully about the issue and try 
to give your best answer. Remember to tell me what you are thinking while answering the question!
235
APPENDICES
3. How much would the proposed intervention has to cost you before you would vote no to this? To 
put it differently, what is your annual maximum willingness to pay fo r  this environmental 
improvement in terms o f  higher prices and taxes?
The maximum amount I  am willing to pay is £   annually
FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS
In this section I would like to ask you about the question you have answered in the above.
4. Firstly, how do you feel about being presented with the procedure above? Do you think it is 
sensible or appropriate to base policy decisions on a similar basis, that is, how much citizens 
value similar problems in economic terms? Explain why or why not, and tell what you think about 
the issue o f  responsibility related to the problem.
5. It might indeed be difficult to state an exact sum in an inquiry like this. How confident are you 
about the amount you have agreed to contribute? Please indicate your willingness to pay on the 
line below, and use this when indicating within which range your contribution most likely will fall: 
(i.e., how precise is your amount?)
I  am rather confident that I  would pay at least £ .....................
I  am rather confident that I  would not pay more than......£ .....................
0 1 5 10 25 50 100 1000
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6. To what extent do you believe that you will actually pay, or being required to pay, the amount you 
were asked in this survey? Put in other words, how credible or realistic do you perceive a 
procedure like this? (compare to an auction fo r  instance)
7. Listed below are a number o f  selected issues that need public resources. Please rank the 5 most 
importance o f  these, implicitly stating which ones are in most need o f  public support. Imagine that 
you are in charge o f  policy decisions, and your current task is to allocate money to the following 
issues. Indicate the most important with "1" and so on.
Air pollution in cities □
Climate change □
Drinking water quality and reliability □
Ozone depletion □
Radioactivity and nuclear waste I I
Rain forest destruction □
Reduction in the availability and quality o f  wildlife and natural parks l~~l
Soil erosion □
The spread o f  poisonous metals and chemicals to the environment I I
Threats to seas and lakes □
8. You have listed ........ issues that you find  more important than climate change. Would you hereby
say that you are willing to pay at least as much fo r  each o f  these, or does this make you rather 
uncertain about your stated amount? Please comment on this, and tell me i f  you had a more 
general picture o f  environmental problems when figuring out your willingness to pay.
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Finally, what do you perceive the effects o f  global warming in the future will be on:
None Very small Small Moderate Large Very large
Your own quality o f  life □ □ □ □ □ □
The consequences fo r society □ □ □ □ □ □
The consequences fo r  animals, □ □ □ □ □ □
plants, and eco-systems
Thank you very much for your co-operation. It will be very valuable for me!
APPENDICES
Focus-Groups
INTRODUCTION
In this interview I am going to ask you some questions that relate to the natural environment. Before 
answering any questions I want you to discuss the questions with each other. It is important that everyone 
in the group participate in this and are active in arriving at an answer. If you are silent for a longer time I 
might ask you about your opinion.
Specifically we are going to discuss one particular environmental issue that our society is facing today. 
However, before coming to this I will ask you some general questions about the environment and also 
present some background information for the forthcoming task.
Do you have any questions?
1. The natural environment is a very broad issue which covers many different concepts and areas. 
Could you please discuss and describe what first comes to mind when thinking about 
environmental degradation?
2. Are these major problems? Is it possible to solve them? Do you think people, politicians, and/or 
industries have the will to solve these problems? Why or why not?
VALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES
Environmental pollution and the degradation of natural resources are indeed important problems that our 
society is facing today, and there is a widespread concern that these issues should be put high on the 
political agenda. However, solving all environmental problems at once is neither possible, nor perhaps 
desirable. Rather, we need to make priorities and allocate our public and private budgets to those issues 
we find most important.
One way of deciding on what are environmental priorities, is to ask people for their willingness to pay for 
solving various environmental problems. This could be put in the contexts of higher taxes, voluntary 
donations or higher prices for various products. Sometimes the underlying economic value is derived by 
establishing a hypothetical market associated with a particular environmental project, whereby people are 
asked to value the actual resource in monetary terms. The main rationale of these approaches is that the 
efforts and costs of solving various environmental problems ought to be compared with their benefits.
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Only when the latter (that is, the aggregated money people are willing to pay) exceed the costs will it be 
worthwile to carry out proposed preservation activities.
SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE - GLOBAL WARMING
Global wanning, or climate change, results from the emission of greenhouse gases, primarily carbon 
dioxides, which are bi-products of manufacturing, heating and transportation. The effects of global 
wanning is somewhat uncertain, and there prevail some disagreement among involved researchers what 
and exactly how large the effects would be. However, it is believed that some areas will get too hot, 
leading to that some types of agriculture will no longer be efficient nor possible in the future. Whereas 
some places will get warmer, other will become colder, leading to changes in the liveability at different 
places. Due to alterations in global and regional temperatures, there are considerable risks of rising sea- 
level and the frequency of droughts, tropical storms and other unexpected changes to the climate. 
Conservation biologists are further concerned with the effects on biodiversity, from extinction of single 
populations of highly habitat-specific endangered plants to the extirpation of entire species and 
communities. On a more broader level, these changes might cause yet unknown but possibly serious 
effects on the global eco-system.
In order to stop this we need to be more efficient in the way we use energy for heating, transport and 
industry. As a first step toward solving the problem, a treaty was signed by 38 countries in Kyoto Japan, 
agreeing to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases 7 percent below 1990 levels by the year 2012. Yet, 
there are a significant number of people, including environmental groups, climate scientists and 
governmental officials, who argue that these efforts are not sufficient and who therefore urge for much 
tougher restrictions. However, by imposing higher charges on the emission of greenhouse gases, along 
with making more use of biological fuels, various fuels and other forms of energy will become more 
expensive. Apart from the direct effect on taxes, such measures will eventually have an impact on the 
prices of various consumer products.
Suppose now that a policy is implemented that will ensure that the emission of greenhouse gases are 
reduced to the extent that the above problems are prevented. There has been some approximation of how 
much such a policy will cost for the average citizen in terms of higher prices and taxes, and the core 
question is if  people are prepared to pay this. I would therefore like to know how much such initiatives 
are worth to you, that is, how much you are willing to pay for these.
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The willingness to pay involves an annual payment. It is conditioned by the fact that the proposed 
intervention is carried through succesfully. Try to consider your current household income, expenses and 
possible future use of your income before making an assessment. Think carefully about the issue and try 
to give your best answer.
The willingness to pay ought to reflect what you as individuals think it is worth, not what the group in 
aggregate are willing or could afford to pay. You do not necessarily have to agree on a specific amount! 
The important thin is that you discuss with each other how you approach the task of assigning an
economic value to this issue (i.e., reasons, considerations, motivations, etc.)!
3. How much would the proposed intervention has to cost you before you would vote no to this? To 
put it differently, what is your annual maximum willingness to pay fo r this environmental 
improvement in terms o f  higher prices and taxes?
The maximum amount I  am willing to pay is £ ....................................................... . annually
FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS
In this section I would like to ask you about the question you have answered in the above.
4. Firstly, how do you feel about being presented with the procedure above? Do you think it is
sensible or appropriate to base policy decisions on a similar basis, that is, how much citizens value 
similar problems in monetary terms? Explain why or why not, and tell what you think about the 
issue o f responsibility related to the problem.
5. It might indeed be difficult to state an exact sum in an inquiry like this. How confident are you 
about the amount you have agreed to contribute? Please indicate your willingness to pay on the 
line below, and use this when indicating within which range your contribution most likely will fall: 
(i.e., how precise is your amount?)
I  am rather confident that I  would pay at least £ .......................
I  am rather confident that I  would not pay more than £ ......................
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6. To what extent do you believe that you will actually pay, or being required to pay, the amount you 
were asked in this survey? Put in other words, how credible or realistic do you perceive a 
procedure like this? (compare to an auction fo r  instance)
7. Some o f  you have listed several issues that you find  more important than climate change. Would
you hereby say that you are willing to pay at least as much fo r  each o f  these, or does th is make 
you rather uncertain about your stated amount? Please comment on this. Did you have a more 
general picture o f  environmental problems when figuring out your willingness to pay.
8. Finally, what do you perceive the effects ofglobal warming in the future will be on:
None Very small Small Moderate Large Very large
Your own quality o f  life □ □ □ □ □ □
The consequences fo r  society □ □ □ □ □ □
The consequences fo r animals, 
plants, and eco-systems
□ □ □ □ □ □
Thank you very much for your co-operation. It will be very valuable for me!
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Appendix C. Design of Experiment Chapter 6
Open-Ended Valuation Format 
INTRODUCTION104
You are about to participate in a study about environmental policy issues. Please follow the written and 
verbal instructions carefully. The questionnaire is separated into two sections; first you will be asked 
some questions about yourself, and then follows some questions related to a particular environmental 
issue. We would like to remind you that your responses are confidential. Your name will not be 
associated with the answers that you provide.
QUESTIONS ABOUT YOURSELF
1. Are you  □  Male
□  Female
2. How old are you?   years
3. What is your nationality? .....................................................
4. What course are you studying at the LSE? Please state B.Sc., M.Sc., or MBA.
5. Could you please estimate the disposable amount o f  money you have each month, including 
grants, loans, income from part-time jobs, savings, etc.
£ .................... month
6. Do you have any children ? □  Yes
□  No
104 The introductory part of the questionnaire is the same across all four valuation formats.
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7. Are you currently a member o f any environmental organisation? □  Yes
□  No
ECONOMIC VALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES
In the following you will be asked how much you would be willing to pay to prevent an environmental 
problem that our society is facing today. More specifically, the study is focused on saving the African 
elephant, which is an endangered wild animal. Please read the text below carefully before answering the 
forthcoming questions.
SCENARIO DESCRIPTION -  MEASURES TO SAVE THE AFRICAN ELEPHANT
The long-term survival of the African Elephant is cause of great concern. The number of elephants has 
fallen drastically during the second half of last century. In 1979, there was an estimated 1.3 million 
elephants in Africa, but by 1995 this figure had shrunk to around 400000. Part of the decline is due to the 
availability o f new dry-land adapted crop strains, with the consequence that former elephant rangelands 
are now being cultivated. Furthermore, in forest areas the impact of major logging programmes is opening 
up and destroying elephant habitat. Apart from such widespread changes in the extent and pattern of land 
use, a major cause of the decline is poaching to satisfy demand for ivory and recreational illegal hunting.
8. What did you previously know about this problem ?
□  I  knew that the African elephant was a threatened animal
□  I  have heard about the problem but did not know much about it
I I I  did not know that the African elephant was a threatened animal
As a consequence, approaches are needed to stop the decline in the number of elephants. Apart from 
traditional anti-poaching efforts and the elimination o f market demand for ivory products, it is essential to 
ensure the survival of the remaining species. The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) is the major actor in this 
field. It is currently running a campaign by setting up and managing reserves in order to protect wild 
elephants. Experience has shown that local involvement is important in these attempts, such as 
community based management, whereby landowners share both responsibility for and benefits accrued 
from elephants.
However successful these conservation approaches may be, they bear significant costs, and as the 
economic situation in many third world countries continues to decline, wildlife departments and local
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communities are suffering significant budget cuts. This makes international support for elephant 
conservation more important than ever. In this study we are interested to know how much the efforts to 
save the elephants are worth to you. More specifically, we would like to know how much you are willing 
to pay, as a yearly contribution, to support the WWF campaign.
In the question below we want you to state how much you are of willing to pay as a contribution to the 
WWF campaign for saving the elephants. The willingness to pay is an annual payment. Take your time 
and try to consider the following before answering:
• your income and/or grants
• your current expenses
• your possible future use o f  your income
9. My maximum willingness to pay fo r  saving the African Elephant is £ .................... yearly
FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS
10. Please state the most important reason fo r the amount that you have agreed to pay. Tick one 
option only.
□  It is what saving the African elephant is worth to me 
I I I  cannot afford to pay more
□  Based on the average contribution, I  think this will be sufficient to cover the costs
□  I  believe this is a fa ir amount given my own responsibility o f  the problem
□  I  believe this is a reasonable amount considering what other people would pay
□  Other consideration(s) ..............................................................................................................
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To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:
"People have to make choices between environmental issues and economic development ”
Strongly agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly disagree
□ □ □ □ □
‘To make decisions and priorities about this and other similar environmental problems 
on the basis o f  citizens' willingness to pay is an appropriate and sensible approach ”
Strongly agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly disagree
□ □ □ □ □
Please comment how valuable it would i f  you were given the opportunity to state your opinion on 
the basis o f  several aspects (such as importance o f  problem, its personal worth to you, 
responsibility o f  problem, how much you could afford to pay, etc.), rather than expressing a single 
value that is supposed to capture all these aspects.
Please comment regarding how valuable it would be to have time to think about the issue before 
developing an opinion and decide on your willingness to pay.
Thank you for participating in this study. Your responses will be very valuable!
APPENDICES
Standard Polychotomous Valuation Format 
ECONOMIC VALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES
In the following you will be asked how much you would be willing to pay to prevent an environmental 
problem that our society is facing today. More specifically, the study is focused on saving the African 
elephant, which is an endangered wild animal. Please read the text below carefully before answering the 
forthcoming questions.
SCENARIO DESCRIPTION -  MEASURES TO SAVE THE AFRICAN ELEPHANT
The long-term survival of the African Elephant is cause of great concern. The number of elephants has 
fallen drastically during the second half of last century. In 1979, there was an estimated 1.3 million 
elephants in Africa, but by 1995 this figure had shrunk to around 400000. Part of the decline is due to the 
availability o f new dry-land adapted crop strains, with the consequence that former elephant rangelands 
are now being cultivated. Furthermore, in forest areas the impact of major logging programmes is opening 
up and destroying elephant habitat. Apart from such widespread changes in the extent and pattern of land 
use, a major cause of the decline is poaching to satisfy demand for ivory and recreational illegal hunting.
8. What did you previously know about this problem ?
□  I  knew that the African elephant was a threatened animal 
I I I  have heard about the problem but did not know much about it 
I I I  did not know that the African elephant was a threatened animal
As a consequence, approaches are needed to stop the decline in the number of elephants. Apart from 
traditional anti-poaching efforts and the elimination of market demand for ivory products, it is essential to 
ensure the survival o f the remaining species. The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) is the major actor in this 
field. It is currently running a campaign by setting up and managing reserves in order to protect wild 
elephants. Experience has shown that local involvement is important in these attempts, such as 
community based management, whereby landowners share both responsibility for and benefits accrued 
from elephants.
However successful these conservation approaches may be, they bear significant costs, and as the
economic situation in many third world countries continues to decline, wildlife depac[ments and local
communities are suffering significant budget cuts. This makes international support for elephant
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conservation more important than ever. In this study we are interested to know how much the efforts to
save the elephants are worth to you. More specifically, we would like to know how much you are willing
to pay, as a yearly contribution, to support the WWF campaign.
In the table below you are presented with 12 different amounts. We want you to state how sure you are of 
paying each of these as a contribution to the WWF campaign for saving the elephants. Please tick the 
appropriate box for each suggested amount. The willingness to pay is an annual payment. Take your time 
and try to consider the following before answering:
• your income and/or grants
• your current expenses
• your possible future use o f  your income
£2 £5 £7 £10 £15 £20 £30 £50 £100 £200 £400
I am definitely sure that I will pay
I am almost certain (90% sure) that I will pay
I am rather certain (75% sure) that I will pay
It is equally likely (50% sure) that I will pay
I am rather certain (75% sure) that I will not pay
I am almost certain (90% sure) that I will not pay
I am definitely sure that I will not pay
9. Please state exactly the amount you are almost certain (90% sure) o f  paying. The amount should 
be less or equal to what you are rather certain (75% sure) o f  paying, but equal or more than what 
you are definitely willing to pay.
I  am almost certain (90% sure) I  would pay £ ...................... to the WWF campaign
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FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS
10. Please state the most important reason fo r the amount that you have agreed to pay. Tick one 
option only.
I I It is what saving the African elephant is worth to me 
I I I  cannot afford to pay more
□  Based on the average contribution, I  think this will be sufficient to cover the costs
□  I  believe this is a fa ir amount given my own responsibility o f  the problem
I I I  believe this is a reasonable amount considering what other people would pay
f~1 Other consideration(s) ..............................................................................................................
11. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:
“People have to make choices between environmental issues and economic development"
Strongly agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly disagree
□ □ □ □ □
“To make decisions and priorities about this and other similar environmental problems 
on the basis o f  citizens' willingness to pay is an appropriate and sensible approach ”
Strongly agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly disagree
□ □ □ □ □
12. Please comment how valuable it would i f  you were given the opportunity to state your opinion on 
the basis o f  several aspects (such as importance o f  problem, its personal worth to you, 
responsibility o f  problem, how much you could afford to pay, etc.), rather than expressing a single 
value that is supposed to capture all these aspects.
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Please comment regarding how valuable it would be to have time to think about the issue before 
developing an opinion and decide on your willingness to pay.
Thank you for participating in this study. Your responses will be very valuable!
APPENDICES
Polychotomous Multi-Attribute Valuation Format 
ECONOMIC VALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES
In the following you will be asked how much you would be willing to pay to prevent an environmental 
problem that our society is facing today. More specifically, the study is focused on saving the African 
elephant, which is an endangered wild animal. Please read the text below carefully before answering the 
forthcoming questions.
SCENARIO DESCRIPTION -  MEASURES TO SAVE THE AFRICAN ELEPHANT
The long-term survival of the African Elephant is cause of great concern. The number of elephants has 
fallen drastically during the second half of last century. In 1979, there was an estimated 1.3 million 
elephants in Africa, but by 1995 this figure had shrunk to around 400000. Part of the decline is due to the 
availability of new dry-land adapted crop strains, with the consequence that former elephant rangelands 
are now being cultivated. Furthermore, in forest areas the impact of major logging programmes is opening 
up and destroying elephant habitat. Apart from such widespread changes in the extent and pattern of land 
use, a major cause of the decline is poaching to satisfy demand for ivory and recreational illegal hunting.
8. What did you previously know about this problem ?
I I I  knew that the African elephant was a threatened animal 
I I I  have heard about the problem but did not know much about it 
□  I  did not know that the African elephant was a threatened animal
As a consequence, approaches are needed to stop the decline in the number of elephants. Apart from 
traditional anti-poaching efforts and the elimination of market demand for ivory products, it is essential to 
ensure the survival of the remaining species. The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) is the major actor in this 
field. It is currently running a campaign by setting up and managing reserves in order to protect wild 
elephants. Experience has shown that local involvement is important in these attempts, such as 
community based management, whereby landowners share both responsibility for and benefits accrued 
from elephants.
However successful these conservation approaches may be, they bear significant costs, and as the
economic situation in many third world countries continues to decline, wildlife departments and local
communities are suffering significant budget cuts. This makes international support for elephant
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conservation more important than ever. In this study we are interested to know how much the efforts to
save the elephants are worth to you. More specifically, we would like to know how much you are willing
to pay, as a yearly contribution, to support the WWF campaign.
Before coming to this question, however, we would like you to consider a number of aspects of the WWF 
campaign. The reason for presenting you with the items below is so you could refine your opinion, rather 
than expressing this on a single monetary scale. Thus, you will be given the opportunity to state more 
precisely what you think about the issue and the proposed intervention. For instance, it may be worth a lot 
to you, but you may still be reluctant to pay if you do not believe in the campaign will be effective, or 
believe it is not really your responsibility since you have not contributed to the problem.
To save the African Elephant is worth something to me □ Agree
□ Disagree
To save the African Elephant is an important issue □ Agree
□ Disagree
I  cannot afford to pay too much fo r this issue □ Agree
□ Disagree
I  do not believe the particular campaign suggested □ Agree
will be efficient in saving the African Elephant □ Disagree
I  do not think this lies within my responsibility. □ Agree
Poachers and other responsible parties should pay □ Disagree
There are other environmental issues that are □ Agree
more important and to which I  rather contribute □ Disagree
Although being worth a lot to me, I  do not think it □ Agree
is appropriate to base policies on the public’s WTP □ Disagree
In the table below you are presented with 12 different amounts. Given your opinion above, we want you 
to state how sure you are of paying each of these as a contribution to the WWF campaign for saving the 
elephants. Please tick the appropriate box for each suggested amount. The willingness to pay is an annual 
payment. Take your time and try to consider the following before answering:
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• your income and/or grants
• your current expenses
• your possible future use ofyour income
£2 £5 £7 £10 £15 £20 £30 £50 £100 £200 £400
I am definitely sure that I will pay
I am almost certain (90% sure) that I will pay
I am rather certain (75% sure) that I will pay
It is equally likely (50% sure) that I will pay
I am rather certain (75% sure) that I will not pay
I am almost certain (90% sure) that I will not pay
I am definitely sure that I will not pay
10. Please state exactly the amount you are almost certain (90% sure) o f  paying. The amount should 
be less or equal to what you are rather certain (75% sure) o f  paying, but equal or more than what 
you are definitely willing to pay.
I  am almost certain (90% sure) I  would pay £ .......................  to the WWF campaign
FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS
11. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:
"People have to make choices between environmental issues and economic development"
Strongly agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly disagree
□ □ □ □ □
"To make decisions and priorities about this and other similar environmental problems 
on the basis o f  citizens ’ willingness to pay is an appropriate and sensible approach "
Strongly agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly disagree
□ □ □ □ □
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12. Please comment how valuable it was to state your opinion on the basis o f  several aspects (such as 
importance o f  problem, its personal worth to you, responsibility o f  problem, how much you could 
afford to pay, etc.), rather than expressing a single value that is supposed to capture all these 
aspects.
13. Please comment regarding how valuable it would be to have time to think about the issue before 
developing an opinion and decide on your willingness to pay.
Thank you for participating in this study. Your responses will be very valuable!
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Polychotomous Time To Think Valuation Format 
ECONOMIC VALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES
In the following you will be asked how much you would be willing to pay to prevent an environmental
problem that our society is facing today. More specifically, the study is focused on saving the African
elephant, which is an endangered wild animal. Please read the text below carefully before answering the 
forthcoming questions.
SCENARIO DESCRIPTION -  MEASURES TO SAVE THE AFRICAN ELEPHANT
The long-term survival of the African Elephant is cause of great concern. The number of elephants has 
fallen drastically during the second half of last century. In 1979, there was an estimated 1.3 million 
elephants in Africa, but by 1995 this figure had shrunk to around 400000. Part o f the decline is due to the 
availability o f new dry-land adapted crop strains, with the consequence that former elephant rangelands 
are now being cultivated. Furthermore, in forest areas the impact of major logging programmes is opening 
up and destroying elephant habitat. Apart from such widespread changes in the extent and pattern of land 
use, a major cause of the decline is poaching to satisfy demand for ivory and recreational illegal hunting.
8. What did you previously know about this problem ?
□  I  knew that the African elephant was a threatened animal
□  I  have heard about the problem but did not know much about it
□  I  did not know that the African elephant was a threatened animal
As a consequence, approaches are needed to stop the decline in the number of elephants. Apart from 
traditional anti-poaching efforts and the elimination of market demand for ivory products, it is essential to 
ensure the survival o f the remaining species. The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) is the major actor in this 
field. It is currently running a campaign by setting up and managing reserves in order to protect wild 
elephants. Experience has shown that local involvement is important in these attempts, such as 
community based management, whereby landowners share both responsibility for and benefits accrued 
from elephants.
However successful these conservation approaches may be, they bear significant costs, and as the
economic situation in many third world countries continues to decline, wildlife departments and local
communities are suffering significant budget cuts. This makes international support for elephant
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conservation more important than ever. In this study we are interested to know how much the efforts to
save the elephants are worth to you. More specifically, we would like to know how much you are willing
to pay, as a yearly contribution, to support the WWF campaign.
We want you to consider the question below. However, we do not want you to answer it now. Instead, 
you will be given a week or more to think about a monetary contribution to the WWF campaign. 
During this time we encourage you to discuss the environmental problem, as well as an economic 
valuation o f  this, with friends, spouse, relatives, etc. We also want you to think o f  your opinion when 
similar (environmental or public) issues are brought up in the media. Although receiving valuable 
comments from other sources, keep in mind that it is your own opinion that we are interested of.
In the table below you are presented with 12 different amounts. We want you to state how sure you are of 
paying each of these as a contribution to the WWF campaign for saving the elephants. Please tick the 
appropriate box for each suggested amount. The willingness to pay is an annual payment. Take your time 
and try to consider the following before answering:
• your income and/or grants
• your current expenses
• your possible future use o f  your income
You are free to use the table below as a guideline when thinking o f  your willingness to pay.
However, it is very important that you do not answer this or the subsequent question until we see each
other asain in a week or two!
£2 £5 £7 £10 £15 £20 £30 £50 £100 £200 £400
I am definitely sure that I will pay
I am almost certain (90% sure) that I will pay
I am rather certain (75% sure) that I will pay
It is equally likely (50% sure) that I will pay
I am rather certain (75% sure) that I will not pay
I am almost certain (90% sure) that I will not pay
I am definitely sure that I will not pay
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9. Please state exactly the amount you are almost certain (90% sure) o f  paying. The amount should
FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS -  SESSION 2
10. Please state the most important reason fo r the amount that you have agreed to pay. Tick one 
option only.
□  It is what saving the African elephant is worth to me
□  I  cannot afford to pay more
□  Based on the average contribution, I  think this will be sufficient to cover the costs
□  I  believe this is a fa ir amount given my own responsibility o f  the problem
□  I  believe this is a reasonable amount considering what other people would pay
□  Other consideration(s) ..............................................................................................................
11. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:
“People have to make choices between environmental issues and economic development”
be less or equal to what you are rather certain (75% sure) o f  paying, but equal or more than what 
you are definitely willing to pay.
I  am almost certain (90% sure) I  would pay £ to the WWF campaign
Please bring the questionnaire with you to the next session!
Strongly agree Undecided
□
Disagree Strongly disagree
□ □
To make decisions and priorities about this and other similar environmental problems 
on the basis o f  citizens ’ willingness to pay is an appropriate and sensible approach ”
Strongly agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly disagree
□ □ □ □ □
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12. Please comment how valuable it would i f  you were given the opportunity to state your opinion on 
the basis o f  several aspects (such as importance o f  problem, its personal worth to you, 
responsibility o f  problem, how much you could afford to pay, etc.), rather than expressing a single 
value that is supposed to capture all these aspects.
13. How many times and with whom did you discuss or mention your participation in this study and/or 
a contribution to the WWF fo r  saving the African Elephant (one or several persons? Note: 
mention type o f  relationship with these persons, not names.
  times with .............................................................................................................................
14. I f  yes, please comment regarding how valuable this ' feed-back ” was in order to develop an 
opinion in the matter and to figure out your contribution?
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Could you please comment regarding how valuable it was to just have time to think about the issue 
before developing an opinion and decide on your contribution?
Thank you for participating in this study. Your responses will be very valuable!
APPENDICES
Appendix D. Design of Choice Experiments Chapter 7 
Hypothetical WTP
QUESTIONNAIRE -  ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES
Thank you for participating in this study! As you may know it is focused on environmental values and 
their influence on policy decisions. However, before starting with this I would like to ask some questions 
about yourself. I would like to stress that your answers would be treated anonymuously. If you have any 
questions please ask them now.
PART A: QUESTIONS ABOUT YOURSELF
1. Are you Q  Male
a Female
2. How old are you?   years
3. Which country do you come from? ...................................................................................
4. What B.Sc., M.Sc., or MBA course are you studying at the LSE?
5. Could you please estimate the disposable amount of money you have each month, including 
grants, loans, income from part-time jobs, savings, etc.
£  ....................... month
6. Do you have any children? □  Yes
□  No
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7. Are you a member of any environmental organisation? □  Yes
□  No
8. How much do you roughly contribute to environmental organisations yearly? £ .......................
PART B: EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS
This part of the questionnaire is focused on the value people place on various aspects of the environment. 
Normally values are reflected in actual market behaviour, but since no markets generally exist for natural 
resources we need to obtain this information in some other way. One frequently used approach is to ask 
people to make hypothetical choices between different environmental issues and the amount of money 
allocated to these. The outcome will then reflect the value people place on these environmental goods and 
services.
We are in this study interested of how you would choose between two different campaigns run by the 
World Wildlife Fund (WWF). You will be presented 16 choice situations and for each choice there will 
be two alternatives to choose from. Each alternative differ with respect to the amount of:
• money given to you
• contribution to a campaign, paid by us
Both campaigns included in this study are run by the WWF in order to protect endangered wild animals. 
The contribution will, depending on your choice, be earmarked for either o f the following two wild 
animals:
a the African Elephant 
b the Green Sea Turtle
The example below illustrates a typical choice problem
Example Alternative A Alternative B
Money given to you 
Contribution to campaign 
Campaign
£10
£ 3
Rain forests
£ 5  
£12  
Coral reefs
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If you choose alternative A, you prefer the alternative where you receive £10 and where £3 is given to the 
WWF campaign for rainforests in Brazil. If you choose alternative B  you prefer instead the alternative 
where you receive £5 and where £12 is given to the WWF campaign for protecting coral reefs in East 
Africa. Hence, by choosing alternative A you receive £5 more than in alternative B, but the money given 
to a campaign is £9 larger in alternative B than in alternative A (but note that there are different 
campaigns in the alternatives A and B).
The choices are hypothetical but it is still very important that you answer them truthfully and as if 
they involved real money. Remember that the purpose of the study is to inform policy analysis. 
There are altogether 16 choices for you to make. Try to consider each of these in isolation as if that 
was the only choice you have to make. If you want you may go back and change your earlier 
answers after second thought.
Do you understand this procedure? Otherwise it is important that you let me know.
SECTION C: WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS105
As you were informed in the previous section, this kind of hypothetical study is frequently employed in 
order to estimate economic values when no markets exist. However, in the following we will establish a 
market for these goods. You will be presented similar choice situations as before, although now your 
choices will in fact determine how much money you earn in this experiment, as well as how much money 
is contributed to the campaigns. It thus involves real money. The procedure is the following:
you will again make 16pair-wise choices
afterwards one o f  these will be drawn randomly as the actual choice set
you will be paid the amount o f  money according to the alternative chosen in this particular choice 
set, whereas the contribution is paid anonymously by us to the WWF
Thus, your choices will now determine how much money you earn in this experiment, as well as 
how much money is contributed to the campaigns. If you want you may go back and change earlier 
answers after second thought.
Do you have any questions?
105 This section concerns real choices made by the respondents who previously have made hypothetical 
choices.
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Choice Experiments Real WTP 
QUESTIONNAIRE -  ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES
Thank you for participating in this study! As you may know it is focused on environmental values and 
their influence on policy decisions. However, before starting with this I would like to ask some questions 
about yourself. I would like to stress that your answers would be treated anonymuously. If you have any 
questions please ask them now.
PART A: QUESTIONS ABOUT YOURSELF
1. Are you Q  Male
I I Female
2. How old are you?   years
3. Which country do you come from? .....................................................................................
4. What B.Sc., M.Sc., or MBA course are you studying at the LSE?
5. Could you please estimate the disposable amount of money you have each month, including 
grants, loans, income from part-time jobs, savings, etc.
£   month
6. Do you have any children? □  Yes
□  No
263
APPENDICES
7. Are you a member of any environmental organisation? □  Yes
□  No
8. How much do you roughly contribute to environmental organisations yearly? £ ......................
PART B: WILLINGNESS TO PAY ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS
This part of the questionnaire is focused on the value people place on various aspects o f the environment. 
Normally values are reflected in actual market behaviour, but since no markets generally exist for natural 
resources we need to obtain this information in some other way. One frequently used approach is to ask 
people to make choices between various environmental issues and the amount of money allocated to 
these.
We are in this study interested of how you would choose between two different campaigns run by the 
World Wildlife Fund (WWF). You will be presented 16 choice situations and for each choice there will 
be two alternatives to choose from. Each alternative differ with respect to the amount of:
• money given to you
• contribution to a campaign, paid by us
Both campaigns included in this study are run by the WWF in order to protect endangered wild animals. 
The contribution will, depending on your choice, be earmarked for either of the following two wild 
animals:
a the African Elephant 
b the Green Sea Turtle
The example below illustrates a typical choice problem
Example Alternative A Alternative B
Money given to you 
Contribution to campaign 
Campaign
£10
£ 3
Rain forests
£ 5  
£12  
Coral reefs
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If you choose alternative A, you prefer the alternative where you receive £10 and where £3 is given to the 
WWF campaign for rainforests in Brazil. If you choose alternative B  you prefer instead the alternative 
where you receive £5 and where £12 is given to the WWF campaign for protecting coral reefs in East 
Africa. Hence, by choosing alternative A you receive £5 more than in alternative B, but the money given 
to a campaign is £9 larger in alternative B  than in alternative A (but note that there are different 
campaigns in the alternatives A and B).
The procedure for the experiment is the following:
you make altogether 16pair-wise choices
afterwards one o f  these will be drawn randomly as the actual choice set
you will be paid the amount o f  money according to the alternative chosen in this particular choice 
set, whereas the contribution is paid anonymously by us to the WWF
Thus, your choices will determine how much money you earn in this experiment, as well as how 
much money is contributed to the campaigns. If you want you may go back and change earlier 
answers after second thought.
Do you understand this procedure? Otherwise it is important that you let me know.
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Design of Choice Sets106
Choice number 1 Alternative A Alternative B
Money given to you 5
7
Elephant
15
0
Sea Turtle
Contribution to campaign
Campaign
Choice number 2 Alternative A Alternative B
Money given to you 15
0
Sea Turtle
10
14
Elephant
Contribution to campaign
Campaign
Choice number 3 Alternative A Alternative B
Money given to you 5
14
Elephant
10
7
Sea Turtle
Contribution to campaign
Campaign
Choice number 4 Alternative A Alternative B
Money given to you 10
21
Sea Turtle
15
14
Elephant
Contribution to campaign
Campaign
Choice number 5 Alternative A Alternative B
Money given to you 15
14
Sea Turtle
0
21
Elephant
Contribution to campaign
Campaign
106 These choice sets were presented in a different order between hypothetical and real contexts of 
valuation, and between different sub-groups of respondents.
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Choice number 6 Alternative A Alternative B
Money given to you 15
0
Elephant
5
14
Sea Turtle
Contribution to campaign
Campaign
Choice number 7 Alternative A Alternative B
Money given to you 5
21
Elephant
10
0
Sea Turtle
Contribution to campaign
Campaign
Choice number 8 Alternative A Alternative B
Money given to you 5
7
Sea Turtle
10
0
Elephant
Contribution to campaign
Campaign
Choice number 9 Alternative A Alternative B
Money given to you 10
7
Elephant
5
21
Sea Turtle
Contribution to campaign
Campaign
Choice number 10 Alternative A Alternative B
Money given to you 15
0
Elephant
10
21
Sea Turtle
Contribution to campaign
Campaign
Choice number 11 Alternative A Alternative B
Money given to you 5
14
Sea Turtle
15
7
Elephant
Contribution to campaign
Campaign
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Choice number 12 Alternative A Alternative B
Money given to you 15
7
Sea Turtle
10
21
Elephant
Contribution to campaign
Campaign
Choice number 13 Alternative A Alternative B
Money given to you 0
14
Sea Turtle
15
7
Elephant
Contribution to campaign
Campaign
Choice number 14 Alternative A Alternative B
Money given to you 5
14
Elephant
15
0
Sea Turtle
Contribution to campaign
Campaign
Choice number 15 Alternative A Alternative B
Money given to you 10
14
Sea Turtle
5
21
Elephant
Contribution to campaign
Campaign
Choice number 16 Alternative A Alternative B
Money given to you 10
14
Elephant
15
0
Sea Turtle
Contribution to campaign
Campaign
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